Jones v. State

Citations

• 8 Tex. Ct. App. 648

Syllabus

<p>1. Theft by False Pretext.—It is well settled in this State that under an ordinary indictment for theft a conviction may be had on proof which shows that the talcing was with the owner’s consent obtained by false pretext, or with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the property and appropriate it to the use and benefit of the taker. But if the indictment specifically charges a theft by false pretext, it must allege the constituent facts of the offence, and the proof must strictly correspond with the allegations,—i.e., the false pretext, the owner’s consent to the taking obtained thereby, the falsity of the pretext, the taking of the property, and the fraudulent intent.</p> <p>2. Practice. — Subject to statutory restrictions, the order and regulation of business in the trial courts is under their discretionary control, and not revisable on appeal when no prejudice to the appellant is shown. It was not error, therefore, despite objection by the defence, to proceed with a trial for theft during the postponement of a murder case until the return of an alias venire facias.</p> <p>3. Jury Law. — Bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant constitutes cause for challenge to a petit juror, and so may relationship to the injured party; but bias or prejudice in favor of or against the injured party does not.</p> <p>4. Theft — Evidence.—In the trial of a party for the theft of a horse he had hired, the defence offered in evidence certain letters written by him subsequent to the res gestee, and asserting that the horse had been taken from him by desperadoes, etc. Held, that the letters were properly excluded.</p>