Houghton v. Meyer

Citations

• 208 U.S. 149
• 28 S. Ct. 234
• 52 L. Ed. 432
• 1908 U.S. LEXIS 1430

Syllabus

<p>While the restraining order authorized by § 718, Rev. Stat., is a species of temporary injunction it is only authorized.until a pending motion for a' temporary, injunction can be disposed of.</p> <p>The undertaking given to obtain a restraining order under § 718, Rev. Stat. must be construed in the light of that section and it necessarily is superseded by an order or decree granting an injunction and thereupon expires by its own limitation, notwithstanding such order or decree may subsequently be reversed.</p> <p>The givers of an undertaking cannot be held for any period not covered thereby on the conjecture, that they would have given a new undertaking had one been required. Their liability must be determined on the one actually given.</p> <p>In this case the obligors on the undertaking obtained an order restraining the Postmaster General from refusing to transmit their matter at second class rates. The motion on the order was not brought on but on the hearing on the merits the trial court, by decree, granted a permanent injunction. This decree was reversed. In an action brought by the Postmaster General, on the undertaking, claiming damages for entire .. period until final reversal of decree, held that:</p> <p>The liability on the undertaking was limited to the difference in postage on matter mailed between the date of the restraining order and the entry of the decree of the trial court which superseded the restraining order. This was not a case in which the parties should be relieved from the obligation of the undertaking for damages during the period for which it was in force. Bussell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433, distinguished.</p>