Bradwell v. Pittsb. Etc. Pass. Ry. Co.

Citations

• 139 Pa. 404
• 27 W.N.C. 264
• 20 A. 1046
• 1891 Pa. LEXIS 1008

Syllabus

<p>[To be reported.]</p> <p>1. Assignments oí error relating to the competency of a juror, and to an irregular separation of the jury before verdict, cannot be sustained with nothing on the record on which to base them; if not supported by bills of exception, such assignments will be dismissed without intimation of opinion on the questions intended to be raised.</p> <p>2. Where the peremptory challenges, in a civil cause, are exhausted, leaving the remaining twelve jurors to be sworn, an order refusing a challenge for cause can be brought upon the record for review by the Supreme Court only when an exception was taken in the court below and bill sealed thereon.</p> <p>3. In an action for personal injuries caused by negligence, it is error to charge that the jury must be “• thoroughly satisfied that the accident did not occur in consequence of the carelessness of the plaintiff, .... because the duty of the plaintiff is, not only to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, but also to prove that he was clear of contributory negligence.”</p> <p>4. The rule sometimes laid down, in such cases, that the plaintiff must present a case clear of contributory negligence, was never intended to mean that the plaintiff, after proving affirmatively that the. defendant’s negligence caused the injury, must also prove negatively that he himself was not guilty of negligence that contributed to the result.</p> <p>5. Moreover, by the expression “ thoroughly satisfied,” the jury would doubtless understand that their belief of the plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence must be so strong as to exclude every reasonable doubt; whereas, in civil cases, the standard of proof, ordinarily, is preponderance of evidence, not such a degree of proof as will produce “thorough” satisfaction.</p> <p>6. In an action for personal injuries, the jury, in the face of uncontradieted evidence of substantial damages, having rendered a verdict for 6J- cents, a provisional order for a new trial,