Cascade Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Wright

Citations

• 99 Wash. 421
• 169 P. 833
• 1918 Wash. LEXIS 634

Syllabus

<p>Counties — Contracts — Contractor’s Bond—Liability. Actual knowledge on the part of the contractor on county work that materials are being furnished does not dispense with the necessity of notice under Rem. Code, § 1159-1, requiring notice not less than ten days after the first delivery of materials as a prerequisite to a claim or action against the contractor and his bond to secure laborers and materialmen.</p> <p>Same — Contractor’s Bond — Notice—Time for Giving. Under such statute, a notice given after commencing to- furnish lumber is sufficient to bind the contractor as to all deliveries subsequent to the notice, when they were not made under a specific contract for a fixed quantity at a given price, but were made on orders given from time to time as the lumber was needed after the manner of a running account.</p> <p>Actions—Joinder of Causes — Counties — Contractors—Bonds. It is proper to unite causes of action against a contractor on county work and his bondsman and a subcontractor, for materials purchased by the contractor which the subcontractor assumed and agreed to pay, and for materials furnished to the subcontractor under his agreement to pay for the same, in view of the statute making the contractor and his bondsmen responsible for performance of the contract.</p> <p>Pleading—Amendments to Conform to Proof. Upon failure to object to a complaint on the ground that it failed to separately state causes of action that could be united, it will be deemed amended to conform to the proof, under Rem. Code, § 1752.</p> <p>Equity—Maxims. A shortage of $3.85 in a judgment is of such trifling import as to fall within the maxim, “He minimis non curat lex.”</p>