Augustine v. Wolf

Citations

• 29 Pa. Super. 336
• 1905 Pa. Super. LEXIS 330

Syllabus

<p>Courts — Discretion—Judicial discretion — Opening judgment.</p> <p>When courts are said to exercise a “discretion,” it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature, or, in other words, to the will of the law.</p> <p>Judgment — Opening judgment — Discretion—Laches.</p> <p>While the measure of proof required by the judge to open a judgment and to clear the way to the jury, cannot be defined by rule, and a mere conflict of evidence is not, generally, sufficient, yet the defendant should be allowed a trial where he has shown by a preponderance of evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict in his favor, that he has a just defense. This is the most prudent course also when material and important questions Of fact are in serious dispute.</p> <p>Mere delay in making the application is not always sufficient ground for refusing to open judgments when third parties are not affected; nor is mere delay always the legal equivalent of laches to take effect as an estoppel. This effect depends on the facts.</p> <p>When fraud and forgery in procuring the judgment are averred, and it becomes apparent that either has been potential or controlling in a former proceeding affirmed by the Supreme Court, an inferior tribunal should give such affirmance the fullest legal effect, when the same facts are presented in any subsequent stage of that proceeding. When the fraud alleged is of such a character as to involve the crime of forgery it cannot be ratified; as a fraud effected by forgery does not admit of ratification.</p> <p>Even where forgeiy is charged there is no inflexible rule which compels the court to open a judgment.</p> <p>While a judgment should not be opened upon the defendant’s oath when cont