Executors of Gyles v. Valk

Citations

• 29 S.C.L. 460

Syllabus

<p>1. The defendant purchased from the plaintiffs’s testatrix, who resided in London, her interest in the residuary personal estate of W., of Charleston, of which, in his will, he had made no disposition, and to a distributive share of which, as one of his next of kin, it was supposed she was entitled; but there being adverse claims, the executors had, before this purchase, filed a bill to have the estate of W. settled under the order of the Court of Chancery. PlaintifFs’s testatrix executed to defendant a deed of assignment, whereby she transferred to him, her “share and proportion, right, estate, title and interest” in W’s. estate, with a power to act for her and receive her share. Defendant, at the same time, executed a bond for the sum agreed to be given for her interest. In the treaty for the purchase,- as recited in the bond, her right is spoken of as a “supposed share or interest” in said estate, “if she should be decreed to be entitled to a distributive share therein,” and the condition of the bond was, in case she “shall be decreed and declared by any competent tribunal to be entitled to a distributive share,” then that defendant do pay the price stipulated within three months next after he “shall receive or be put in possession of the said share f (“if any”)</p> <p>2. In an action upon defendant’s bond, it was adjudged that by the true construction of the condition, his liability accrued when the court decreed that the contingent right which he had purchased was vested in plaintiffs’s testatrix, and that by the power and control which from that time defendant exercised in the right, it was put in his possession.</p> <p>3. The word “share” in the last of the terms of the condition, held synonimous with right. .The use of these words in the bond, justify this signification.</p> <p>4. The words “if any” are to be understood, if any share shall be decreed.</p>