Gyger v. Phila. etc. Ry. Co.

Citations

• 136 Pa. 96
• 20 A. 399
• 1890 Pa. LEXIS 1016

Syllabus

<p>1. When either of the words, railroad or railway, is used in a statutory or constitutional provision, and the context is without indication that a particular kind of road is intended, the provision will be held applicable to every species of road embraced in the general sense of the word used: Ilestonville etc; R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. 210.*</p> <p>2. But, though the words, railroad and railway, are thus synonymous, yet, when either one or the other of them is used in a provision, and it is evident from the context that a particular kind of road is intended, that kind of road only will be held to be the subject-matter of the enactment.</p> <p>3. Section 1, article XVII. of the constitution, providing that “ no railroad, canal or other corporation.....shall consolidate.....with, or lease or purchase the works or franchises of, or in any way control, any other railroad or canal corporation owning.....a parallel or competing line,” is not applicable to street-railway companies.</p> <p>i. The passenger travel over parallel streets of cities is not necessarily a competing travel, and it is quite clear, therefore, that the sense of “ competing,” which is the essential sense of the prohibition of the section, is not applicable to the travel upon the streets of cities and towns over street-passenger railways.</p>