Buchanan v. Flinn

Citations

• 51 Pa. Super. 145
• 1912 Pa. Super. LEXIS 193

Syllabus

<p>Negligence — Automobiles—Evidence—Discharge of chauffeur — Experts.</p> <p>1. In an action to recover damages for injuries to an automobile caused by a collision between automobiles owned by the plaintiff and the defendant, where the defendant in his testimony exonerates his chauffeur from blame, and on cross-examination states that he had discharged the chauffeur after the accident because the women of his family would never again feel safe with him, it is reversible error for the trial judge in his charge to give the jury the impression that they could take into consideration the fact that the defendant’s chauffeur had been discharged as bearing on the inquiry whether he had been guilty of negligence at the time of the accident. The fact of the discharge is not substantive evidence for the purpose of establishing negligence.</p> <p>2. The taking of precaution after an accident against the future cannot be held to be an implied admission of liability for what had theretofore taken place.</p> <p>3. In an action to recover damages for injuries to an automobile caused by a collision between two automobiles, it is error to permit the jury to consider as substantive proof of defendant’s negligence declarations of defendant’s chauffeur made to the plaintiff, to the effect that he had been discharged, and asking for a letter stating that he was not altogether to blame.</p> <p>4. In such a case where it appears that the two machines were in good working condition, and the circumstances of the accident are fully described, and are of such a nature that men without special training could understand the situation, expert testimony is not admissible.</p>