City of New Orleans v. Dukes
Citations
- 427 U.S. 297
- 96 S. Ct. 2513
- 49 L. Ed. 2d 511
- 1976 U.S. LEXIS 75
About this case
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1976 United States Supreme Court case
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), was a 1976 United States Supreme Court decision.
Background
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The original case involved a 1972 New Orleans ordinance banning all pushcart food vendors in the French Quarter except those who had continuously operated there for eight or more years. Two vendors had done so for twenty years or more and qualified under the grandfather clause . Appellee Dukes had operated a pushcart for only two years and challenged the ordinance, winning in the lower courts.
The decision
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The City of New Orleans ordinance, authorized under state 'home rule' law, authorized under the Tenth Amendment State Police powers to protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of its citizens - vs- Dukes' Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection of the law:
The question for the court was whether the city of New Orleans' ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment?
_Per Curiam _: No. Case was Reversed.
When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage . . . any classifications other than these must only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . .States are accorded a wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies. . .
In short, the judiciary may not sit as a super legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.
[New Orleans] Classification rationally furthers the purpose which [the] city had identified as its objective in enacting the provision, that is, as a means 'to preserve the appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive to tourists.'
Further reading
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- Choper, Jesse H.; et al. (2001). Constitutional Rights and Liberties (9th ed.). St. Paul: West Group. pp. 1068–1069. ISBN 0-314-24718-1 .
- Joyce, P. M. (1977). "Equal Protection Challenges to Economic Regulations: Mere Rationality or Near Rationality". Loyola Law Review. 23: 584.
External links
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- Text of City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) is available from: CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Internet Archive (docket files) Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)
United States Fourteenth Amendment case law
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How courts have described this case
Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.
- holding that a state may only partly ameliorate a perceived evil at one time and that the failure of a regulation to eliminate all of an evil at one step does not make the regulatory classification irrational
- explaining that rational basis scrutiny applies to equal protection claims “[u]nless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage”
- noting that legislative bodies are “accorded wide latitude” under the rational basis test, and “rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude”
- noting that “suspect distinctions 19 such as race, religion, or alienage” are protected classes for equal protection 20 purposes
- noting that 3 “suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” are protected classes for 4 equal protection purposes
- noting that “suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” are 18 || protected classes for equal protection purposes
Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).
Judges: Marshall, Stevens
Read full opinion on CourtListenerSourced from CourtListener / Free Law Project (CC0).
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.