Jones v. Rees

Citations

• 22 Del. 504
• 6 Penne. 504
• 69 A. 785
• 1908 Del. LEXIS 25

Syllabus

<p>Appeal from Chancellor—Will; Construction of—Rule in Shelley’s Case—Personal Property—Intention of Testator—Trust— Life Estate—Executor.</p> <p>1. The rule in Shelley’s case governs the transmission of real property in this State in cases which come within its terms. The rule, however, is an arbitrary one. It is strictly a rule of law and not of construction or intention. Where the language used in the instrument brings the case within the rule, the fact that it was the intention of the grantor or devisor that the rule should not operate, is of no importance.</p> <p>2. This arbitrary feature has induced courts of law and equity to construe the rule most strictly, and when practicable, to take cases out of its operation.</p> <p>3. Courts are not inclined to extend the rule to personal property. Both reason and authority are against such extension. The trend of modern decisions and legislation is altogether the other way.</p> <p>4. Under the will the trustee is directed to “apply the income as received, to the maintenance and support of my daughter Ann Jane during her lifetime, and from and after her decease, it is my will and I direct that all the said property, money, stock,’’ etc. * * * *. “shall be held by the said Thomas A Rees free and discharged from the aforesaid trust, to and for the use of the heirs and assigns of the said Ann Jane forever.” Held, that Ann Jane took only a life estate in the trust property, and that the corpus of the funds after her decease went to her heirs, and not to her executors.</p>