Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad

Citations

• 229 Pa. 61
• 78 A. 28
• 1910 Pa. LEXIS 553

Syllabus

<p>Railroads — Common carriers — Illegal discrimination — Furnishing cars —Measure of damages — Instruction,</p> <p>1. In an action by a coal company against a railroad to recover damages for alleged illegal discrimination in furnishing transportation facilities, an instruction to the jury stating that “the only known method to get at data from which to estimate what a man is damaged by reason of discrimination in not furnishing cars or other facilities of transportation is to give the shipper discriminated against what would have been a reasonably fair profit on whatever is shown to be the fairly probable output of the mine discriminated against, less what was actually shipped from such mine,” presents a reasonable and proper measure of damages.</p> <p>2. The fact that the coal was left in the ground and might be available for future shipment, is immaterial, in the absence of any proof offered by the defendant that the plaintiff would realize for its coal, when shipped in the future, as much as it would have realized if shipped during the period of the action.</p> <p>3. In an action of tort a greater latitude is allowed by the court to the jury in the assessment of damages than is allowed in actions of contract. All damages which ordinarily, and in the natural course of things, have resulted from the commission of the wrongful act are recoverable.</p> <p>Railroads — Discrimination — Furnishing cars — Actions — Interstate Commerce Commission — Lis pendens.</p> <p>4. An action by a coal company against a railroad to recover damages for alleged illegal discrimination in furnishing transportation facilities in which plaintiff only claims to recover for profits on coal which it was prevented from shipping “to points and places within the state of Pennsylvania” is not barred by the pendency of a discrimination suit between the same parties before the Interstate Commerce Commission.</p> <p>Stewáet and Brown, JJ., dissent as to the measure of damages.</p>