Clay v. Walton

Citations

• 9 Cal. 328

Syllabus

<p>Where a defendant entered into a contract with a builder for the construction of a brick house, and the builder applied to the plaintiffs, who were proprietors of a brick-yard, for the sale of the necessary brick, and the defendant said to the proprietors, to induce the sale, that he would become responsible for all the brick furnished his building, and whatever contract or agreement was made with the builder he would see carried out, or would pay for the brick if the builder did not: Held3 that the promise of the defendant was within the Statute of Frauds.</p> <p>Such a promise is conditional, and dependent upon the default of another. If there is any doubt as to its import, the Court will look to all the circumstances of the case to ascertain the intention of the parties.</p> <p>Wherever the leading object of the promisor is not to become surety or guarantor of another, but to subserve some interest of his own, his promise is not within the statute, although the effect of the promise maybe to pay the debt or discharge the obligation of another.</p> <p>But the mere fact that the debt guarantied was for brick to be used in the building of the guarantor does not show such an object in the promise of the guarantor.</p> <p>The interest which a promisor has in the performance of a contract by another, or the benefit which he may derive thereby, cannot determine his liability. That liability arises from the character of the promise; and the interest in the principal contract, and the benefit to be derived from it, become matters of consideration only as they may serve to determine that character.</p>