Heilbron v. Heilbron

Citations

• 158 Pa. 297
• 27 A. 967
• 1893 Pa. LEXIS 1583

Syllabus

<p>Divorce — Libel—Pleading—Surplusage—Amendment.</p> <p>Where a libel in divorce sets out a statutory cause of divorce in the e terms of the statute, but specifies particulars not within the statutory requirement, and tending to negative the general averment, the particulars may be stricken out as surplusage, provided the evidence in the cause sustains the cause of action as averred in the specific terms of the statute. In such case an amendment should be allowed, and a divorce thereupon decreed.</p> <p>Divorce — Gruel and barbarous treatment.</p> <p>A libel in divorce by a husband against a wife for cruel and barbarous treatment was sustained where the respondent admitted on cross-examination that she broke the glass door of her husband’s store and interfered with his customers, that she broke dishes and threw them down stairs, threw hot coffee on the servant girl, and, on two occasions, when her stepsons complained of the dinner, she brought in slop and threw it on the table.</p> <p>Alimony pendente lite — Decree—Practice, G. P.</p> <p>On an application for alimony pendente lite, the court has no authority in dismissing the libel, to require alimony to be paid “ until the further order of the court.” The order must be limited to the pendency of the suit, and should terminate with the decree dismissing the libel.</p> <p>Order for alimony pendente lite — Order for support.</p> <p>The existence of an order of the quarter sessions requiring a husband to pay for the support of his wife, does not prevent the court of common pleas from decreeing alimony pendente lite. Both orders may run concurrently during the pendency of the proceedings, but when the common pleas has awarded a divorce, with or without alimony, the jurisdiction of the quarter sessions will be at an end.</p>