Baker v. Carr

• Article

• Talk

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that redistricting qualifies as a justiciable question under the Fourteenth Amendment 's equal protection clause, thus enabling federal courts to hear Fourteenth Amendment-based redistricting cases. The court summarized its Baker holding in a later decision as follows: "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature in designing the geographical districts from which representatives are chosen either for the State Legislature or for the Federal House of Representatives." (_Gray v. Sanders _, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)). The court had previously held in _Gomillion v. Lightfoot _ that districting claims over racial discrimination could be brought under the Fifteenth Amendment.

English Wikisource has original text related to this article:

**Baker v. Carr **

The case arose from a lawsuit against the state of Tennessee, which had not conducted redistricting since 1901. Tennessee argued that the composition of legislative districts constituted a nonjusticiable political question , as the U.S. Supreme Court had held in _Colegrove v. Green _ (1946). In a majority opinion joined by five other justices, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. held that redistricting did not qualify as a political question, though he remanded the case to the federal district court for further proceedings. Justice Felix Frankfurter strongly dissented, arguing that the Court's decision cast aside history and judicial restraint and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and courts.

The case did not have any immediate effect on electoral districts, but it set an important precedent regarding the power of federal courts to address redistricting. In 1964, the Supreme Court handed down two cases, _Wesberry v. Sanders _ and _Reynolds v. Sims _, that required the United States House of Representatives and state legislatures to establish electoral districts of equal population on the principle of one person, one vote .

Contents

• 1 Background

• 2 Decision

• 3 Dissent by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan

• 4 Aftermath

• 5 See also

• 6 References

• 7 Further reading

• 8 External links

Background

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Baker_v._Carr&action=edit&section=1 "Edit section: Background")

Plaintiff Charles Baker was a Republican who lived in Shelby County, Tennessee , and had served as the mayor of Millington , near Memphis .[1] The Tennessee State Constitution required that the Tennessee General Assembly 's legislative districts be redrawn every ten years to provide for districts of substantially equal population (as was to be done for congressional districts). Baker's complaint was that Tennessee had not redistricted since 1901, in response to the 1900 census . He was represented by Charles S. Rhyne , a Washington, D.C. attorney and former president of the American Bar Association .[2]

By the time of Baker's lawsuit, the population had shifted such that his district in Shelby County had about ten times as many residents as some of the rural districts. Rural citizens' votes were thus overrepresented compared to those of urban citizens. Baker's argument was that this discrepancy was causing him to fail to receive the "equal protection of the laws" the Fourteenth Amendment requires. Defendant Joe Carr was sued in his position as Tennessee Secretary of State . Carr was not the person who set the district lines – the state legislature had done that – but was sued _ex officio _ as the person ultimately responsible for the conduct of elections in the state and the publication of district maps.

Tennessee argued that the composition of legislative districts was essentially a political question, not a judicial one, as had been held by _Colegrove v. Green _,[3] a plurality opinion of the Court in which Justice Felix Frankfurter declared that "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket." Frankfurter believed that relief for legislative malapportionment had to be won through the political process.[4]

Decision

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Baker_v._Carr&action=edit&section=2 "Edit section: Decision")

Baker v. Carr was one of the most wrenching decisions in the Court's history. The case had to be put over for reargument because in conference no clear majority emerged for either side of the case. Justice Charles Evans Whittaker was so torn over the case that he eventually had to recuse himself for health reasons. The arduous decision process in Baker is often blamed for Whittaker's health problems, which forced him to retire from the Court in 1962.[5]

The opinion was finally handed down in March 1962, nearly a year after it was initially argued. The Court split 6 to 2 in ruling that Baker's case was justiciable, producing, in addition to the opinion of the Court by Justice William J. Brennan , three concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions. Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine, identifying six factors to help in determining which questions are "political" in nature. Cases that are political in nature are marked by:

1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"; as an example, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political questions"
2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it";
3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion";
4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government";
5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made"; and
6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

Justice Tom C. Clark switched his vote at the last minute to a concurrence on the substance of Baker's claims, which would have enabled a majority that could have granted relief for Baker. Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court.

The large majority in this case can in many ways be attributed to Brennan, who convinced Justice Potter Stewart that the case was a narrow ruling dealing only with the right to challenge the statute. Brennan also talked down Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas from their usual absolutist positions to achieve a compromise.[6]

Dissent by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Baker_v._Carr&action=edit&section=3 "Edit section: Dissent by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan")

Frankfurter, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan II , dissented vigorously and at length, arguing that the Court had cast aside history and judicial restraint, and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and Courts.[7] He wrote:

Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted. But they ar

…