City of Scranton v. Whyte

Citations

• 148 Pa. 419
• 23 A. 1043
• 1892 Pa. LEXIS 997

Syllabus

<p>[Marked to be reported.]</p> <p>Constitutional law — Classification of cities — As to what classes of subjects constitutional — Grading and paving of streets — Act of May 23, 1889.</p> <p>The test by which is to be determined the constitutionality of a law relating to cities of a particular class is the subject-matter to which the law is applicable. If it relates to subjects of municipal concern only, it is constitutional because operating upon all members of the class, and therefore a general law. If it relates to subjects of a general, as distinguished from a municipal character, it is local and therefore invalid, although it may embrace all the members of a class.</p> <p>The subject of the grading and paving of streets is clearly and exclusively one for municipal control. The power to collect the cost of the work so done by any appropriate form of taxation is a municipal power. Therefore-an act upon this subject relating to one of the classes of cities is constitutional.</p> <p>So far as such an act applies in such cases the regular and settled course of procedure, as for example, the filing of a lien for assessments, with the usual procedure thereunder, it does not offend against the constitution by providing for peculiar local procedure.</p> <p>Semble, That any provision varying the usual course in such eases by providing a special period of limitation, duration of lien or similar special provision, would be unconstitutional;</p> <p>The act of May 23, 1889, art. XV., P. L. 317, is not unconstitutional as a whole. Whether certain of its provisions, for example, those providing for the duration of a municipal lien, the effect of a sheriff’s sale thereunder, etc., ai’e unconstitutional, not decided.</p>