Apex Oil Company, Inc., individually and as Assignee of Glencore, Ltd. v. State of Rhode Island, acting by and through Division of Taxation

Syllabus

The plaintiff, Apex Oil Company, Inc. (Apex), filed a petition of certiorari seeking review of an order of the Sixth Division District Court dismissing two actions that challenge the State of Rhode Island Division of Taxation's denial of Apex's claim for a refund of $4,280,039.44 paid for Motor Fuel Tax assessed on the purchase and sale of 300,000 barrels of oil. Apex claimed that (1) it had standing because it suffered an injury in fact and also was the beneficiary of express statutory authority granting standing to seek a refund of the Motor Fuel Tax (2) the trial judge erred in concluding that res judicata barred its appeal and (3) the doctrine of administrative finality did not apply to bar its claims. <br><br>The Supreme Court concluded that Apex had suffered an injury in fact and thus had standing to pursue its claims. The Court explained that Apex had suffered a substantial economic injury in excess of $4 million. This injury, the Court opined, was concrete, particularized, and actual, not conjectural or hypothetical. The Court also determined that Apex's injury was caused by the Division because it was traceable to the action of the Division—namely, the Division's decision to deny Apex a motor fuel distributor registration certificate and then impose the Motor Fuel Tax.<br><br>The Court also concluded that the trial judge erred in dismissing Apex's claims based upon the doctrine of res judicata. The Court explained that the parties to the settlement agreement and the parties in the instant action were not the same, nor were they in privity, because Glencore and Apex did not share a commonality of interests. Specifically, the Court noted that, at the time of the settlement agreement, Glencore had no incentive to challenge the tax as Apex was required to reimburse it pursuant to the terms of their contract. <br><br>Lastly, the Court concluded that the doctrine of administrative finality did not apply because the doctrine requires that the initial application f