Davey v. County of Galveston

Citations

• 45 Tex. 291

Syllabus

<p>1. Blessing v. City of Galveston, 42 Tex., 641, reaffirmed.</p> <p>2. Cain v. The State, 20 Tex., 356, reaffirmed.</p> <p>3. Constitutional law. — The act of February 2, 1856, (Paschal’s Dig., 2061-2071,) entitled “An act to authorize the County Courts of the State to grant a license for the retail of spirituous, vinous, and intoxicating liquors, in quantities less than a quart, and imposing a license tax for such privilegeHeld, To embrace but one leading object; its subsidiary provisions are legitimately connected with, and tend to enforce such main object so expressed in its title.</p> <p>4. Construction of statutes. — The said act and the amendment to it (October 27, 1866, Paschal’s Dig., 2075-2082) was not repealed by the act of November 6,1866, “An act to levy taxesthe provisions in said acts not conflicting. The amount of the tax, the manner of collecting it, and the purpose to which it should be applied are matters of legislative discretion.</p> <p>5. Court-house and jail tax. — The act “authorizing the Police Courts of the several counties of the State to issue and sell bonds for the purpose of erecting court-houses and jails, and to levy a special tax to meet the same,” approved October 27, 1860, (Gen. Laws, 11th Leg.,) was intended to enable the different counties to provide the means to erect suitable buildings for the proper administration of justice and enforcement of the law; and such act was sufficient authority to levy a tax to pay interest on bonds for the erection of a “jail and work-house.”</p> <p>6. Same. — That such bonds have not been issued, is not a sufficient ground to maintain an action to recover taxes so levied, in the absence of allegations that the county had abandoned the purpose of erecting such buildings, or that the tax collected had been diverted to other purposes.</p>