Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Schaffer

Citations

• 124 Ill. 112
• 16 N.E. 239

Syllabus

<p>1. Fobmeb beo overt—after- accruing damages—whether a further action may be brought—of continuing a miisance. Where a railway company, under authority of law, properly constructs a bridge over a watercourse, and suit is brought by the land owner for damages thereby caused to his property, and a judgment is recovered and paid, it will be regarded as in full for all future as well as past damages, and a bar to a second suit for subsequent damages arising from the same cause.</p> <p>2. But when the bridge is imperfectly and improperly built, so as to prevent the free passage of the water, and thereby damages the lands above, a judgment for the damages caused by the creation of a nuisance by means of such bridge, will not be a bar to any subsequent action for damages caused by its continuance in such bad condition. In such case, the party injured is not bound to assume that the imperfect structure will be a permanent one. He has a right to regard the nuisance as of a transient character, and instead of bringing one action for the whole injury to the value of his property, resulting from the original construction of the nuisance, he may sue for the amount of such injury as he suffers from its continuance.</p> <p>3. So a party injured thereby may maintain an action against another for the creation of a nuisance, and a subsequent action for its continuance. The continuance of that which was originally a nuisance, is regarded as a new nuisance, and although a recovery may be barred upon the original cause, an action on the case may be brought at any time before an entry is barred, to recover such damages as have accrued by reason of its continuance, within the statutory period.</p> <p>4. If, however, a land owner treats a defective structure as a railroad bridge across a stream of water, which causes his land to be overflowed and otherwise injured, as a permanent source of injury, and recovers the full amount of damages, both present and prospective, which his property s