Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Covered Financial Institutions
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Issuing agencies
Abstract
FinCEN is issuing this proposed rule to strengthen customer due diligence requirements under the Customer Due Diligence Rule consistent with the policy goals of, and as directed by, Executive Order 14406, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial System. Specifically, the proposal ensures financial institutions covered by the Customer Due Diligence Rule collect sufficient information to verify the identities of beneficial owners of legal entity customers and maintain the authority, where warranted, to obtain additional information, including information relevant to whether the beneficial owners of legal entity customers possess lawful immigration status and employment authorization in the United States when such information is relevant to assessing risks.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 222 (Thursday, November 19, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 222 (Thursday, November 19, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 74514-74530]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-23614]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
31 CFR Part 1010
RIN 1506-AB78
Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Covered Financial
Institutions
AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing this proposed rule to strengthen customer
due diligence requirements under the Customer Due Diligence Rule
consistent with the policy goals of, and as directed by, Executive
Order 14406, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial System.
Specifically, the proposal ensures financial institutions covered by
the Customer Due Diligence Rule collect sufficient information to
verify the identities of beneficial owners of legal entity customers
and maintain the authority, where warranted, to obtain additional
information, including information relevant to whether the beneficial
owners of legal entity customers possess lawful immigration status and
employment authorization in the United States when such information is
relevant to assessing risks.
DATES: Comments must be received by January 19, 2027.
ADDRESSES: Comments must be submitted in one of the following two ways
(please choose only one of the ways listed):
<bullet> Electronically at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>. Follow the
``Submit a comment'' instructions under Docket FINCEN-2026-0298. If you
are reading this document on <a href="http://federalregister.gov">federalregister.gov</a>, you may use the green
``SUBMIT A PUBLIC COMMENT'' button beneath this rulemaking's title to
submit a comment to the <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> docket.
<bullet> You may mail written comments to the following address:
Regulatory and Strategic Affairs Division, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183. Mailed comments must be
received by the close of the comment period.
All comments will be made available to the public. Do not include
personal identifiable information in submissions; submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. We may redact in
part or withhold entirely from publication a comment that contains
threats of violence, classified information, or information potentially
related to a whistleblower submission or that identifies a
whistleblower. Comments may be submitted anonymously. When multiple
comments are submitted with identical or near-identical content, FinCEN
may post only a single representative example of identical or
substantially identical comments. All related documents and comments
are posted on <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>.
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), a summary of this proposed
rule may be found at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: FinCEN's Regulatory Support Section by
submitting an inquiry at <a href="http://www.fincen.gov/contact">www.fincen.gov/contact</a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Scope
This proposed rule would amend the Customer Due Diligence (CDD)
Rule, which was promulgated under authorities provided by the Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA), to strengthen certain customer due diligence
requirements. This proposed rule supports the efforts of the Department
of the Treasury to make the CDD Rule more effective, risk-based, and
focused on the greatest threats to financial institutions and national
security, as well as promote Treasury's efforts to reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden consistent with Executive Order 14192, Unleashing
Prosperity Through Deregulation. This proposal implements the directive
in Executive Order 14406, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial
System (hereinafter ``Executive Order 14406'') to propose changes to
applicable BSA regulations to strengthen risk-based customer due
diligence requirements.
II. Background and Authority
A. The Bank Secrecy Act
Enacted in 1970 and amended several times since, the BSA is
designed to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and
other illicit finance risks.\1\ Congress has authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to administer the BSA. The Secretary has in turn
delegated the authority to implement, administer, and enforce
compliance with the BSA and its associated regulations to the Director
of FinCEN.\2\
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\1\ Certain parts of the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act, its amendments, and the other statutes relating to
the subject matter of that Act, are collectively referred to as the
Bank Secrecy Act or BSA. These statutes are codified at 12 U.S.C.
1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951-1960, and 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314 and 5316-5336
and notes thereto, with implementing regulations at 31 CFR chapter
X.
\2\ See Treasury Order 180-01, at ] 3 (Jan. 14, 2020), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/orders-and-directives/treasury-order-180-01">https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/orders-and-directives/treasury-order-180-01</a>; see also 31 U.S.C. 310(b)(2)(I) (providing
that the Director of FinCEN shall ``[a]dminister the requirements of
subchapter II of chapter 53 of this title, chapter 2 of title I of
Public Law 91-508, and section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, to the extent delegated such authority by the Secretary of the
Treasury'').
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Since its original enactment, Congress has expanded the BSA to
address various aspects of anti-money laundering (AML) and countering
the financing of terrorism (CFT) compliance, including through
expansion of the BSA. In 1992, the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act \3\ gave the Secretary authority to require financial institutions,
as defined in the BSA regulations, to ``carry out'' AML programs and to
prescribe minimum standards for such programs, including: ``(A) the
development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; (B) the
designation of a compliance officer; (C) an ongoing employee training
program; and (D) an independent audit function to test programs.'' \4\
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\3\ Section 1517 of Public Law 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (Oct. 28,
1992) (Annunzio-Wylie).
\4\ Section 1517(b) of Public Law 102-550 (amending 31 U.S.C.
5318(h)(1)).
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Later, the USA PATRIOT Act further amended the BSA, reinforcing the
Annunzio-Wylie framework by making it mandatory for financial
institutions to maintain AML programs that meet minimum prescribed
standards.\5\ The USA PATRIOT Act also, among other things, directed
the Secretary to set minimum standards for financial institutions
regarding customer identity in connection with the opening of accounts,
commonly referred to as customer identification program (CIP)
requirements,\6\ and expanded the definition of ``financial
institution'' under the BSA, and by extension the AML program
requirement, to cover certain other financial industry participants
(e.g., credit unions and futures commission merchants).\7\
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\5\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318(h), as added by section 352 of the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001).
\6\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318(l) as added by section 326 of the USA
PATRIOT Act.
\7\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(E) and 31 U.S.C. 5312(c), as added
by section 321 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
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[[Page 74515]]
Finally, on January 1, 2021, Congress enacted the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY
2021 NDAA), of which the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AML Act) was a
component.\8\ Among the purposes of the AML Act, as stated by Congress,
was to reinforce that required policies, procedures and controls should
support the need for AML/CFT programs to be ``risk-based.'' \9\
Consistent with the goals of the AML Act, Treasury recognizes the
urgent need to modernize the AML/CFT regime in the United States so
that it is effective, risk-based, and focused on the greatest threats
to financial institutions and national security.\10\
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\8\ William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Public Law 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (Jan.
1, 2021).
\9\ Section 6002(4) of the FY 2021 NDAA; see also 31 U.S.C.
5311(2), (3) as added by section 6101 of the AML Act (establishing
that among the purposes of the BSA are to prevent money laundering
and terrorist financing through the establishment of ``risk-based
programs'' and facilitate the ``tracking of money that has been
sourced through criminal activity''). Section 5318(h), as amended by
section 6101 the AML Act, also requires that when prescribing
minimum standards for programs under this section, the Secretary
shall take into account certain factors: (i) financial institutions
are spending private compliance funds for a public and private
benefit, including protecting the United States financial system
from illicit finance risks; (ii) extension of financial services to
the underbanked and the facilitation of financial transactions,
including remittances, coming from the United States and abroad in
ways that simultaneously prevent criminal persons from abusing
formal or informal financial services networks are key U.S. policy
goals; (iii) effective AML/CFT programs safeguard national security
and generate significant public benefits by preventing flow of
illicit funds in the financial system and by assisting law
enforcement and national security agencies with identification and
prosecution of persons attempting money laundering and other illicit
activity in the financial system; and (iv) AML/CFT programs should
be reasonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with BSA
requirements and be risk-based, including ensuring that more
attention and resources of financial institutions be directed
towards higher risk customers and activities than lower risk. FinCEN
took these factors into consideration when preparing this proposal.
\10\ See, e.g., FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the
Financing of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR 18704, 18708 (Apr. 10, 2026)
(discussing Treasury's guiding principles for BSA reform and
providing examples of steps taken to implement a modernized BSA
regulatory and supervisory regime).
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B. The Customer Due Diligence Rule
FinCEN has implemented these statutory mandates and authorities by
promulgating program rules, among other requirements. Most notably in a
2016 rulemaking, FinCEN, in consultation with the Federal functional
regulators, incorporated both general and specific customer due
diligence (CDD) requirements into FinCEN's regulations.\11\
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\11\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial
Institutions, 81 FR 29398 (May 11, 2016).
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First, the 2016 rulemaking required banks, brokers and dealers in
securities, mutual funds, and futures commission merchants and
introducing brokers in commodities (collectively ``covered financial
institutions'') to implement and maintain, as part of their AML
programs, ``appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing
customer due diligence,'' including ``[u]nderstanding the nature and
purpose of customer relationships for the purposes of developing a
customer risk profile'' and ``[c]onducting ongoing monitoring'' both
``to identify and report suspicious transactions'' and ``on a risk
basis, to maintain and update customer information.'' \12\ This became
what is now colloquially known as the ``fifth pillar'' of an AML
compliance program.\13\
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\12\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial
Institutions, 81 FR at 29457 (setting out the regulatory text); see
also id. at 29450, note 185; 31 CFR 1020.210(b)(2)(v),
1023.210(b)(5), 1024.210(b)(5), 1026.210(b)(5).
\13\ As indicated above, the other pillars are the four
requirements listed in 31 U.S.C. 5318(h): ``(A) the development of
internal policies, procedures, and controls; (B) the designation of
a compliance officer; (C) an ongoing employee training program; and
(D) an independent audit function to test programs.''
