Doland v. Mooney
Citations
- 79 Cal. 137
- 21 P. 436
- 1889 Cal. LEXIS 684
Syllabus
<p>Tax Sale—Variance in Recitals — Sale for Excessive Sum—Presumption. — The fact that the amount of taxes and costs recited in the certificate of tax sale is fifty cents less than that recited in the tax deed will not vitiate the tax sale or tax deed, or show that the sale was for a sum in excess of the taxes and legal costs. If the property was in fact sold for an excessive sum, that fact may be shown to invalidate the sale; but the presumption is in favor of the regularity of official action.</p> <p>IiX-—Recital of Interest Sold.—It is not ground of objection to a certificate of tax sale and a tax deed thereunder that the certificate recites that the bidder “offered to take the least quantity of said property, or the smallest portion of interest therein,” when the certificate and deed both show by the description of the premises sold that quantity was offered and only quantity was sold.</p> <p>Id.—Recital of Costs of Publication.—A recital in the certificate of tax sale and tax deed of the non-payment of the costs of publication will not vitiate the sale or deed, if it does not appear that the amount for which the property was actually sold included anything for costs of publication.</p> <p>Id. —Tax Proceedings — Substantial Conformity to Law—Quieting Title — Evidence. - - When a certificate of tax sale and tax deed conform substantially to the requirements of the Political Code, it is error to refuse to admit the deed in evidence in an action to quiet title founded thereupon.</p>
How courts have described this case
Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.
- holding that a statute making it unlawful for any person to disrupt or interfere with the operation of any public school contains words of ordinary meaning that give constitutionally sufficient notice as to the statute’s application
- holding that a statute making it unlawful for any person to disrupt or interfere with the operation of any public school contains words of ordinary meaning that give constitutionally sufficient notice as to the statute’s application
- saying only that the appellant contended that a criminal statute was “unconstitutionally vague,” without identifying whether the claim was raised under the United States or Georgia constitution, and citing mostly federal cases
- this Court had jurisdiction where the constitutional question was raised and distinctly ruled upon orally at the hearing
- this Court had jurisdiction where the constitutional question was raised and distinctly ruled upon orally at the hearing
- although OCGA § 20-2-1181 was not unconstitutionally vague, an overbroad challenge was waived because not raised below
Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).
Judges: Paterson
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