Brown v. Pitcairn

Citations

• 148 Pa. 387
• 24 A. 52
• 1892 Pa. LEXIS 992

Syllabus

<p>Equity — Specific performance — Ealse representations inducing contract for sale of land.</p> <p>Specific performance is of grace and not of right.</p> <p>“ He who comes into equity must do so with clean hands,” or as otherwise expressed, “ he that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity.” It necessarily follows from these and other cardinal principles that one who asks specific performance of a contract, in the procurement of which he has practiced deceit, is always an unwelcome suitor in a court of equity. It is well settled that though a contract is valid at law, equity will not enforce it specifically, unless the transaction be free from fraud or surprise.</p> <p>A much less degree of proof is required to induce a chancellor to refuse specific performance of a contract for the sale of land than is required to induce him to reform it or to set it aside.</p> <p>The evidence established the fact that a contract for the sale of land was procured by deceitful misrepresentations made by and on behalf of the plaintiff for the purpose of securing the property, which he desired to use for a blacksmith shop, but which he induced defendant’s agent to believe he intended to use for the erection of dwelling-houses. On learning the use to which plaintiff intended to put the property, defendant refused to carry out the contract and plaintiff filed a bill.</p> <p>Held, that under such a state of a facts a decree for specific performance should be refused.</p> <p>Equity practice — Parties—Decree including wife of defendant, who was not a party to the bill, erroneous.</p> <p>A decree for specific performance which includes the wife of the defendant, who was not a party to the proceeding, is erroneous.</p>