Chicago, St. Louis & Pittsburg Railroad v. Hutchinson

Citations

• 120 Ill. 587
• 11 N.E. 855

Syllabus

<p>1. Negligence-—general basis of recovery—of the care required to avoid danger. It is the settled doctrine of this court, that a plaintiff may recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of the defendant, if he has observed ordinary care for his personal safety, and to avoid the injury.</p> <p>2. The law requires a person, when approaching a known place of danger, or when placed in a dangerous position, to exercise such care and circumspection for his safety as an ordinarily prudent and cautious man would observe under the circumstances surrounding him. But the degree of care required can not be formulated into a particular rule of conduct, for the reason that the conduct of ordinarily cautious and prudent men will vary as the circumstances presented may be varied.</p> <p>3. While it is the duty of a person approaching a place of danger, to do so cautiously, and with due and proper care for his safety, it can not be said, as a matter of law, that he must take a particular precaution or measure, or just what a prudent man would do under all circumstances.</p> <p>4. This court is not prepared to say, ás a matter of law, that a person approaching a railroad crossing, when there is nothing apparent to warn him of danger, and at which he knows a flagman is stationed, whose duty it is to warn all persons of danger from moving trains, is required to look elsewhere than to the flagman.</p> <p>g_ js fljg ¿ráy 0f a flagman at a public street crossing in a populous city, which is much used by the public, to know of the approach of trains, and to give timely warning to all persons attempting to cross the railroad track, and the public have a right to rely upon a reasonable performance of that duty. The absence of such flagman from his post may excuse one cognizant of his duty, from gross negligence in failing to stop before attempting to cross, and look both ways to see if a train is approaching.</p> <p>6. If it be true that in a particular case a reasonably prudent an