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Second, the CDD rulemaking codified at 31 CFR 1010.230 a
requirement that covered financial institutions ``identify and verify
beneficial owners of legal entity customers.'' \14\ Under what became
known as the ``ownership prong'' of this requirement, covered financial
institutions collect the names and identifying information of ``[e]ach
individual, if any, who, directly or indirectly . . . owns 25 percent
or more of the equity interests'' of the legal entity customer.\15\
Under what became known as the ``control prong'' of this requirement,
covered financial institutions collect the name and identifying
information of ``[a] single individual with significant responsibility
to control, manage, or direct a legal entity customer.'' \16\ For the
status of the specified individuals as beneficial owners of the legal
entity customer, covered financial institutions could ``rely on the
information supplied by the legal entity customer . . . provided that
[the covered financial institution] has no knowledge of facts that
would reasonably call into question the reliability of such
information.'' \17\ For verification of the identity of the individual
beneficial owners, covered financial institutions, at a minimum, would
have to follow procedures containing all of the elements required for
verification of individual account-holders under applicable CIP
regulations.\18\ Covered financial institutions were required to
undertake this identification and verification ``at the time a new
account is opened,'' meaning every time that a legal entity customer
opened a new account.\19\
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\14\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial
Institutions, 81 FR at 29451 (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(a)).
\15\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(d)(1)).
\16\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(d)(2)).
\17\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2)).
\18\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2)). The CIP
regulations are category-specific rules establishing the
requirements for some categories of financial institutions,
including all covered financial institutions, in connection with
customer identification and verification of identity. See 31 CFR
1020.220 (CIP for banks), 31 CFR 1023.220 (CIP for brokers and
dealers in securities), 31 CFR 1024.220 (CIP for mutual funds), 31
CFR 1026.220 (CIP for futures commission merchants and introducing
brokers in commodities).
\19\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial
Institutions, 81 FR at 29451 (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(a)(1)).
CDD Rule requirements were effective long before the passage of the
Corporate Transparency Act, and the two legal authorities differ in
numerous ways. The CTA's objective, creating a nationwide system of
direct reporting to the federal government of highly useful
information related to beneficial ownership, is different from that
of the CDD Rule, as are its definition of beneficial owner, the
information in which it is interested, the entities reporting that
information, and the recipients of that information.
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C. Recent Modifications to CDD Rule Obligations
In 2026, FinCEN used its authority under the BSA to grant exceptive
relief to covered financial institutions from the requirement to
identify and verify the identities of beneficial owners of legal entity
customers at each new account opening.\20\ That order, FIN-2026-R001,
acknowledged that the CDD Rule requires a covered financial institution
to identify and verify a legal entity customer's beneficial owners each
time that customer opens an account with the covered financial
institution, regardless of how little time passes between account
openings or whether the covered financial institution has knowledge of
facts that would reasonably call into question the reliability of
beneficial ownership information last obtained about the customer.
Consistent with the Trump Administration's policy of reducing
unnecessary regulatory burden and enhancing the risk-based framework of
the AML/CFT regulations, FinCEN granted relief so that a covered
financial
[[Page 74516]]
institution--instead of being required to undertake identification and
verification ``at the time a new account is opened''--``may instead
limit its identification and verification of the identities of
beneficial owners . . . to the following scenarios: (1) when a legal
entity customer first opens an account with a covered financial
institution; (2) any time thereafter when the covered financial
institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into
question the reliability of beneficial ownership information previously
obtained about the legal entity customer; and (3) as needed based on a
covered financial institution's risk-based procedures for conducting
ongoing customer due diligence.'' \21\ FinCEN noted in its exceptive
relief order that it would consider whether to codify this relief via a
rulemaking.
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\20\ See FinCEN, FIN-2026-R001, Exceptive Relief from
Requirement to Identify and Verify Beneficial Owners at Each Account
Opening (Feb. 13, 2026), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-02/FinCEN-Order-CCDExceptiveRelief.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-02/FinCEN-Order-CCDExceptiveRelief.pdf</a>.
\21\ Id.
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D. Executive Order 14406: Restoring Integrity to America's Financial
System
On May 19, 2026, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order
14406 to further the Administration's policy of ``restor[ing] integrity
to America's financial system, safeguard[ing] financial institutions
against structural risks, and deter[ring] fraud and abuse.'' \22\ The
Executive Order highlighted risks to the financial system caused by
illicit cross-border financial activity and extension of credit or
financial services to the inadmissible and removable alien population.
To address these risks, it emphasized the importance of the Federal
government adopting tailored measures to safeguard the financial system
from illicit use and promote safe and sound lending and other practices
by financial institutions and stated the need for financial
institutions to have in place ``proper know-your-customer practices''
to prevent abuse of the system and be attentive to ``credit risks posed
by the extension of . . . consumer credit to the inadmissible and
removable alien population.'' \23\ The Executive Order requires actions
by various Federal agencies, including changes to the CDD Rule and
consideration of changes to CIP rules.\24\
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\22\ Executive Order 14406 of May 19, 2026, Restoring Integrity
to America's Financial System, 91 FR 30479 (May 22, 2026).
\23\ Id.
\24\ Section 3(a) directed the Secretary to issue a formal
Advisory to financial institutions regarding the risks associated
with the exploitation of the United States financial system by non-
work authorized populations and their employers. Executive Order
14406 of May 19, 2026, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial
System, 91 FR at 30480. The Secretary, through FinCEN and jointly
with the FDIC, OCC, and NCUA, on June 5, 2026, issued an advisory
that urged financial institutions to be vigilant against fraud
schemes and other suspicious or potentially criminal activities
involving the unlawful employment of illegal aliens and the
associated risks to the integrity of the U.S. financial system. See
FinCEN, FIN-2026-A002, Joint Advisory on Non-Work Authorized
Populations and Their Employers and Risks to the Integrity of the
U.S. Financial System (June 5, 2026), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf</a>.
Section 4 directed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
to consider clarifying that potential deportation and loss of wages
are factors that could adversely affect a non-work authorized
borrower's ability to repay an extension of credit under the
``ability-to-repay'' standards, and it required the FDIC, OCC, and
NCUA to issue guidance regarding the management of the potential
credit risks posed by the non-work authorized population. Executive
Order 14406 of May 19, 2026, Restoring Integrity to America's
Financial System, 91 FR at 30480-81. The CFPB issued its statement
on June 8, 2026. See CFPB, Statement on Ability to Repay and
Immigration Status, 91 FR 34607 (June 8, 2026). The FDIC, OCC, and
NCUA subsequently published interagency guidance. FDIC, OCC, and
NCUA, Interagency Guidance on Lending to Individuals Not Legally
Authorized to Work in the United States (July 13, 2026), <a href="https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2026/nr-ia-2026-57a.pdf">https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2026/nr-ia-2026-57a.pdf</a>.
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This proposal would implement section 3(b) of Executive Order
14406. Section 3(b) directs the Secretary--in consultation with the
``appropriate Federal functional financial regulators,'' defined in the
Executive Order as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA)--to propose changes to applicable implementing
regulations of the BSA to strengthen risk-based customer due diligence
requirements for covered financial institutions. Section 3(b) of the
Executive Order specifies that such changes should ensure that ``(i)
institutions collect and verify sufficient customer identity
information to reasonably identify the nominal and beneficial owners of
accounts in order to assess risks related to illicit finance, sanctions
evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity; and (ii) institutions
maintain the authority, where warranted by other risk indicators or
supervisory concerns, to obtain additional information necessary to
resolve material compliance concerns, including information relevant to
whether account holders possess lawful immigration status and
employment authorization in the United States when such information is
relevant to assessing risks associated with fraud, identity
misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other illicit financial
activity, as part of a risk-based customer due diligence program.''
E. Other FinCEN Proposed Rules
In developing its proposal to implement section 3(b) of Executive
Order 14406, FinCEN has considered other relevant FinCEN regulations--
both those in effect and those in consideration--that are relevant to
customer due diligence and mitigation of customer risk to inform the
specifics of this proposed rule.
FinCEN has issued proposed rules further emphasizing the risk-based
approach to AML/CFT programs for covered financial institutions, as
well as permitted payment stablecoin issuers (PPSIs).\25\ Those rules,
if finalized as proposed, would, among other things, require each
covered financial institution and PPSI to establish a risk-based set of
internal policies, procedures, and controls that must be reasonably
designed to conduct ongoing customer due diligence. Under these
proposed requirements, if finalized, covered financial institutions
must establish and maintain a written AML/CFT program that includes
appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due
diligence, to include, but not be limited to, understanding the nature
and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a
customer risk profile.
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\25\ FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing
of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR 18704 (Apr. 10, 2026); FinCEN,
Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering
the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Program
Requirements, 91 FR 18582 (Apr. 10, 2026); see also FinCEN, OCC,
FRB, FDIC, and NCUA, Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Customer
Identification Program, 91 FR 37234 (June 22, 2026). FinCEN's
proposal implementing the GENIUS Act's anti-money laundering
obligations for PPSIs also proposes changes to 31 CFR 1010.230. The
potential changes under both proposals would be complementary rather
than conflicting.
