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· 3/20/1908

Bailey v. Janvier

Citations

  • 120 La. 893
  • 45 So. 932
  • 1908 La. LEXIS 589

Syllabus

<p>Elections — Primary Elections — Contests— Parties — Venue.</p> <p>The law (section 25, Act No. 49, p. 77, of 1906) authorizing a candidate in a primary election, who feels aggrieved by the decision of the state central committee upon his protest against the result, as promulgated by the Secretary of State, to have such decision reviewed by a court of competent jurisdiction, in a proceeding, by rule, against the “person declared by the committee to be the nominee,” no more authorizes or contemplates a suit or proceeding against such committee, than against the Secretary of State, and as neither the one nor the other has any interest in the result of such suit there is no reason why either should be made, and no authority for making either, a party defendant therein. The only person whom the complaining candidate is authorized, or has any reason, to bring into court in such case is the opposing candidate or nominee, and the “court of competent jurisdiction,” so far as he is concerned, is the court of his domicile.</p> <p>Nicholls, J., dissenting.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

  • holding that when the plaintiffs “as a condition of their employment [] had to provide personal information” to the defendant, the defendant “implicitly agreed to safeguard that information”
  • holding monetary and time loss from information safeguarding, emotional distress were sufficient to plead a cognizable injury
  • finding that the plaintiff’s essentially identical allegations of injury sufficiently pled proximate cause over the defendant’s similar argument that they were too speculative
  • holding employees who disclosed personal information as a condition of employment stated a claim for breach of implied contract sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
  • holding, under Kentucky and Utah law, that “[a] defendant’s actions may be intentional when the Defendant acts with such reckless disregard for the privacy of the plaintiff that the actions rise to the level of being an intentional tort.”
  • taking an “affirmative action” to “gather” plaintiffs’ personal tax information amounted to an intrusion within the meaning of the Restatement

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).

Judges: Monroe, Nicholls

Read full opinion on CourtListener

Sourced from CourtListener / Free Law Project (CC0).

This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.