Binz v. Weber

Citations

• 81 Ill. 288

Syllabus

<p>I. Statutbs-to/ the passage of laws—the title. Under the constitution of 1870, only such portions of a bill as were expressed in the title when it passed the two houses will acquire the force of law. It does not matter what title may be adopted to designate the act after it has passed. That is no part of the law, nor does it enlarge, limit or control the law. But every bill must have a title, and such title does limit and control the bill as passed.</p> <p>- 3. But the mere fact that the title of an act is more restrictive than the title of the bill when it passed one of the houses, will not necessarily defeat the entire act, if there be portions of it which are still embraced in the more restrictive title, and^which may be executed independently of those portions Which have to be rejected.</p> <p>8. SAMK—presumption. However, where the legislative journals are not proved for the purpose of showing by what title a bill passed each house, it •will be presumed that it so passed by the title to the act, and the operation and effect of the act will be governed by such title.</p> <p>4. Same—^whether an act relates to more than one subject. The “ act to authorize the city of Belleville and the town of Mascoutah to issue bonds,” so far as it authorized the places named to issue their bonds for the purpose mentioned in the act, is held to contain but one subject, and that is accurately expressed in the title.</p> <p>. o. Former decision. It was incidentally, said in Larrison v. Peoria, Atlanta and Decatur Railroad Co. 77 Ill. 11, that the constitution does not require a title to a bill. But that was wrong, as the practice is changed by the constitution so as to render a title to a bill indispensable, and that opinion should be regarded as modified to that extent.</p>