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Notably, those proposals are consistent with Executive Order
14406's directive to adopt tailored measures to safeguard the financial
system from illicit use and ensure that institutions maintain risk-
based customer due diligence programs.\26\ Most importantly,
[[Page 74517]]
the proposals would, if finalized, ensure internal policies,
procedures, and controls--including those relating to conducting
ongoing customer due diligence--must be reasonably designed to mitigate
assessed risk, including by allocating more attention and resources
toward higher-risk customers and activities rather than toward lower-
risk customers and activities.\27\
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\26\ This proposal is one element of broader CDD Rule revisions,
including those required by the Corporate Transparency Act. The CTA
directed Treasury to revise the CDD Rule to: (1) bring it into
conformity with the AML Act of 2020, including the CTA; (2) account
for financial institutions' access to beneficial ownership
information reported to FinCEN so financial institutions may confirm
beneficial ownership information provided directly to them for the
purpose of facilitating their compliance with anti-money laundering,
countering the financing of terrorism, and customer due diligence
requirements; and (3) reduce any burdens on financial institutions
and legal entity customers that are, in light of the CTA,
unnecessary or duplicative. Section 6403(d)(1)(A)-(C) of the FY 2021
NDAA. The current proposal is not the revision to the CDD Rule that
addresses the issues specified by the CTA. FinCEN recently issued a
final rule regarding beneficial ownership reporting requirements,
which limits reporting to foreign entities registered to do business
in the United States. FinCEN, Beneficial Ownership Information
Reporting Requirement Revision, 91 FR 52508 (Aug. 14, 2026). FinCEN
has determined that, given how recently the new beneficial ownership
reporting regime has been finalized, such changes are more
appropriately considered as part of a separate rulemaking.
Additionally, FinCEN has proposed, as required by the GENIUS Act,
applying CDD obligations to PPSIs. See OFAC and FinCEN, Permitted
Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the
Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Program Requirements,
91 FR at 18604. This proposal, with respect to PPSIs, if finalized,
would apply to PPSIs as a category of institution covered by CDD
obligations.
\27\ See, e.g., 91 FR at 18717-18.
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III. Overview of the Proposal
In drafting this proposed rule, FinCEN has considered how it can
best strengthen the CDD Rule by adopting tailored measures to safeguard
the financial system, including by ensuring that covered financial
institutions have risk-based collection and verification requirements
and direct compliance resources towards higher risk customers as
directed by Executive Order 14406. In addition to implementing the
directive in section 3(b) of Executive Order 14406, FinCEN also seeks
to further the Trump Administration's efforts to modernize the AML/CFT
regime by making it more effective, risk-based, and focused on the
greatest threats to national security, while reducing unnecessary
regulatory burden.
After considering the existing regulations, proposals, and
obligations, as well as the directives in Executive Order 14406, FinCEN
assesses that targeted amendments to the CDD Rule--specifically, Sec.
1010.230--best effectuate the goals of Executive Order 14406.
Specifically, this proposal includes three targeted revisions to the
CDD Rule codified at Sec. 1010.230, in addition to other minor
regulatory clarifications.
First, consistent with Executive Order 14406, the proposal would
strengthen risk-based customer due diligence requirements for covered
financial institutions by making explicit that, where warranted by
other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, a covered financial
institution may obtain additional information necessary to resolve
material compliance concerns, including information relevant to whether
account holders possess lawful immigration status and employment
authorization in the United States when such information is relevant to
assessing risks associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation,
sanctions evasion, or other illicit financial activity, as part of a
risk-based customer due diligence program.
Second, FinCEN is proposing to formally incorporate the exceptive
relief provided in FIN-2026-R001. This change would formally eliminate
the requirement for covered financial institutions to repeatedly
collect and verify beneficial ownership information in cases where
there is no reason to believe that the customer's beneficial ownership
information has changed since it was last collected, and the
circumstances do not indicate a risk-based need to collect and verify
beneficial ownership information. By codifying this relief, FinCEN is
ensuring that covered financial institutions will continue to benefit
from the flexibility to direct compliance resources consistent with
their own assessments of risk.
Third, the proposal would specify in Sec. 1010.230 the pieces of
information a covered financial institution must collect relating to
beneficial owners. This would involve moving the specific details of
the requirement to collect information about beneficial owners from the
rule's Appendix A into the rule itself. Most, but not all, of those
details would not change. The proposal would, however, restrict the
ability to satisfy the information collection requirement by collecting
a beneficial owner's Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN).
Additional flexibilities described in the proposal would allow
institutions to obtain information from third parties. FinCEN assesses
that these proposed changes would ensure that covered financial
institutions collect sufficient, appropriate information to be able to
verify the identities of beneficial owners while making it less
burdensome for covered financial institutions to reasonably identify
beneficial owners. As a result, FinCEN expects covered financial
institutions will be both able to use their resources more efficiently
and better positioned to assess risks related to illicit finance,
sanctions evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity.
In developing this proposal, as directed by Executive Order 14406,
FinCEN consulted with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union
Administration. Additionally, FinCEN consulted the staff of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, which are the primary Federal functional regulators for
additional categories of institutions covered by the CDD Rule,
specifically brokers and dealers in securities, mutual funds, and
futures commission merchants and introducing brokers.\28\
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\28\ As noted in note 26 above, if FinCEN's proposed rule
regarding PPSIs is finalized, the list will also include PPSIs.
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IV. Section-By-Section Analysis
A. Proposed Amendment to 31 CFR 1010.230(a)--In General
As mentioned above, this rulemaking is rooted in FinCEN's authority
to ``prescribe minimum standards for programs'' intended to ``guard
against money laundering and the financing of terrorism through
financial institutions . . . including . . . the development of
internal policies, procedures, and controls[.]'' \29\ Consistent with
Executive Order 14406's emphasis on assessing the risk associated with
beneficial owners, the proposed language would clarify that covered
financial institutions are required to establish and maintain written
procedures reasonably designed to identify and verify the identity of
beneficial owners of legal entity customers. This proposed addition of
the words ``the identity of'' to Sec. 1010.230(a) is intended to make
clear that covered financial institutions are required to collect and
verify identifying information on a beneficial owner (i.e., to verify
the individual's existence and identity), not whether that individual
is actually a beneficial owner of the legal entity that is the covered
financial institution's customer. This is consistent with language in
the current rule that a covered financial institution may rely on the
information supplied by the legal entity customer regarding the
identity of its beneficial owner or owners, provided that it has no
knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into question the
reliability of such information.\30\ This proposed language is intended
as a clarification and does not change covered financial institutions'
existing obligations to verify the identities of beneficial owners.
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\29\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318(h)(1)(A), (2).
\30\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial
Institutions, 81 FR at 29407.
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FinCEN is also proposing to add ``countering the financing of
terrorism'' to the reference in Sec. 1010.230 to ``anti-
[[Page 74518]]
money laundering compliance programs.'' The inclusion of countering the
financing of terrorism is a technical change, consistent with other
FinCEN proposals, which reflects a statutory change requiring
institutions to account for risks related to terrorist financing.\31\
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\31\ See, e.g., FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the
Financing of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR at 18711 (proposing adding
``countering the financing of terrorism'' to references to ``anti-
money laundering program'' to reflect USA PATRIOT Act obligation to
account for risks related to terrorist financing and to reflect new
statutory language in the AML Act amending 31 U.S.C. 5318(h)(1)).
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B. Proposed Amendment to 31 CFR 1010.230(b)--Identification and
Verification
1. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(i)--Timing
The proposal would codify the exemptive relief provided in FIN-
2026-R001 by amending Sec. 1010.230(b)(1)(i). FinCEN expects that this
proposed change, if finalized, will ensure covered financial
institutions continue to benefit from the flexibility to allocate
compliance resources to focus on customers that present higher risks
related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other
unlawful activity as indicated in Executive Order 14406.
The current rule requires a covered financial institution to
identify the beneficial owner(s) of each legal entity customer every
time a new account is opened, subject to certain limited exemptions.
Covered financial institutions and their trade associations have
characterized this requirement as unnecessarily burdensome,
particularly in situations involving legal entity customers whose
business happens to involve the frequent creation of new accounts.
Where there is no reason to think that the customer's beneficial
ownership information has changed since last collected, they have
pointed out, repeated collection and verification of the same
information wastes resources that, deployed in a more risk-conscious
manner, could improve overall risk management.
The proposed rule would address these concerns by replacing the
rigid account opening requirement with a more flexible, risk-based
approach. The proposed rule provides that a covered financial
institution must identify the beneficial owner(s) of a legal entity
customer: (1) when the legal entity customer first opens an account
with the covered financial institution; (2) any time thereafter when
the covered financial institution has knowledge of facts that would
reasonably call into question the reliability of beneficial ownership
information previously obtained about the legal entity customer; and
(3) as needed based on a covered financial institution's risk-based
procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence. The proposal
would eliminate the requirement for covered financial institutions to
collect a legal entity customer's beneficial ownership information at
each new account opening except, among other circumstances, as needed
based on a covered financial institution's risk-based procedures for
conducting ongoing customer due diligence. Whether a financial
institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into
question the reliability of previously obtained beneficial ownership
information would depend upon the facts and circumstances. Notably, if
a covered financial institution elects, as part of its risk-based
procedures, to continue collecting beneficial ownership information at
each account opening, it would be permitted to do so under the proposed
rule. FinCEN expects this change would, consistent with the policy
goals of Executive Order 14406, improve the risk-based nature of the
CDD Rule by allowing financial institutions to focus on higher risk
customers, including those that present risks related to illicit
finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other unlawful activity.
FinCEN requests comment on the timing element of the proposal.
Specifically, FinCEN seeks comment on whether ``any time thereafter
when the covered financial institution has knowledge of facts that
would reasonably call into question the reliability of beneficial
ownership information previously obtained about the legal entity
customer'' is an appropriate trigger for identification and
verification of beneficial owners.
Additionally, one of the three circumstances in which FinCEN's
exceptive relief specifies that beneficial ownership information should
be collected--and therefore one of the circumstances in which this
proposal requires that it be collected--is ``when the covered financial
institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into
question the reliability of beneficial ownership information previously
obtained about the legal entity customer.'' FinCEN requests comment on
its use of ``reliability.'' If, for example, the covered financial
institution has reason to believe there has been a change in ownership
of the legal entity, the covered financial institution might not be
questioning the ``reliability'' so much as the continuing accuracy of
the information originally provided. FinCEN therefore requests comment
on whether ``reliability'' should be used, defined in a more specific
fashion, or supplemented.
2. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(ii)--Information To Collect
The proposed rule would make two changes relating to the
information potentially collected by financial institutions under Sec.
1010.230. Both changes support the policy directives of Executive Order
14406 by ensuring institutions collect information sufficient to
reasonably identify the beneficial owners of legal entity customers for
the specific purpose of assessing risks related to illicit finance,
sanctions evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity. One change would
make explicit the information a covered financial institution must
collect, while the second would ensure that covered financial
institutions can collect additional information, where warranted by
other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, to assess risks
associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion,
or other illicit financial activity.
This combination reinforces the original CDD Rule's balancing of
categorical and risk-based elements. FinCEN has assessed that this
balance not only ensures that a covered financial institution will
collect sufficient information with regard to beneficial owners of its
legal entity customers, but also provides flexibility for a covered
financial institution to collect additional information for particular
beneficial owners where warranted by risk. In doing so, FinCEN aims to
strengthen the risk-based element of the CDD Rule, including by
ensuring that institutions maintain the authority to collect additional
information based on risk, while still maintaining the categorical
aspect of the CDD Rule.
The proposed rule in general requires that a covered financial
institution must obtain information about each beneficial owner of a
legal entity customer sufficient to allow the institution to identify,
and to verify the identity of, the beneficial owner. FinCEN proposes
these changes to make plain the specific information that covered
financial institutions are required to obtain about beneficial owners
of legal entities. The proposed rule specifies a discrete list of
information that a covered financial institution must obtain about each
beneficial owner of a legal entity customer, which includes a
qualifying identifying number for the individual.
[[Page 74519]]
Under this proposal the regulatory text would set out a list of
identifying numbers that may be used to satisfy this requirement,
including a Social Security number, or for non-U.S. persons a passport
number with country of issuance, an alien identification card, or a
number and country of any other government-issued document evidencing
nationality or residence and bearing a photograph--all of which are
included in the existing certification form in Appendix A to the
current rule. The proposal also specifies that an Individual Taxpayer
Identification Number (ITIN) is not an acceptable substitute for a
Social Security number.\32\ This specification recognizes that an ITIN,
as the IRS has noted, is ``issued . . . for federal tax purposes
only.'' \33\ It also reinforces the analysis set forth in FinCEN's
recent advisory that recognized the use of an ITIN in lieu of a Social
Security number or valid employment authorization document may be
identified as a risk factor requiring enhanced due diligence.\34\
Recognizing the risk associated with ITINs, FinCEN proposes to exclude
their use as an identifying number for a beneficial owner. It expects
that ITIN holders legally in the United States and authorized to work
will have alternative identification including, for example, a foreign
passport or an alien identification card.
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\32\ IRS, Instructions for Form W-7 (12/2024) (revised Dec.
2024), <a href="https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7">https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7</a> (directing individuals
not to apply for an ITIN if they ``have an SSN or [are] eligible to
get an SSN'').
\33\ See, e.g., IRS, Individual taxpayer identification number
(ITIN) (last accessed Nov. 3, 2026), <a href="https://www.irs.gov/tin/itin/individual-taxpayer-identification-number-itin">https://www.irs.gov/tin/itin/individual-taxpayer-identification-number-itin</a>. Notably, to obtain
an ITIN an individual must provide documents that both establish
identity and connection to a foreign country. IRS, Instructions for
Form W-7 (12/2024) (revised Dec. 2024), <a href="https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7">https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7</a>. In some cases, documents required by the IRS to
establish either foreign status or identity could also be used under
the proposed rule, including a passport, a visa issued by the U.S.
Department of State, or national identification card meeting certain
requirements. Id.
\34\ FinCEN, FIN-2026-A002, Joint Advisory on Non-Work
Authorized Populations and Their Employers and Risks to the
Integrity of the U.S. Financial System (June 5, 2026), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf</a> (noting that ``the use of an ITIN in lieu
of an SSN or valid employment authorization document may be
identified as a risk factor requiring enhanced due diligence to
ensure the account is not being utilized to facilitate the unlawful
employment of unlawful aliens'').
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While new in the rule itself, the proposed language identifying
core pieces of information is substantively the same as the current
rule's optional Appendix A form. The proposed rule returns the appendix
to its proper function of providing material supplementary to the
regulation, rather than stating the regulatory requirement itself. In
maintaining that continuity, FinCEN seeks to preserve a workable level
of flexibility for covered financial institutions in complying with
this requirement. FinCEN seeks comment on the workability of its
specific proposal that an ITIN cannot substitute for a Social Security
number under this provision, as well as whether it should make other
changes, either specifically to permit or to prohibit acceptance of
other identification numbers or documents.
As noted earlier in this section, the proposed rule has a second
goal: that covered financial institutions maintain the authority to
collect additional information. The proposed rule does this by
proposing regulatory text stating that, where warranted by other risk
indicators or supervisory concerns, a covered financial institution may
obtain additional information necessary to mitigate indicated risk or
address supervisory concerns, including when relevant to assessing
risks associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions
evasion, or other illicit financial activity, lawful immigration status
or employment authorization in the United States. This is intended to
make clear that, in situations of heightened risk or supervisory
concern, a financial institution may consider obtaining additional
information in order to confirm a beneficial owner's identity. It is
also intended to make clear that such additional information can
include immigration status and employment authorization information.
FinCEN anticipates providing additional guidance, alerts, or
advisories to financial institutions, including highlighting new and
emerging threats and typologies that may further feed into financial
institutions' risk-based assessments. Providing this type of feedback
through supplemental documents, rather than in specific regulatory
text, will allow both Treasury and the financial institutions to more
quickly adapt to address new and emerging threats and typologies and
allow financial institutions to assess risks associated with fraud,
identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other illicit
financial activity, including illicit activity relating to a lack of
lawful immigration status or employment authorization in the United
States.
This proposal does not specify situations that present heightened
risks, instead deferring that judgment to financial institutions and
allowing them greater flexibility to identify such situations, relying
on appropriate risk-based practices. However, such situations may well
be judged to include instances where the identifying information for a
beneficial owner residing in the United States presented to covered
financial institutions includes documentation issued by a foreign
government, rather than an identity document issued by a United States
federal or state government agency. An individual may even present an
ITIN and represent it to be a Social Security number, which could be a
risk factor warranting additional inquiry.
Moreover, the CDD Rule is critical to aiding a covered financial
institution's efforts to detect and report suspicious activity,
including activity that could expose the institution to loss.
Immigration and employment status would also be germane to reasonably
assessing risk if the beneficial owner were providing a financial
guarantee based on the beneficial owner's income from U.S. employment--
income that might be in jeopardy if the beneficial owner were not
legally authorized to work in the United States. Thus, a covered
financial institution's compliance with the CDD Rule and its efforts to
detect and report suspicious activity may aid the institution in
evaluating risk outside of illicit finance.\35\
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\35\ Immigration status or status as a permanent resident of the
United States may be relevant for financial institutions in
evaluating risks other than illicit finance risks, such as credit
risks of borrowers. See Interagency Guidance on Lending to
Individuals Not Legally Authorized to Work in the United States,
supra note 24; see also 12 CFR 1002.6(b)(7).
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This permissiveness, however, should not be misinterpreted. The
proposed language providing that a covered financial institution
``may'' obtain such additional information is not intended to suggest
any reduction of the requirement to conduct ongoing due diligence or to
verify the identity of each beneficial owner according to risk-based
procedures that contain, at a minimum, the same elements financial
institutions are required to use to verify the identity of individual
customers under applicable CIP requirements. It is intended to
reinforce the individual covered financial institution's authority,
where warranted by other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, to
demand additional information as part of a risk-based customer due
diligence program.
FinCEN is interested in receiving comments on whether this
rulemaking strikes an appropriate balance between mandating information
collection and recognition that covered financial institutions may be
better placed to assess what information they should
[[Page 74520]]
collect. FinCEN is also interested in receiving comments on whether its
proposed approach mitigates the risks identified in Executive Order
14406, including by providing covered financial institutions sufficient
authority to collect necessary information.
3. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(iii)--Sources of Information
The proposed rule also would improve the risk-based nature of the
CDD Rule by providing more flexibility in how a covered financial
institution obtains information, which is expected to reduce compliance
burden. In doing so, this change supports Executive Order 14406 by
allowing those financial institutions to direct resources to higher
risk customers and activities, including customers that present risks
related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other
unlawful activity as indicated in Executive Order 14406.
The CDD Rule specifies that covered financial institutions must
obtain information about a legal entity customer's beneficial owners
``from the individual opening the account on behalf of the legal entity
customer,'' using the optional certification form found at Appendix A
to the rule or its substantive equivalent.\36\ Some have attempted to
read the regulation as allowing the collection of information from
third parties along the lines of the bank-specific CIP Rule's special
provision for the opening of individual credit card accounts, provided
that a representative of the legal entity customer certified the
accuracy of the information.\37\ However, given the equivocal support
that the CDD Rule's preamble provides for this interpretation, many
covered financial institutions have been collecting beneficial
ownership directly from their customers every time it was required,
despite the time and expense of this practice.\38\
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\36\ 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1).
\37\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.220(a)(2)(i)(C) (credit card account
opening CIP rule for banks). Notably, in the CIP Rule context FinCEN
and the Federal Banking Agencies granted exceptive relief to permit
banks to obtain Tax Identification Number information from a third-
party source rather than the customer for all accounts, provided
that the bank otherwise complies with the CIP Rule. See FinCEN, OCC,
FDIC, NCUA, Order--Customer Identification Program (June 27, 2025),
<a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2025-06/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-final508.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2025-06/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-final508.pdf</a>; FinCEN and Board, Order--Customer Identification
Program (July 31, 2025), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/shared/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-Board-only-508.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/shared/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-Board-only-508.pdf</a>.
