Grand v. Dreyfus

Citations

• 122 Cal. 58
• 54 P. 389
• 1898 Cal. LEXIS 527

Syllabus

<p>Slander—Pleading—Innuendo—Inducement—In an action for slander, when the words spoken are not actionable per se, the innuendo in the pleading can only be employed to interpret the meaning of the words used; and if the natural import of the language is not actionable, the innuendo cannot serve to introduce a broader meaning to make it so, unless connected with proper introductory averments of matter of inducement, or colloquium, setting forth extrinsic circumstances, which, coupled with the language uttered, affects its construction, and makes it actionable. The innuendo cannot supply the place of the colloquium, or inducement.</p> <p>Id.—Meaning Attributed by Bystanders—A defendant cannot be required to answer to a charge of slander merely because bystanders attributed to his language an actionable meaning, different from the natural import of the terms used, if the complaint does not disclose facts from which the court can see that the hearers had a right to put such construction on the language used, or that, as matter of law, it had such meaning.</p> <p>Id.—Charge oe Selling Hogs—Insufficient Complaint.—A complaint, alleging that the defendant spoke of plaintiff the words: “If he [meaning the plaintiff] continues to sell [meaning steal] my hogs, I will send him [meaning plaintiff] where he was another time [meaning the state’s prison of the state of California],” and alleging that the words were so understood by the persons spoken to, but not alleging facts from which the court can see that the words used were susceptible of the meaning alleged, does not state a cause of action.</p>