Harmon v. Harmon

Citations

• 111 Kan. 786
• 208 P. 647
• 1922 Kan. LEXIS 348

Syllabus

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Action for Divorce — Infidelity of Wife Committed with Connivance and Consent of Husband. While a husband who suspects his wife of infidelity may, without connivance, and merely to test the accuracy of his suspicions and to secure proof of her delinquency, permit her in a single instance to take advantage of an opportunity to indulge her adulterous disposition; yet when he both knowingly and passively suffers her to keep late hours and dance in the dark and go riding in an automobile with a married man, while he himself dances, keeps late hours and similarly goes automobile riding at night with the wife of the man with whom his own wife is infatuated, and when such unusual intimacy on the part of the four persons concerned continues almost every night for many weeks until the wife is seduced by such other man, this long continued course of conduct and bad example on his part, together with his continued friendly association and comradeship with her seducer after his discovery of their delinquency are evidential circumstances from which a trial court may make the deduction that the adultery of the wife was committed with the knowledge, connivance and consent of the husband.</p> <p>2. Same — Reprehensible Conduct of Husband. Even if the husband’s long-continued passive conduct and his own bad example do not strictly rise to the gravity of connivance, such conduct as outlined in section 1 of the syllabus was so far at variance with proper decorum and general moral standards of propriety that, notwithstanding his wife’s lapse into adultery, a divorce was not erroneously denied to the husband.</p> <p>3. Same — Excluded Testimony. The exclusion of testimony cannot be the basis of reversible error unless it is presented in some proper form in support of a motion for a new trial.</p> <p>4. Same — Custody of Minor Child. The record examined, and no error disclosed in the trial court’s decree that “until the further order of the court” the