Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Coats

Citations

• 115 F. 452
• 53 C.C.A. 382
• 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4220

Syllabus

<p>1. Railroads — Fire from Locomotive — Evidence—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Where fire is shown to have started from sparks from a passing locomotive, the burden is on the company, in an action for damages, to show that the locomotive was properly constructed, equipped, and operated.</p> <p>2. Same — Sufficiency of Evidence — Jury Question.</p> <p>Where it clearly appeared that a fire was started on the right of way of a railroad by a passing locomotive, which extended to and destroyed adjoining property, and the company, on the trial of an action against it, produced testimony, which was not directly contradicted, tending to show that the locomotive was properly constructed, equipped, inspected, and operated, held, that it was the province of the jury to determine whether the presumption of negligence, created by the starting of the fire, was overcome, since the jury had the right to weigh the testimony and to determine whether the witnesses for the company were credible.</p> <p>S, Same.</p> <p>The engineer and fireman, who were the principal witnesses for the company in an action for fire started by sparks from their locomotive, testified that, at the time or immediately after the locomotive passed the place where the fire was set, the front and rear dampers were closed; that the former had not been opened; that the screen netting in the smokestack was in place; that there was no opening in the ash pan through which fire could escape; that the steam was shut off; and that it was running on acquired momentum at the rate of 15 miles an hour. Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that, before reaching the place where the fire started, the locomotive was climbing a grade under forced draft, and that it had acquired such a momentum that it could run a quarter of a mile up grade with steam shut off and dampers closed, which was contended to be negligent on a windy day, when in proximity to combustible materials. ‘Held, that the court could not say, as a matter of law, that