\38\ See FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for
Financial Institutions, 81 FR at 29405-29406. The best argument for
the expansive reading is based on the negative inference to be drawn
from the statement ``FinCEN declines to permit reliance solely upon
previously gathered alternate sources of beneficial ownership
information.'' See 81 FR at 29406.
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The proposed addition of paragraph (b)(1)(iii) would offer covered
financial institutions clarity by providing that a covered financial
institution may obtain any information described in paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) by acquiring it from a third-party source. Regardless of the
source from which information is obtained, a covered financial
institution must comply with the certification requirement set forth in
paragraph (b)(1)(iv). Similarly, regardless of the source from which
information was obtained, a covered financial institution must comply
with the requirement to identify the beneficial owner(s) of a legal
entity customer any time after the legal entity customer first opens an
account with the covered financial institution when the covered
financial institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call
into question the reliability of beneficial ownership information
previously obtained about the legal entity customer.
4. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(iv)--Certification
Relatedly, the proposed rule also would improve the risk-based
nature of the CDD Rule by providing more flexibility about when an
institution must obtain a new certification for an existing legal
entity customer. This enables a covered financial institution to rely
on beneficial ownership information previously obtained from a
certification provided in connection with the initial opening of an
account by the legal entity customer with the covered financial
institution. This change supports Executive Order 14406 by allowing
financial institutions to focus on higher risk customers and
activities, instead of activities that result in unnecessary
information collection untethered from the risk of a particular
customer.
The proposal provides that when a legal entity customer first opens
an account with a covered financial institution, the covered financial
institution obtaining information on the legal entity customer's
beneficial owners must obtain a certification from the individual
opening the account on behalf of the legal entity customer that the
information obtained is accurate to the best of the individual's
knowledge. A covered financial institution may, but is not required, to
use the standardized certification form contained in Appendix A to
Sec. 1010.230. If the standardized certification form is not used, a
covered financial institution must obtain from the individual opening
the account the information required by the standardized certification
form by another means.
The proposal also provides that, when obtaining information on
beneficial owners as needed based on a covered financial institution's
risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence, a
covered financial institution may rely on beneficial ownership
information previously obtained from a certification provided in
connection with the initial opening of an account by the legal entity
customer with the covered financial institution. In order to rely on
such a prior certification, the covered financial institution must
obtain from a representative of the legal entity customer either oral
or written confirmation that such information is up to date and
accurate to the best of the individual's knowledge. This confirmation
may, but is not required to, take the form of the standardized
certification form in Appendix A of this section. Thus, certification
remains essential to collection of beneficial ownership information,
but the proposal grants flexibility to institutions with respect to the
form of certification obtained.
The covered financial institution must maintain a record of such
certification or confirmation, whether the certification or
confirmation is oral or written. If a covered financial institution is
unable to obtain a necessary certification or confirmation that
previously obtained beneficial ownership information is up-to-date and
accurate, or if the covered financial institution has knowledge of
facts that would reasonably call into question the reliability of
beneficial ownership information previously obtained about the legal
entity customer, the covered financial institution must identify and
verify the identities of the beneficial owners of the legal entity
customer in accordance with the general requirements of Sec. 1010.230.
5. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2)--Verification
Under this proposal, Sec. 1010.230 would contain a discrete list
of information that covered financial institutions must collect, which
would serve as the factual basis for their verification of the
identities of the beneficial owners of their legal entity customers.
The presence of this list could create confusion given Sec. 1010.230's
current cross-reference to the CIP rules, which encompass those rules'
own list of information that must
[[Page 74521]]
be collected for CIP compliance purposes. The cross-reference currently
requires covered financial institutions to have procedures that
``contain the elements required for verifying the identity of customers
that are individuals under Sec. 1020.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for
banks); Sec. 1023.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for brokers or dealers in
securities); Sec. 1024.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for mutual funds);
or Sec. 1026.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for futures commission
merchants or introducing brokers in commodities).'' \39\ Sections
(a)(2)(ii) and (a)(2)(iii) of the CIP rules concern procedures for
customer verification and procedures in situations where verification
is impossible. Section (a)(2)(i) of those rules, however, is a list of
customer information that a financial institution is required to
collect about each individual or corporate customer. Among other
things, section (a)(2)(i) of those rules specifically allows use of ``a
taxpayer identification number,'' i.e. an ITIN, for a non-U.S. person,
which would not be permitted under this proposal and should not be
misinterpreted to apply to the CDD Rule.
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\39\ 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2).
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To clarify which aspects of the CIP rules do and do not apply for
purposes of the CDD Rule, FinCEN proposes amending Sec.
1010.230(b)(2). That change will clarify that a covered financial
institution must have customer due diligence verification procedures
that reflect the requirements of that institution's CIP rule, but also
that covered financial institutions must adhere to proposed Sec.
1010.230(b)(1)(ii), which specifies the information to be collected.
This change is designed to clarify but not change the current CDD
Rule's adoption of CIP verification procedural standards while
recognizing that the information a financial institution can use to
verify an identity will, if this proposal is adopted, be different
under the CIP and CDD Rules. FinCEN requests comment on challenges that
may arise from different information collection requirements for CIP
and CDD obligations, and whether the revised cross-reference is
sufficiently clear.
In addition, given the continuing reference to, and incorporation
of the standards of, the CIP rule, FinCEN solicits comments about the
need for the CDD Rule itself to qualify the compliance standard of its
verification requirement with the phrase ``to the extent reasonable and
practicable''--a phrase that is already found in the CIP rule.\40\
Alternatively, FinCEN solicits comments on whether it should dispense
with cross-references altogether and insert in the CDD Rule all of the
specific appropriate procedural language now found in the CIP rule
itself, even if such insertion simply reproduces relevant CIP rule
language.
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\40\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.220(a)(2).
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V. Effective Date
FinCEN proposes that the rule would be effective 90 days after
publication in the Federal Register.
VI. Requests for Comment
FinCEN seeks comments on all aspects of the proposed rule and
specifically seeks comments on the following topics. For all responses,
commenters are encouraged to provide the basis for any conclusions
drawn in their comments.
1. Do the information collection requirements proposed in this
rulemaking strike an appropriate balance, including between providing
covered financial institutions sufficient direction in information
collection, as well as discretion to require more information when risk
warrants additional collection?
2. Is the information that the proposal requires covered financial
institutions to collect and verify sufficient for them to reasonably
identify most beneficial owners and assess beneficial ownership-related
risks related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, or other
unlawful activity? If not, what additional or alternative information
should covered financial institutions be required to collect?
3. Does the proposal provide covered financial institutions
sufficient certainty that, where warranted, they maintain the ability
to collect additional information, including relating to whether
beneficial owners possess lawful immigration status and employment
authorization in the United States? Should the proposed text be refined
in any way?
4. Under the proposal, a covered financial institution may be
required to collect beneficial ownership information ``any time
thereafter [that is, after the initial collection] when the covered
financial institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call
into question the reliability of beneficial ownership information
previously obtained about the legal entity customer.'' Is this
circumstance an appropriate trigger for identification and verification
of beneficial owners? Does it need to be refined or clarified, and if
so how? For example, could ``reliability'' be supplemented with another
measure, such as ``accuracy'' or ``continuing accuracy,'' given that,
if the covered financial institution has reason to believe there has
been a change in ownership of the legal entity, the covered financial
institution might not be questioning the ``reliability'' so much as the
continuing accuracy of the information originally provided?
5. Does the proposal's prohibition on use of an ITIN in lieu of a
Social Security number appropriately balance risk? Does it represent
any compliance challenges for covered financial institutions, including
because of the potential divergent approach between the information
permitted to be collected under the CIP rules and the CDD Rule? Would
additional FinCEN guidance help address those challenges?
6. Should FinCEN consider alternatives to prohibiting use of an
ITIN? For example, should FinCEN allow collection of an ITIN for
verification purposes but require a covered financial institution to
undertake additional steps, such as further due diligence measures or
submission of additional information or documentation? Describe
benefits and drawbacks of such alternatives.
7. Are there circumstances where an individual lawfully present in
the United States would have an ITIN, but no other number or document
specified in the proposal? If yes, how could FinCEN account for such
scenarios while still accounting for the risk addressed by Executive
Order 14406?
8. The CDD Rule incorporates some language borrowed from the CIP
rules, and it also cross-references the CIP rules. In general, should
FinCEN dispense with cross-references altogether and insert in the CDD
Rule all of the specific appropriate procedural language of the CIP
rule itself? Whether or not FinCEN adopts this global solution, should
FinCEN retain the phrase ``to the extent reasonable and practicable,''
borrowed from the CIP rules, in the verification section of the CDD
Rule? Should it use an alternative standard? If the phrase is deleted,
what will be the effect?
9. The CDD Rule requirement is, generally speaking,
``categorical,'' imposing essentially the same core requirements with
respect to all of a covered financial institution's non-exempt legal
entity customers. Should FinCEN provide greater flexibility to covered
financial institutions to adjust their due diligence efforts with
respect to legal entity customers and their beneficial owners downward
with decreased risk, not simply upward with
[[Page 74522]]
respect to increased risk? What lower risk scenarios might be
identified, under which on a risk-basis financial institutions should
be permitted to collect less or different information related to
beneficial ownership?
