Cunningham v. State

Citations

• 17 Tex. Ct. App. 89
• 1884 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 176

Syllabus

<p>1. Murder — Self-defense.— Upon the subject of how far self-defense is available to a slayer who provoked the combat or produced the occasion which necessitated him to kill his adversary in his own defense, a general rule is as follows: If he provoked the combat or produced the occasion, in order to have a pretext for killing his adversary or doing him great bodily harm, or engaged in a combat knowing that it might or would result in the death, or some serious bodily injury which might produce the death, of either party thereto, or if, by his own wrongful acts, he intentionally, with a view thereto, brought about the necessity of taking life, the killing will bo murder, no matter to what extremity he may have been reduced in the combat.</p> <p>2. Same — Charge of the Court.— See the opinion in extenso for a charge of the court which, when tested by the rule above announced, is incorrect because it fails to properly qualify the word “produces;” because, in authorizing the jury to determine, from the evidence, which of the combatants, in the first instance, was in the wrong, it does not confine the jury to the occasion of the homicide; and because it does not define the nature or quality of the wrongful act, a definition essential in view of the fact that all wrongful acts of a slayer will not deprive him of the right of self-defense,</p> <p>8, Same — Practice. — This court is not called upon to reverse a judgment of conviction because of an erroneous charge in the absence of a bill of exceptions thereto, or a proper special charge refused, unless, looking to the whole record, the court’s charge in its entirety, and the statement of facts, it becomes obvious that the rights of the accused were probably prejudiced. In this case the interests of the accused were protected by subsequent clauses of the charge, for which see the opinion in extenso.</p> <p>4. Same.— The charge complained of contains the following clause, which is objected to by the appellant: “. . . or b