Jackson v. Lamar

Citations

• 58 Wash. 383
• 108 P. 946
• 1910 Wash. LEXIS 944

Syllabus

<p>Deeds — Execution — Validity — Mental Capacity—Evidence— Sufficiency. The evidence is insufficient to show mental incapacity to execute a deed, where it appears that the parties to the deed were brothers, who had lived together as bachelors and accumulated considerable property held by them in common under an agreement that the first to die should execute a deed to the survivor to avoid a testamentary disposition of the property, that the deed was executed the day after the grantor was taken to a hospital suffering from an illness from which he died a month later, that three witnesses present at the time clearly established that he fully understood the nature of the business, and the only evidence to the contrary being that of nonexperts as to the grantor’s appearance during his stay at the hospital.</p> <p>Deeds—Delivery—Evidence—Sufficiency. Possession • of a deed by the grantee raises a strong presumption of delivery, which is not overcome by the evidence of an extreme partisan, disappointed in not receiving a portion of the estate granted, who testified, seven years after the occurrence and several years after the death of both parties to the deed, that the grantor, who was on his deathbed at the time and had executed a deed to his brother, pursuant to a previous agreement, directed the notary to take care of the deed until he called for it, which he would do as soon as he got well; the notary having testified that the grantor executed the deed in order, as he stated, that his brother should have the estate in case of his death.</p> <p>Morris, Fullerton, and Parker, JJ., dissenting.</p>