Cynthia A. Ebbert v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

• holding that “oral notice can suffice to start the 90-day period” if it is “equivalent to written notice”
• finding that general delegation of authority to EEOC to “carry out the provisions of [Title 42]” did not impliedly authorize EEOC to interpret “notice” with respect to the timeliness of court filings in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
• finding oral notice of the right to sue was insufficient only because claimant was not informed of the 90-day statute of limitations
• explaining the ADA uses Title VII’s procedures which include a ninety day statute of limitations from the day the plaintiff received notice of dismissal from the EEOC (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1))
• approving of constructive notice because “a notice letter correctly delivered to a complainant’s residence or postal box constitutes notice even though the complainant may not have seen the notice him or herself at the time of delivery”
• “[A] ‘right-to-sue letter’ will follow an exhaustion of agency remedies; notice of the latter being the actual prerequisite to a Title VII lawsuit.”

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).