Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney-General

Citations

• 99 Miss. 1
• 54 So. 446

Syllabus

<p>1. Telegraphs and Telephones. Regulations. Charges. Statutory law. Common carrier. Code 1906, sections 4826, 4899, 4842, 4843, 4844, 4839, 4841, 4845, 4883. Laws 1008, chapter 119, p. 124.</p> <p>By Code 1906, §§ 4826, 4899, a railroad commission is created for the supervision of common carriers, defining its purpose, and providing remedies for its violation, of which section 4843 includes telegraph and telephone companies as common carriers, as declared by Constitution 1890, § 195. Section 4842 gives the commission power to fix and supervise rates, section 4839 prohibits discrimination in rates, unless authorized by the commission, section 4844 forbids rebates or reductions from fixed charges, and sections 4839, 4841, 4845 and 4883, provide remedies for violations of the act. Annotated Code 1892, sections 4437, 4442, relating to combinations in restraint of trade and agreements fixing the transportation of commodities, was extended in 1900 (Laws 1900, ch. 88), section 2 of which became Code 1906, § 5002, and was re-enacted by Laws of 1908, chapter 119. Section 1, sub-section K, as amended by subsection N and 0 defines trusts and combines, and provides procedure and remedies for violations of the act. The defendant company was charged, in a bill filed on relation of the attorney-general, with being a trust, with discriminations in its rates, and with attempting to monopolize the business of independent companies; the prayer of the bill being for an injunction and ouster, and for penalties. Held that the specific statutes relating to railroad commission conferred jurisdiction upon it as to the whole matter of regulating telephone rates and provided ample remedies for violation of law to the exclusion of the general anti trust laws.</p> <p>2. Statutes. Implied, repeal.</p> <p>Laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject, and it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute, it was not in