Amet v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.

Citations

• 117 La. 454
• 41 So. 721
• 1906 La. LEXIS 721

Syllabus

<p>1. Expropriation —■ Statutes — Construction.</p> <p>The terms “taking or expropriation” as used in Act No. 96, p. 142, of 1896, amending the general expropriation statutes of the state, must be construed as equivalent.</p> <p>2. Same — Constitutional Provisions.</p> <p>The term “taken” is used in the state Constitutions of 1879 and 1898 in the sense of “expropriation” and that is its proper signification in legislation relative to the exercise of the power of eminent domain.</p> <p>3. ■ Constitutional Law — Statutes —■ Con - struction in Eavor oe Validity.</p> <p>To hold that the Legislature intended the word “taking” as used in the-act of 1896, to mean an unlawful appropriation of lands, and that this term was interpolated in the- text to enable corporations'to acquire' title by the short prescription of two years, would be tantamount to declaring the act unconstitutional, as no such object is expressed in the title.</p> <p>4. Eminent Domain — Remedies oe Owners— Prescription.</p> <p>The short .prescription of two years applies only when there'has been a judgment of expropriation, and the corporation has entered into possession before the payment of the compensation awarded. Mitchell v. Railway Co., 6 South. 522, 41 La. Ann. 363, reaffirmed.</p> <p>As the present Constitution of the state prohibits such a taking, unless just and adequate compensation be first paid, the power of the Legislature to make such a trespass the basis of a special short prescription is more than doubtful.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>