Charles v. Byrd

Citations

• 29 S.C. 544
• 8 S.E. 1
• 1888 S.C. LEXIS 164

Syllabus

<p>1. An agreement in writing whereby B rented a plantation from C for five years, containing no clause of forfeiture or provision for a determination upon any act of the lessee in inviium, construed to be a lease, which, upon the death of the lessee during the term, vested in his administratrix, notwithstanding covenants providing for acts to be personally performed by the lessee, and forbidding a transfer without the lessoi‘’s consent.</p> <p>2. The terms of this parol agreement could not be added to or varied by parol.</p> <p>3. This lease having vested in the administratrix by operation of law, she could not surrender it except by “deed or note in writing.” Qen. Stat., | 2018.</p> <p>4. The doctrine of part performance could not apply to a surrender by the administratrix to herself individually, for that would be merely retaining a pre-existing possession; nor could she as administratrix surrender to herself personally this asset of her intestate’s estate.</p> <p>5. Under a writ of certiorari, the Circuit Court is bound by the facts found by the trial justice. But the conclusion reached by the Circuit Judge being correct, even under the facts so found, his review of these findings was an immaterial error.</p>