Day v. Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co.

Citations

• 69 Miss. 589

Syllabus

<p>1. Land. Licensee. Parol gift. Estoppel.</p> <p>A father licensed his son to enter upon a }>art of his land, under a parol agreement that the son should occupy and pay taxes on such part, and, on a certain contingency, receive a deed. The land continued to be assessed to the father. Subsequently a railroad was built across it; and, after condemnation proceedings and considerable litigation as to the right of way between the company and the father, it paid him, and received a deed for the right of way. All this was known to the son, who attended upon the litigation, but remained silent. Ildcl, that he cannot in equity controvert the title conveyed by his father, although he had been in possession, in the manner stated, for more than ten years, and had received a deed from his father, which was recorded just before the latter executed the deed to the company, it not having actual notice of his deed. See Railway Co. v. Day, 07 Miss., 227. — Hep.</p> <p>2. Chancery Pleading. How construed. Injunction. Insufficient averment.</p> <p>A railroad company filed a bill averring its right to cut certain trees by virtue of a deed conveying to it a right of way, “ and the right to fell any timber beyond the right of way which is sufficiently near the track of said road to fall on or obstruct the same; ” and sought, among other things, to enjoin an action against it for “trespass in going outside of the right of way and felling timber or trees in section 20,” etc. The evidence did not definitely locate the trees within the section. Held, that a decree enjoining the trespass suit is erroneous, and must be reversed, since complainant failed either to aver or show that the trees, for the cutting of which the trespass suit was brought, were such as the deed gave it a right to fell.</p>