American Bible Society v. Price

Citations

• 115 Ill. 623
• 5 N.E. 126

Syllabus

<p>1. Testamentary capacity—of the various elements affecting that question. Although a person may have sufficient mental capacity to attend to the ordinary business affairs of life, yet if he is insane with regard to subjects connected with the testamentary disposition of his property and the objects of his bounty, while influenced and controlled by such insanity, to such an extent as to be unable rationally to comprehend the nature and effect of the provisions of his will, he will be incapable of making a valid will.</p> <p>2. An understanding, however, of the nature of the business in respect of which the testator is about making a will, of the kind and value of the property devised, and the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty, and of the manner in which he wishes to dispose of his property, are evidences of testamentary capacity.</p> <p>3. But where there is an insane delusion in regard to one who is a natural object of the testator’s bounty, which causes him to make a will he would not have made but for such delusion, the will can no't be sustained; or where there is an insane delusion in regard to the duty or moral obligation of the testator to make a will in favor of a particular corporation or society, a will made as the result of such delusion can not be sustained.</p> <p>4. Eccentricities or peculiarities, or radical or extreme notions or opinions upon religion, colleges, education, or masonry and secret societies, will not necessarily render a man incapable of making a will, but they may. It is therefore no error to modify an instruction that such things will not incapacitate a person, by making it read they will not necessarily incapacitate.</p> <p>5. Same—opinions of persons not experts. The opinions of witnesses not experts, as to the sanity of a testator at the time of making his will, after first stating their observations upon which they are based, are competent evidence in a contest of a will.</p> <p>6. Pleading and evidence—sufficien