Glory Chapel International Cathedral v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co.

Citations

• 224 Conn. App. 501

Syllabus

Pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 10-44), ''[w]ithin fifteen days after the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new pleading; provided that in those instances where an entire complaint . . . or any count in a complaint . . . has been stricken, and the party whose pleading or a count thereof has been so stricken fails to file a new pleading within that fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon motion, enter judgment against said party on said stricken complaint . . . or count thereof.'' The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court striking all counts of its complaint against the defendant insurance company, P Co. The plaintiff filed its original complaint against both P Co. and the individual defendant, B, alleging that B had set fire to a garage adjacent to a church owned by the plaintiff. In their efforts to contain and extinguish the fire, emergency personnel severely damaged portions of the church. The complaint alleged that, at the time of the fire and resulting damage, the plaintiff was insured against such damage pursuant to an insurance policy issued by P Co. The plaintiff filed a claim with P Co., and a dispute ensued when P Co. allegedly paid amounts that were inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the actual costs of repairs. The plaintiff's complaint contained two counts against P Co., claiming breach of contract and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and one count alleging negligence against B. P Co. filed a motion to strike the two claims against it on the ground of misjoinder, arguing that the plaintiff's contractual claims against P Co. and its negligence claim against B were separate actions that did not arise out of the same transaction. The trial court granted P Co.'s motion to strike counts one and two of the complaint for misjoinder, concluding that, although the fire and its consequences were common facts to the plaintiff'