Chicago Lumber Co. v. Douglas

Citations

• 89 Kan. 308
• 131 P. 563
• 1913 Kan. LEXIS 59

Syllabus

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Mechanic’s Lien — What Constitutes “Material” under the Law — Liability of Surety. Lumber furnished for and used in the making of forms for a concrete structure as provided in the contract and specifications for its erection, and which is I largely consumed and rendered valueless by such use, is material within the meaning of the mechanic’s-lien law (Civ. Code, §§ 649-662) and of the provisions of a bond given by al surety company in the form provided for in section 660 ofl the civil code, the obligation of which is that the contractorl will “pay all indebtedness incurred for labor and material furnished and used in and about said contract work, or which| might become the basis of a lien.”</p> <p>2. -Payment by Contractor — Application of Money by “Materialman” — Surety Not Released. The surety company can not escape liability upon the bond for material furnished to and used by the contractor in the building on the ground that money received from the owner and paid to the materialman was applied by the latter in discharge of an earlier indebtedness of the contractor for material used on other buildings, no direction having been given by the contractor as to the application of the payment at the time it was made.</p> <p>3. CORPORATIONS — Suretyship for Profit — Not “Favorites of the Laiv.” The law does not have the same solicitude for corporations organized for the purpose of giving indemnity bonds and which make suretyship a business for profit that it has for voluntary sureties. Such corporations are essentially insurers, and in determining their rights and liabilities the rules peculiar to suretyship do not apply.</p>