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· 3/12/1906

Cusachs v. Sewerage & Water Board

Citations

  • 116 La. 510
  • 40 So. 855
  • 1906 La. LEXIS 525

Syllabus

<p>1. Damages—Contracts—Rescission.</p> <p>When the proprietor exercises the right accorded to him by article 2765, Civ. Code, to put an end to the contract at pleasure, he does not violate the contract, but merely exercises a legal right which he has under the contract. Hence, in such a case, the contractor cannot recover damages as for breach of contract—for example, for injury to his reputation as a contractor—but only such amount as he may be entitled to in pursuance of the contract; and that amount is • the expenses incurred by him up to date, plus such profits as he can show he would have made if permitted to complete the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 15, Cent. Dig. Damages, §§ 326-334.]</p> <p>2. Same — Breach of Contract — Rem-ote Damages.</p> <p>For breach of contract through bad faith even in the sense of ill will, a contractor can recover no more than the damages which are the direct and immediate consequence of the breach. If, as an effect of the breach, he is deprived of the use of the only collateral he possesses on which to raise money for saving from the pursuit of his creditors a business he is carrying on separately and independently of the contract, and his creditors seize and sell this business, the loss of this business is only a remote consequence of the breach of the' contract, and cannot be recovered as damages for the breach of contract.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

  • explaining that “in this circuit, cases hold that a plaintiff need not plead with specificity how the infringing trademark causes confusion”
  • finding that allegation that the shape and/or ornamental design of the plaintiff's product is non-functional sufficient to survive motion to dismiss because functionality involves an inherently factual review
  • stating that because of “the factually intensive nature of secondary meaning, it is not appropriate for the court to weigh the factors at [the motion to dismiss] stage.”
  • listing (1) advertising expenditures; (2)consumer studies linking the mark to a source; (3) sales success; (4) unsolicited media coverage of the product; (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark; and (6
  • “in this circuit, cases hold that a plaintiff need not plead with specificity how the infringing trademark causes confusion”

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).

Judges: Provosty

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