Skip to main content
· 7/6/1998

David v. McFarland v. General American Life Insurance Company

Citations

  • 149 F.3d 583
  • 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15031
  • 1998 WL 371996

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

  • noting that “[t]his would be the case even if, in percentage terms, the disability affected an essential duty that comprised ... only 5% of the person’s overall duties”
  • interpreting a similar total disability policy to \protect[ ] the insured from disabilities that prevent his continuing in his regular occupation\
  • explaining that a shortstop no longer able to throw due to an injury, but still able to perform a shortstop’s other “principal duties” of running, hitting, and catching, “would be totally disabled because he could no longer be employed as a shortstop”
  • noting that “a person purchasing disability insurance with the definition of totally disabled at issue here would reasonably expect that, if he was no longer able to perform an essential duty of his regular occupation, resulting in the loss of his position, he would be ‘totally disabled’ ”
  • interpret- ing a similar total disability policy to “protect[] the insured from disabilities that prevent his continuing in his regular occupation”
  • “Because this is a diversity case, we look to state law to provide the substantive law regarding interpretation of the insurance policy.”

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).

Judges: Ripple, Manion, Evans

Read full opinion on CourtListener

Sourced from CourtListener / Free Law Project (CC0).

This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.