Holden v. Minnesota

Citations

• 137 U.S. 483
• 11 S. Ct. 143
• 34 L. Ed. 734
• 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2112

Syllabus

<p>Section 4 of the Minnesota statute of April 24, 1889, (Gen. Laws Minn. 1889, c. 20,) providing that, in case of sentence of death for murder in the first degree, the convict shall be kept in solitary confinement after the issue of the warrant of execution by the governor, and only certain persons allowed to visit him, is an independent provision, applicable only to offences committed after its passage, and is not ex post facto.</p> <p>Section 7 of that statute, which repeals all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with its provisions does not repeal the previous statute which prescribes the punishment of murder in the first degree by death by hanging, and that the execution should take place only after 'the issue of a warrant of execution.</p> <p>Section 3 of that statute, which requires the punishment of death by hanging to be inflicted before sunrise of the day on which the execution takes place, and within the jail or some other enclosure higher than the gallows, thus excluding the view from persons outside, and limiting the number of those who may witness the execution, excluding altogether reporters of newspapers, are regulations that do not affect the substantial rights of the convict, and are not ex post facto within the meaning of the, Constitution of the United States, even when applied to offences previously committed.</p> <p>The provisions of a statute cannot be regarded as inconsistent with a subsequent statute merely because the latter reenacts or repeats those provisions.</p> <p>The case of Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160, distinguished from this case.</p> <p>The statutes of Minnesota authorizing the governor to fix by his warrant the day for the execution of a convict sentenced to suffer death by hanging, are not repugnant to the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law; it being competent for the legislature to confer either upon the court or the executive the power to designate the time when su