10. Should the recordkeeping requirement of the CDD Rule, 31 CFR
1010.230(i), be amended to better account for written or verbal
confirmations contemplated under the proposed revisions to 31 CFR
1010.230(b)(1)(iv)(B)? The existing language of 31 CFR
1010.230(i)(1)(i) requires covered financial institutions to keep
records that include ``For identification, any identifying information
obtained by the covered financial institution pursuant to paragraph (b)
of this section [the paragraph requiring collection of information],
including without limitation the certification (if obtained)[.]'' Is it
clear that the phrase ``any identifying information obtained'' includes
a confirmation that information previously collected has not changed,
or should the text be amended to explicitly address the matter of such
confirmations about previously collected information?
11. The Appendix A form provides a list of corporate positions that
could have ``significant responsibility for managing the legal
entity,'' which includes ``Vice President'' and ``Treasurer.'' Should
these or any other positions be listed as possible control persons?
Alternatively, should any of these or other positions be excluded from
the category of control person?
12. Should FinCEN consider a longer or shorter implementation
period? Why?
VII. Severability
As part of this proposal, FinCEN proposes that if one portion of
the proposed regulation, if finalized, is found to be invalid, the
invalidated portion of the regulation should be severed with the
remaining portions of the regulation remaining in full force and
effect. FinCEN's position is that invalidation of any one provision, or
application thereof to any one person or circumstance, does not, and
should not, affect any other provision in this proposed regulation.
Each provision serves an important, related, but distinct purpose and
application, designed to benefit the public by protecting the U.S.
financial system from illicit financial activity. FinCEN accordingly
has proposed each provision such that invalidity to one provision would
not undermine the operability or usefulness of the other provisions.
VIII. Executive Order 14294 Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal
Regulations
Executive Order 14294 Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal
Regulations requires that agencies promulgating regulations potentially
subject to criminal enforcement explicitly describe the conduct subject
to criminal enforcement, the authorizing statutes, and the mens rea
standard applicable to those offenses.\41\ Section 5 of Executive Order
14294 directs that all future notices of proposed rulemaking and final
rules published in the Federal Register, the violation of which may
constitute criminal regulatory offenses, should include a statement
identifying that the rule or proposed rule is a criminal regulatory
offense and the authorizing statute.\42\ Executive Order 14294 directs
agencies to draft this statement in consultation with the Department of
Justice.\43\
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\41\ Executive Order 14292 of May 9, 2026, Fighting
Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations, 90 FR 20363, 20364 (May
14, 2025).
\42\ Id.
\43\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Order 14294 further directs that the regulatory text of
all NPRMs and final rules with criminal consequences published in the
Federal Register after May 9, 2025 should explicitly state a mens rea
requirement for each element of a criminal regulatory offense,
accompanied by citations to the relevant provisions of the authorizing
statute.
Willful violations of the regulations set forward in this proposed
rule, if finalized, may be subject to criminal penalties pursuant to 31
U.S.C. 5322 and regulations promulgated in 31 CFR chapter X. The
statutory authority for criminal liability requires a mens rea of
willfulness as an element pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5322(a) and 31 U.S.C.
5322(b). FinCEN's existing regulation, 31 CFR 1010.840, that sets out
criminal penalties for violations of regulations promulgated in 31 CFR
chapter X also includes a mens rea of willfulness. In drafting this
statement, FinCEN has consulted with the Department of Justice.
IX. Regulatory Impact Analysis
FinCEN has analyzed this proposed rule as required under Executive
Orders 12866, 13563, and 14192; the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA);
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA); and the Paperwork Reduction
Act (PRA). This section presents the findings of its analysis,
including a discussion of the expected incremental economic effects of
the proposed rule relative to the current regulatory baseline and
invites comment on all aspects of this analysis, including any data or
information that would assist FinCEN in better quantifying the costs,
cost savings, or other effects of the proposed rule.
The proposed rule would amend the CDD Rule, 31 CFR 1010.230,
primarily by making three overarching revisions, and introduce certain
minor regulatory clarifications. These revisions, as discussed in
section III: (1) make it explicit that covered financial institutions
may obtain additional information necessary to mitigate indicated risk
or address supervisory concerns; (2) incorporate FinCEN's exceptive
relief and required information, permissible sources, and
certification; and (3) specify pieces of information required to be
collected, while providing additional flexibility in how such
information is obtained. The following analysis focuses on the expected
incremental economic effects of these revisions.
As a threshold matter, FinCEN does not expect the proposed
amendments would have a significant economic effect. Among other
things, the proposal would not expand the set of covered financial
institutions, would not expand the definition of legal entity customer,
would not require covered financial institutions to collect beneficial
ownership information from a new class of customers, and would not
impose a new mandatory reporting or recordkeeping requirement. Instead,
the proposal would codify regulatory flexibility that reduces
duplicative beneficial ownership identification and verification at
repeat account openings while identifying select risk-based triggers
for obtaining and updating information when appropriate. The proposed
clarification regarding the collection of additional information in
heightened-risk circumstances is itself risk based; it does not impose
a categorical obligation to collect any particular additional document
or information, nor does it expand the pre-existing authority or
obligation of covered financial institutions to collect risk-relevant
information.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See supra section IV.B.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Analysis of Impact
1. Broad Economic Considerations
As it proposes these amendments to Sec. 1010.230, FinCEN remains
mindful of the fundamental economic tensions observed in the original
rule. The analysis in the CDD Rule framed beneficial ownership
requirements as addressing externalities associated with
[[Page 74523]]
illicit finance. Covered financial institutions bear the private costs
of collecting and verifying beneficial ownership information, while
many of the benefits of improved transparency, including reduced money
laundering, terrorist financing, fraud, sanctions evasion, and related
illicit activity, accrue broadly to the public, law enforcement,
national security agencies, and the financial system as a whole. Absent
a standard of collection requirements, covered financial institutions
may underinvest in beneficial ownership information collection,
particularly if they believe more rigorous requirements could place
them at a competitive disadvantage relative to institutions with less
comprehensive practices.
Prior FinCEN analysis also recognized cross-border spillovers.\45\
Jurisdictions with less stringent AML/CFT standards may become more
attractive destinations for laundering proceeds generated by illicit
activity elsewhere, allowing those jurisdictions to receive capital
inflows without bearing the full social costs of the underlying crimes.
A clear and consistent CDD framework can help mitigate this concern by
improving beneficial ownership transparency and making it more costly
for illicit actors to misuse legal entities to access the U.S.
financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ See FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for
Financial Institutions, 81 FR at 29432-33; FinCEN, Notice of
Availability of Regulatory Impact Assessment and Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis Regarding the Customer Due Diligence
Requirements for Financial Institutions, 80 FR 80308 (Dec. 24,
2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed revisions build on that same general framework but are
expected to have more limited incremental economic effects than the
original CDD Rule. Rather than creating a new beneficial ownership
information-collection obligation, the proposal would clarify and
refine existing CDD requirements, reduce duplicative collection at
repeat account openings, and preserve risk-based authority to obtain
additional information when warranted by risk indicators or supervisory
concerns. Thus, the relevant economic trade-off is not whether to
impose a new beneficial ownership framework, but how best to preserve
the benefits of beneficial ownership transparency while reducing
unnecessary or duplicative compliance activity.
Having taken the original animating concerns into consideration,
FinCEN believes the proposed amendments would enhance the balance of
imposing private costs on financial institutions for the public benefit
of standardized due diligence practices.
2. Institutional Baseline and Affected Parties
a. Regulatory Baseline
The anticipated incremental economic effects of the proposed rule
were analyzed against a counterfactual state of the world in which a
covered financial institution's obligations under the BSA would
maintain the status quo. For purposes of this analysis, FinCEN
considered the most salient component of the regulatory baseline to be
comprised of both the original CDD Rule, as currently implemented and
interpreted, and FinCEN's February 2026 exceptive relief.\46\
Additionally, the impact analysis takes into account that covered
financial institutions continue to be subject to, among other
obligations, applicable AML/CFT program, customer identification,
suspicious activity reporting, and recordkeeping requirements under the
BSA. FinCEN further took into consideration that covered financial
institutions' business practices may be subject to other regulatory
standards and requirements that govern operating risks.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Covered financial institutions also currently have
flexibility under the February 2026 exceptive relief order to
identify and verify beneficial owners at the first account opening,
when facts reasonably call previously obtained information into
question, and as otherwise required by risk-based ongoing customer
due diligence procedures.
\47\ See, e.g., Interagency Guidance on Lending to Individuals
Not Legally Authorized to Work in the United States, supra note 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using this baseline, FinCEN does not expect the proposed rule to
impose significant incremental costs because the primary change is to
codify and make durable an existing form of relief, while clarifying
that covered financial institutions may obtain additional information
in risk-based circumstances. In the alternative, if the proposed rule
were evaluated relative to the pre-relief requirement to identify and
verify beneficial owners each time a legal entity customer opened a new
account, the proposed rule would be expected to generate cost savings
by eliminating duplicative beneficial ownership collection and
verification at repeat account openings.
b. Baseline of Affected Parties
The primary affected parties of the proposed amendments are the
covered financial institutions already subject to the CDD Rule and,
indirectly, their current and prospective legal entity customers and
beneficial owners. Because the proposal would not expand the definition
of covered financial institution, legal entity customer, account, or
beneficial owner, FinCEN does not expect the proposal to impose new
compliance costs on any newly affected population. FinCEN encourages
commenters who do not share this expectation to submit comments on the
subject, ideally supported by specific information.
i. Covered Financial Institutions
The proposed rule would apply to all financial institutions
currently subject to the CDD Rule: banks, brokers or dealers in
securities (broker-dealers), mutual funds, and futures commission
merchants (FCMs) and introducing brokers in commodities (IBCs). FinCEN
estimates that there are approximately 14,554 potentially affected
covered financial institutions, consisting of 8,988 banks; 3,277
brokers-dealers; 1,335 mutual funds; and 954 FCMs and IBCs.\48\ While
these estimates provide a useful reference point for the total
population of financial institutions with CDD obligations, they do not
identify how many covered financial institutions have legal entity
customers that open more than one account with the same institution
during a given period. As such, the estimates of expected affected
covered financial institutions summarized in table 1 are provided for
illustrative purposes only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ For a complete description of the sources of data and
methodologies utilized to form these estimates, see the endnotes
provided in table 1. As previously discussed, FinCEN has separately
proposed to apply CDD Rule obligations to a proposed new type of
regulated financial institution, PPSIs. See supra section II.E, note
28. Because that proposal is not yet finalized, meaning that PPSIs
are not currently a covered financial institution, this analysis
does not incorporate PPSIs. Notably, however, FinCEN has estimated
that the number of PPSIs would be small. See OFAC and FinCEN,
Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering
the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program
Requirements, 91 FR at 18628 (estimating 50 PPSIs).
