Dunnenbaum & Friedlander v. Schram & Co.

Citations

• 59 Tex. 281
• 1883 Tex. LEXIS 152

Syllabus

<p>1. Attachment.— Hopkins v. Nichols, 22 Tex., 206, and other cases which hold that an affidavit for attachment which embraces more than one distinct statutory ground, set out in the alternative, is not sufficient to authorize the issuance of the writ, followed. Any ambiguity in the oath for attachment as to which distinct ground for this summary process is relied on, will be fatal. Distinguished from Blum v. Davis, 56 Tex., 427, where an oath in the alternative, embracing different phases of the one distinct statutory ground for the writ, was permitted.</p> <p>2. Same.— This case distinguished also from Klenk v. Schwalm, 19 Wis., 124, and Parsons v. Stockbridge, 42 Ind., 121.</p> <p>3. Same.— Under the statute which makes the fact that a debtor has disposed in whole or in part of his property with intent to defraud, etc., one ground for attachment, and which makes the fact that “he is about to dispose of his property with intent to defraud,” etc., another and different ground, an affidavit which states them conjunctively as co-existing facts, is bad, for the affidavit must on its face, as to one or the other ground, be untrue.</p> <p>4. Same — Peactice.— Though an affidavit for attachment maybe-had for uncertainty, yet if there be another affidavit verifying the allegations in the petition for the writ, and the allegation as to the cause for attachment be distinct, specific and sufficient as to the existence of a statutory ground, it will support the writ.</p> <p>5. Statute cokstkued.— The statute (sec. 3, p. 718, R. S.), which provides that all civil laws shall be liberally construed, does not obviate the necessity of complying with material requirements of law, in substance, in making oath for the summary process of attachment.</p>