Bank v. Poore

Citations

• 231 Pa. 362
• 80 A. 525
• 1911 Pa. LEXIS 848

Syllabus

<p>Judgments — Collateral attack — Married women — Capacity to contract —Presumptions—Act of June 8,1898, P. L. 844 — Principal and surety —Ejectment.</p> <p>1. Under the Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, a married woman occupies the same position with regard to her property and the right to make contracts as if she,were unmarried with the exceptions noted in the act. Formerly her capacity to contract was exceptional and her disability general; now the disability is exceptional and her capacity general; the burden is on her when she seeks to avoid her contract to bring it within one of the few exceptions. The unlimited power over her property and the unrestricted right to make contracts have changed the former presumption that her contracts were void.</p> <p>2. A judgment regular on its face and entered by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot, in the absence of fraud or collusion, be impeached collaterally in any court by the parties or privies thereto, or by a stranger. Since the passage of the act of 1893, there being no presumption that a judgment confessed by a married woman is void, it is prima facie valid, and being only voidable it cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding, such as an action of ejectment.</p>