Bulkley v. Devine

Citations

• 127 Ill. 406
• 3 L.R.A. 330

Syllabus

<p>1. Lease—uncertainty in description of premises—cured by possession. A lessee, after having executed the lease, having taken possession under the contract and having paid rent under it, can not repudiate the lease merely because it does not definitely describe the demised premises.</p> <p>2. A leased to B premises in the city of Chicago, etc., “known and described as follows, to-wit, the house known and numbered as No. — Thirty-second street,” etc., at a rental of $35 per month, payable in advance, the term to begin January 1,1885, and end April 30,1886. B took possession of the house, and occupied the same till April 12, 1886, paying the rent thereof to the lessor until June 1,1885, and afterward to the assignee of the lessor up to the time he left, except for the month of August, 1885, which he refused to pay, claiming a set-off. On. suit by the assignee, the tenant resisted judgment, on the ground that the lease sued on was void for uncertainty in the description of the house leased: Held, that the possession of the tenant and use of the property leased had the legal effect of removing all uncertainty as to the property intended to be described.</p> <p>3. Paeol evidence—to identify subject matter of written, contract. Extrinsic proof is always competent to identify the subject matter of a contract, if necessary; and this in no way violates the rule that parol testimony is never admissible to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract. The admissibility of parol evidence, in such case, does not depend upon the distinction between patent and latent ambiguities.</p> <p>4. Ebbob will not always bevebse — admission of improper evidence. A judgment will not be reversed because improper evidence may have been admitted upon the trial, when it is apparent that the result must have been the- same had it been excluded.</p>