Commonwealth v. Bell

Citations

• 145 Pa. 374
• 22 A. 641
• 1891 Pa. LEXIS 674

Syllabus

<p>1. When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus sets forth that the relator is in custody by virtue of an order of the court adjudging him guilty of contempt and sentencing him to imprisonment, for refusing to testify as a witness in a criminal case, the fact that the sheriff’s return to the writ does not set out the contempt, or state facts showing the jurisdiction of the court to commit the relator, is immaterial.</p> <p>2. When a witness has been sentenced to imprisonment for contempt of court in refusing to testify for the commonwealth upon the trial of an indictment, the sufficiency of such indictment, whether it was properly framed, or whether the acts charged therein constitute an indictable offence, cannot be considered upon a petition of the recusant witness for a writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>3. A witness who declines to answer a question, upon the ground that it would tend to criminate himself, is not the final arbiter of the question whether the interrogatory propounded to him has such a tendency. The decision of this question is committed by § 10, act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 161, to the trial judge, who therefore necessarily has the power to enforce his decision by punishing a refusal to obey it.</p> <p>4. Upon the trial of an indictment for bribery, a witness for the commonwealth was asked, in substance, whether the defendant on trial had at a certain time offered a bribe to the witness. A responsive answer to the question, without more, would not tend to criminate the witness, in such a sense as to justify a refusal on his part to answer it: Per Mr. Justice Sterrett.</p> <p>5. The provision in § 32, article HI. of the constitution, that a witness shall not be permitted to withhold his testimony against persons charged with “the offence of bribery, or corrupt solicitation,” but that such testimony shall not afterwards be used against him in any proceeding, etc., does not relate solely to the “bribery” and “corrupt solicitation” specified in §§ 29 to 3