[[Page 74524]]
Table 1--Estimates of Covered Financial Institutions by Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of financial
Covered financial institution type \a\ institutions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Banks with a Federal functional regulator \b\.... \c\ 8,623
Banks without a Federal functional regulator \d\. \e\ 365
Broker-dealers \f\............................... \g\ 3,277
Mutual funds \h\................................. \i\ 1,335
FCMs and IBCs \j\................................ \k\ 954
----------------------
Total........................................ 14,554
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t) (definition of
financial institution).
\b\ See 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(1); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(d), 31 CFR
1020.210(a).
\c\ This includes 4,336 FDIC-insured depository institutions (i.e.,
federally regulated banks) according to the FDIC's Quarterly Bank
Profile for 2025 Q4, p. 2 (<a href="https://www.fdic.gov/quarterly-banking-profile/past-quarterly-banking-profiles">https://www.fdic.gov/quarterly-banking-profile/past-quarterly-banking-profiles</a>). It also includes 4,287 NCUA-
insured credit unions as of December 31, 2025, according to the NCUA's
Quarterly Credit Union Data Summary: 2025 Q4, p. i (<a href="https://ncua.gov/analysis/credit-union-corporate-call-report-data/quarterly-data-summary-reports">https://ncua.gov/analysis/credit-union-corporate-call-report-data/quarterly-data-summary-reports</a>).
\d\ See 31 CFR 1020.210(b).
\e\ The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Master Account
and Services Database (<a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/master-account-and-services-database-existing-access.htm">https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/master-account-and-services-database-existing-access.htm</a>) contains
data as of November 30, 2025, on financial institutions that use
Federal Reserve Bank financial services, including those with no
additional Federal regulator. FinCEN used this data to identify 365
banks and credit unions with no additional Federal regulator using
Federal Reserve Bank financial services.
\f\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(G); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(2).
\g\ This estimate is based on U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) data on active broker-dealers, see Company Information About
Active Broker-Dealers (last updated Oct. 1, 2026), December 2025 Data
table (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/foia-services/frequently-requested-documents/company-information-about-active-broker-dealers">https://www.sec.gov/foia-services/frequently-requested-documents/company-information-about-active-broker-dealers</a>), which
listed 3,277 active broker-dealers registered with the SEC as of
December 31, 2025.
\h\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(I); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(10) and 31
CFR 1010.100(gg).
\i\ This estimate is based on the number of registered investment
companies filing Form N-1A in SEC's Annual Registered Investment
Company Update: Form N-CEN Data, Period Ending December 2025 (May
2026), table 1.3, p. 4 (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/files/annual-registered-investment-company-update-20260512.pdf">https://www.sec.gov/files/annual-registered-investment-company-update-20260512.pdf</a>).
\j\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(H); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(8-9).
\k\ According to Commodity Futures Trading Commission data on FCMs, see
Financial Data for FCMs, December 31, 2025 data, (<a href="https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/financialfcmdata/index.htm">https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/financialfcmdata/index.htm</a>), there were 66 registered
FCMs as of December 31, 2025. The number of IBCs as of December 31,
2025 (888) was obtained from the National Futures Association ``NFA
Membership and Registration'' website (<a href="https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/membership-and-directories.html">https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/membership-and-directories.html</a>). Because
deduplication of entities registered as both FCMs and IBCs was not
feasible, this estimate may double-count some entities registered in
both categories. FinCEN, however, believes this subpopulation may be
small.
ii. Legal Entity Customers and Their Beneficial Owners
Legal entity customers and their beneficial owners are also
affected because covered financial institutions obtain and verify
beneficial ownership information when a legal entity customer first
opens an account and, as applicable, when facts call prior information
into question or risk-based procedures otherwise require it. FinCEN
cannot estimate the total number of unique legal entity customers or
beneficial owners that may be directly affected parties from the
estimated 5,465,250 \49\ annual responses projected using its
historical methodology because that measure may include multiple
responses for the same legal entity customer and information concerning
multiple beneficial owners. Because the 1.5-account-per-day assumption
that informed that estimate is based on limited information developed
for the CDD Rule in 2016, and a 2024 banking-industry survey has since
suggested that it may be low,\50\ FinCEN considers 5,457,750 a rough
estimate and requests comments that include current data on legal
entity account openings, including variation by institution type and
size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ See FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for
Financial Institutions Final Rule, 81 FR at 29448 (explaining that
FinCEN had no direct data on annual legal entity account openings by
small financial institutions and that the estimate, based in part on
information from one very large financial institution, assumed small
institutions would open at most 1.5 such accounts per day, and
probably fewer); see also FinCEN, Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed Renewal; Comment Request; Renewal Without
Change of the Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Legal Entity
Customers, 84 FR 72137, 72138 n.9 (Dec. 30, 2019); FinCEN, Agency
Information Collection Activities; Proposed Renewal; Comment
Request; Renewal Without Change of the Beneficial Ownership
Requirements for Legal Entity Customers, 89 FR 14148, 14149 n.16
(Feb. 26, 2024) (applying an average of 1.5 new legal entity
accounts per business day to all covered financial institutions).
Applying that rate to the 14,554 covered financial institutions
identified in Table 1 and 250 business days yields 5,457,750 legal
entity customer accounts opened per year (14,554 x 1.5 x 250).
Industry comments suggest the estimate may be low, at least for
banks.
\50\ See American Bankers Association, Letter to FinCEN on CDD
PRA Rule, Docket No. FINCEN-2024-0008, OMB Control No. 1506-0070, at
5 (Apr. 26, 2024) (reporting that 92 percent of 141 surveyed banks
disagreed with the 1.5-account estimate and that 94 percent of those
respondents characterized it as ``very low''), <a href="https://www.aba.com/-/media/documents/comment-letter/clfincencdd20240426.pdf?rev=07c23ff3932e4fe5a5f3f7033bb57344">https://www.aba.com/-/media/documents/comment-letter/clfincencdd20240426.pdf?rev=07c23ff3932e4fe5a5f3f7033bb57344</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Current Market Practices
Covered financial institutions currently use a range of processes
to manage account-opening, customer due diligence, customer
identification, and beneficial ownership information-related
activities. These processes may be implemented through internal
systems, third-party vendors, core processors, transfer agents,
introducing and carrying broker relationships, or other operational
arrangements, depending on the institution type and business model.
Many covered financial institutions maintain customer or party master
files and account master records that allow the institution to
associate multiple accounts with the same legal entity customer. The
degree of centralization, comingling of data and automation varies by
institution size, product mix, and technology architecture.
FinCEN expects that covered financial institutions have already
developed policies and procedures to obtain and verify beneficial
ownership information for legal entity customers and to update customer
information on a risk basis. FinCEN also expects that some covered
financial institutions have revised or begun revising their procedures
in response to the February 2026 exceptive relief. As a result, the
proposed rule is expected to align the text of the CDD Rule with
practices that many
[[Page 74525]]
institutions may already have adopted or planned to adopt.
3. Description of Proposed Regulation
For purposes of the RIA, FinCEN considered the various components
of the proposed rule with a view towards the specific features or
elements that may generate, either directly or indirectly, an economic
benefit or cost or lead to changes in a market participant's incentives
in a way that may generate economic benefits or costs.\51\ To balance
the completeness of the RIA with the desire for expositional clarity
and ease of tractability between the proposed regulatory text and
sections IV (Section-by-Section Analysis) and IX (Regulatory Impact
Analysis), FinCEN has included table2, to provide a mapping of the
various components of the proposed rulemaking as presented in sectionIV
to their analogous categorization in the RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ See infra section IX.A.4.
Table 2--Overview/Mapping of the Proposed Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussed in
Elements of the proposed rule Section IV RIA Proposed regulatory text location
analysis subsection(s)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revise the general requirement to clarify IV.A............. IX.A.3......... 1010.230(a).
that covered financial institutions must
establish and maintain written
procedures reasonably designed to
identify and verify the identity of
beneficial owners of legal entity
customers, and include such procedures
in their AML/CFT programs.
Add ``countering the financing of IV.A............. IX.A.3......... 1010.230(a).
terrorism'' to the reference to anti-
money laundering compliance programs.
Replace the current requirement to IV.B.1........... IX.A.1, IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(1)(i).
identify and verify beneficial owners at IX.A.4.a,
each new account opening with a timing IX.A.4.b,
framework requiring identification and IX.C, IX.E.
verification: (1) when the legal entity
customer first opens an account with the
covered financial institution; (2) when
the institution has knowledge of facts
that would reasonably call into question
the reliability of beneficial ownership
information previously obtained about
the legal entity customer; and (3) as
needed based on risk-based procedures
for conducting ongoing customer due
diligence.
Specify the minimum information that a IV.B.2........... IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(D)
covered financial institution must IX.A.4.a,
obtain about each beneficial owner, IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
including name, date of birth, address,
and an identifying number, unless risk-
based procedures warrant obtaining more
information.
