Grigsby v. Peak

Citations

• 57 Tex. 142
• 1 Tex. L. R. 181
• 1882 Tex. LEXIS 110

Syllabus

<p>L. Case reaffirmed.— Stewart v. Crosby, 15 Tex., 546, reaffirmed; which decides that an ordinance appended to a constitution of the state, and adopted by the same convention that makes the constitution, is of equal binding force upon all the departments of the state as though incorporated in the constitution itself.</p> <p>2. Limitation—Constitutional law.—Sec. 14, art. 12, of the constitution of 1869, was not restricted in its operation to that class of persons who should, at the date of its acceptance or subsequently, labor under the disabilities therein named.</p> <p>R. Constitution at. construction.—While a state constitution should, as a general rule, be interpreted to operate prospectively, its retrospective operation will be enforced when such was clearly the purpose of its framers, provided no right already vested would be disturbed thereby.</p> <p>4. Limitation — Constitutional law.—-In construing sec. 14, art. 12, of the constitution of 1869, held,</p> <p>(1) That it did not change the common-law rule of construction of statutes of limitation, but simply extended the time within which, under previous laws, persons under disability had the right to sue.</p> <p>(2) That a married woman (in this case) could not tack the disability of coverture to that of infancy; but when the plea of limitation of five years was interposed, had the constitution not been abrogated, she had seven instead of five years within which to institute suit from the time of her marriage, when the statute first began to run.</p> <p>(3) That if she was under disability, so that the statute had not begun to run prior to the adoption of the constitution, had it remained in force, she had full seven years after its removal within which to sue; if the statute had begun to run prior to the adoption of the constitution, the time during which it had run should be counted as part of the seven years.</p> <p>5. Due process op law.-— The term “ due process of law,” as used in the fourteenth amend