Johnstone v. Peyton

Citations

• 59 Wash. 436
• 110 P. 7
• 1910 Wash. LEXIS 1220

Syllabus

<p>Process — Substituted Service — Knowledge oe Residence — Judgment — Validity. A decree of foreclosure of a mortgage, obtained on publication of a summons mailed to the defendant at Toronto, is void, where the plaintiff knew defendant’s address to be at Chicago, and defendant had no knowledge of the suit.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Sueeiciency. A finding that the plaintiff in a foreclosure suit instituted in 1903 knew the post officb address of the defendant to be at Chicago, will not be disturbed on appeal, where it appears that he had resided there since the execution of the mortgage, except for about six months in 1892, and defendant testified that he and the plaintiff were intimately acquainted for many years and had occasional correspondence and had met in Chicago on several occasions since his return there, although he was flatly contradicted by the defendant.</p> <p>Limitation oe Actions — Accrual—Discovery oe Fraud — Laches. An action to set aside a fraudulent judgment of foreclosure is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud; and the mortgagor, although extremely dilatory and in default for years, is not barred where he commenced an action to vacate the decree within a few months after discovery of the judgment.</p> <p>Same — Imputed Notice — Mortgages—Judgment. Notice of entry of a fraudulent judgment is not imputed to a mortgagor who was in default for several years, especially where he met the mortgagee after the foreclosure, which was not disclosed, although the mortgage indebtedness was the subject of conversation between them.</p>