Hyde v. Buckner

Citations

• 108 Cal. 522
• 41 P. 416
• 1895 Cal. LEXIS 884

Syllabus

<p>Deed—Mortgage—Evidence—Subsequent Declarations of Grantor.— In an action to restrain the sale under execution against the grantor of lands conveyed by him, upon the alleged ground that the deed was intended as a mortgage, it is error to admit evidence of statements made by the grantor long after the execution of the deed, impeaching the title conveyed thereby, by showing that it was given as security for a loan.</p> <p>Id.—Testimony of Grantor—Adverse Witness — Explanatory Evidence—Contrary Declarations.—Where the grantor had been called as a witness for the sheriff and execution creditor to prove that the deed was intended as a mortgage, and had testified that the transaction was a sale, and that the relation of debtor and creditor did not continue between himself and the grantee after the execution of the deed, contrary declarations of the grantor could only be shown by the defendants to explain why they had called a witness adverse to them, and not then, unless they were surprised by his testimony; and beyond this the evidence of contrary declarations subsequent to the execution of the deed is entitled to no weight, and could have no force in making an affirmative case for the defendants.</p> <p>Id.—Reason Assigned for Ruling—Presumption of Prejudice.—Where the court, in admitting the evidence of the subsequent declarations of the grantor, gave as a reason for the ruling that the evidence was competent for the purpose of ascertaining what the intention of the parties was, it cannot be presumed that the evidence had no weight in the determination of the principal issue as to whether the deed was intended as a mortgage, and the judgment must be reversed for error in the ruling.</p>