Di Donato v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co.

Citations

• 266 Pa. 412
• 109 A. 627
• 1920 Pa. LEXIS 583

Syllabus

<p>Workmen’s compensation — Railroads — Interstate commerce — Watchman — Flagging at crossing — Presumption—Burden of proof.</p> <p>1. A watchman employed by a railroad company at a public road crossing is not engaged in interstate commerce when flagging an intrastate train, although trains engaged in the interstate commerce use the same tracks.</p> <p>2. The nature of the employment is determined by the work in hand at the immediate time of the accident; and, as such work often shifts rapidly from one class of employment to the other, each ease must he decided in the light of its particular facts, and he governed by the purpose of the operation. If the work in hand is interstate, or so closely related thereto as to he practically a part of it, then it falls within the act of Congress; otherwise it falls within the State act.</p> <p>3. A crossing flagman is in the nature of a traffic officer who protects the public and pilots each train over the crossing, and it cannot be said that he is engaged in through traffic when so conducting a local train.</p> <p>4. The fact that flagging a local train promotes its safe passage, and thus tends to keep the track open and clear for through traffic, does' not make the work interstate traffic, any more so than the work of the crew of an intrastate train on the same track.</p> <p>5. The true rule apparently is, that to come within the range of interstate commerce, the work must hear directly, and not remotely thereon; otherwise practically all local work on trunk railways would be in interstate commerce.</p> <p>6. There is no presumption that the train a watchman at a local crossing was flagging when killed, was an interstate train. It is not a matter governed by presumption, hut by proof, the burden of which rests upon the railroad company alleging it. If no evidence is offered upon the question, the defense fails.</p>