CHEN

Citations

• 28 I. & N. Dec. 676

Syllabus

(1) The \stop-time\ rule under section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1), is not triggered by the entry of a final removal order, but rather only by service of a statutorily compliant notice to appear or the commission of specified criminal offenses, in accordance with the plain language statutory analysis provided in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021). (2) Breaks in physical presence under section 240A(d)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(2), continue to be interpreted as distinct from termination of physical presence under the stop-time rule. Matter of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I&N Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000), followed. (3) A respondent claiming a fundamental change in law as the basis for seeking sua sponte reopening must also establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. Matter of G‑D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999), followed.