Galbraith v. McLain

Citations

• 84 Ill. 379

Syllabus

<p>1. Contract—by a child with parent, to release to other children all claim to parent’s estate, is valid and binding. Where a father executes a deed for a tract of land to one child, who accepts and takes possession of the same, upon the express understanding and agreement that it is in lieu of all claim such child may have in and to the residue of the father’s estate upon his death, and that such child will release to the other children all his claim in expectancy to the residue of the estate, such, contract is legal and binding, and will be enforced in equity.</p> <p>2. Same—when not within Statute of Frauds, nor contrary to Statute of Wills. A contract made by a child with his father, in consideration of a conveyance of land to him by the father, that he will release to his brothers and sisters all claim in expectancy to the residue of the father’s estate, is not within the Statute of Frauds, nor is it contrary to the provisions of the Statute of Wills.</p> <p>3. Witness—when widow is competent in suit between heirs of her husband. In a suit between the heirs at law of a decedent, for a partition of the land of deceased amongst a portion of the heirs, and to exclude one heir on the ground of a contract between him and the deceased, the widow of the deceased, not being a party to the suit, is a competent witness as to a transaction or conversation which occurred with her husband in his lifetime.</p> <p>4. Same—party on his own behalf, in suit between heirs, not competent. In a suit between the heirs of a deceased person, the fact that the scrivener who was employed to draw a deed, executed by the deceased to one of the heirs litigant, testified to a conversation between them at the lime the deed was drawn, does not make such heir a competent witness on his own behalf in relation to the same conversation, the scrivener being in no legal sense an agent of the deceased, except for the special purpose of drawing the deed.</p>