Clarify that, for a U.S. person IV.B.2........... IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(1)(ii)(D)
beneficial owner, the required IX.A.4.a,
identifying number is a Social Security IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
number, and that for U.S. and non-U.S.
persons, an ITIN is not an acceptable
substitute for a Social Security number.
Clarify that, where warranted by other IV.B.2........... IX.A.1, IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(1)(ii)
risk indicators or supervisory concerns, IX.A.4.a,
a covered financial institution may IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
obtain additional information necessary
to mitigate indicated risk or address
supervisory concerns, including when
relevant to assessing risks associated
with fraud, identity misrepresentation,
sanctions evasion, or other illicit
financial activity, information relevant
to lawful immigration status and
employment authorization in the United
States.
Permit covered financial institutions to IV.B.3........... IX.A.1, IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(1)(iii)
obtain required beneficial ownership IX.A.4.a,
information from a third-party source, IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
subject to compliance with the
certification requirement.
Require a covered financial institution, IV.B.4........... IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(1)(iv)(A)
when obtaining beneficial ownership IX.A.4.a,
information at the first account IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
opening, to obtain a certification from
the individual opening the account on
behalf of the legal entity customer that
the information obtained is accurate to
the best of that individual's knowledge;
retain use of the standardized
certification form as optional.
Permit a covered financial institution, IV.B.4........... IX.A.1, IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(1)(iv)(B)
when obtaining beneficial ownership IX.A.4.a,
information as needed based on risk- IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
based ongoing CDD procedures, to rely on
information previously obtained from a
certification provided at the first
account opening, provided that a
representative of the legal entity
customer gives oral or written
confirmation that the information is up
to date and accurate to the best of the
individual's knowledge.
Clarify the verification cross-reference IV.B.5........... IX.A.3, 1010.230(b)(2)
to the applicable CIP rules so that IX.A.4.b.
covered financial institutions must use
verification procedures containing the
elements required for verifying the
identity of individual customers, while
avoiding ambiguity that the CIP
information-collection list governs
beneficial ownership information
collection under the CDD Rule.
Retain the provision allowing a covered IV.B.5........... IX.A.3......... 1010.230(b)(2)
financial institution to rely on
information supplied by the legal entity
customer regarding the identity of its
beneficial owner or owners, provided
that the institution has no knowledge of
facts that would reasonably call into
question the reliability of such
information.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Anticipated Economic Effects
a. Expected Benefits
FinCEN expects the proposed rule to produce several categories of
benefits. First, codifying the relief from beneficial ownership
identification and verification at every repeat account opening should
reduce duplicative compliance activity. Covered financial institutions
would be able to rely on beneficial ownership information obtained at
the first account opening unless facts reasonably call the reliability
of that information into question or risk-based procedures otherwise
require additional or updated information. This should reduce
repetitive customer outreach, duplicative collection of identification
information, and associated account-opening delays.
Second, the proposed rule should improve regulatory clarity.
Codifying the February 2026 exceptive relief in the CDD Rule would
reduce uncertainty about the continued availability and operation of
that relief and would allow covered financial institutions to design
policies, procedures, systems, and training around the text of the
regulation. Clearer regulatory text may also promote more consistent
supervisory expectations across covered financial institutions and
functional regulators, possibly reducing examination costs.
Third, the proposal should better align the CDD Rule with a risk-
based
[[Page 74526]]
approach to AML/CFT compliance. The proposal would preserve the
ability, and where applicable the obligation, of covered financial
institutions to update or obtain additional information when facts call
previously obtained beneficial ownership information into question or
when risk-based procedures indicate that additional or updated
information is appropriate. At the same time, the proposal would avoid
requiring covered financial institutions to repeat the same
identification and verification steps at every account opening without
regard to risk or whether the institution already has reliable
information about the legal entity customer.
Fourth, the proposed clarification concerning additional
information in heightened-risk or supervisory-concern circumstances may
help covered financial institutions resolve material compliance
concerns involving fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions
evasion, or other illicit financial activity. By clarifying that
covered financial institutions may obtain additional information where
warranted by risk indicators or supervisory concerns, the proposal may
support more effective risk assessment while avoiding a categorical,
one-size-fits-all requirement.
FinCEN has not quantified these benefits at this stage because
public data are limited regarding the number of repeat account openings
by the same legal entity customer at the same covered financial
institution and regarding the degree to which institutions have already
implemented the February 2026 exceptive relief.
b. Expected Costs
FinCEN does not expect the proposed rule to impose significant
economic costs. The proposal would not impose a new obligation to file
reports with FinCEN, would not require covered financial institutions
to retain a new category of records, would not expand the population of
covered financial institutions, and would not impose a new mandatory
customer due diligence procedure for all accounts or all customers.
Covered financial institutions may incur limited one-time costs to
review the final rule and revise policies, procedures, forms, account-
opening workflows, monitoring processes, or training materials. FinCEN
expects these costs to be small because covered financial institutions
already maintain CDD policies and procedures and because the proposed
rule generally aligns with existing exceptive relief and ordinary-
course risk-based due diligence practices. To the extent an institution
has already implemented the February 2026 exceptive relief, any
incremental implementation cost attributable to this proposal should be
further reduced.
FinCEN does not expect that its specification of information
covered financial institutions must collect and exclusion of ITINs will
impose significant costs. FinCEN believes its proposed regulatory text
largely aligns with current practices, though some institutions may
incur limited one-time costs to review the final rule and revise
policies, procedures, forms, account-opening workflows, monitoring
processes, or training materials accordingly.
FinCEN does not expect the proposed clarification regarding
additional information in heightened-risk circumstances to require
covered financial institutions to collect additional information in
every case. The proposed language would clarify that an institution may
consider obtaining additional information where warranted by risk
indicators or supervisory concerns and where the information is
relevant to resolving material compliance concerns. FinCEN does not
expect this clarification to result in significant recurring costs.
FinCEN also does not expect the proposed rule to have significant
adverse effects on competition, innovation, access to financial
services, or market structure. By reducing duplicative collection and
verification requirements, the proposal may reduce account-opening
friction for legal entity customers, including small businesses.
5. Consideration of Alternatives
In developing the proposed rule, FinCEN considered several policy
alternatives, including alternatives specifically tailored to
accommodate small entities that may otherwise be disproportionately
burdened by regulatory compliance. FinCEN invites comment on these
alternatives, and on any other alternatives that were not considered
here but could reasonably be expected to accomplish the same policy
objectives with equal or greater efficiency.
a. Alternative 1: Strictly Risk-Based Information Collection
First, FinCEN considered adopting an entirely risk-based approach
to the determination of the types of information that covered financial
institutions would have to collect in order to identify and verify the
identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers.\52\ In
contrast to the proposed rule, the alternative considered would
eliminate the proposed list of required information and instead grant
covered financial institutions complete discretion to determine what
information to obtain from a beneficial owner of a legal entity
customer, based upon the institution's own risk-based analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ The proposed rule sets out a discrete list of information
that a covered financial institution must obtain about each
beneficial owner of a legal entity customer: name; date of birth;
residential or business street address, or if the beneficial owner
does not have a residential or business street address an Army Post
Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO) box number, or the
residential or business street address of next of kin or of another
contact individual; and (1) for a U.S. person, a Social Security
number (not including an ITIN), or (2) for a non-U.S. person, (a) a
Social Security number (not including an ITIN); (b), a passport
number and country of issuance; (c) an alien identification card
number; or (d) a number and country of issuance of any other
government-issued document evidencing nationality or residence and
bearing a photograph or similar safeguard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FinCEN believes that the proposed rule, which specifies certain
information that a covered financial institution must collect,
appropriately acknowledges a continuing need for a minimum standard,
supplemented, rather than replaced, by tailoring based on risk. FinCEN
is concerned that declining to set a minimum requirement for
information to be collected across covered financial institutions would
make it easier for illicit actors to enter into the financial system by
persuading covered financial institutions that they are low-risk
customers and therefore should not provide much, if any, identifying
information, or by targeting covered financial institutions with less
comprehensive CDD programs or less sophisticated risk-analysis
capabilities. In return for focusing on heightened risks, the financial
services industry as a whole might obtain some regulatory relief, but
in FinCEN's judgment not significantly more than the proposal itself
provides. Accordingly, FinCEN has opted against this alternative. This
alternative could reduce compliance costs for some covered financial
institutions by allowing them to collect less information for
beneficial owners they determine to present lower risk. The cost
savings would likely arise from reduced customer outreach, fewer
information fields collected, and potentially shorter account-opening
processes in low-risk cases. The magnitude of those savings, however,
is uncertain and may be limited because the proposed rule already
reduces duplicative compliance activity by eliminating repeated
beneficial ownership identification and
[[Page 74527]]
verification at repeat account openings unless facts or risk-based
procedures call for updated information. The proposed rule also already
permits covered financial institutions to obtain additional information
only where warranted by risk indicators or supervisory concerns, rather
than imposing a categorical obligation to collect additional
information in every case.
This alternative would also likely provide greater discretion and
potentially greater burden reduction in some low-risk circumstances,
but at the cost of reduced uniformity, less regulatory certainty, and
potentially weaker beneficial ownership transparency. This trade-off
may be particularly important for smaller or less technologically
sophisticated covered financial institutions. Although the alternative
could appear less burdensome because it would allow such institutions
to collect less information in some cases, it could also require them
to make and document more case-specific judgments about what
information is sufficient to identify and verify beneficial owners.
That added discretion could increase uncertainty, training needs,
supervisory risk, and inconsistency in implementation.
FinCEN therefore expects that the proposed rule would better
balance costs and benefits. Compared with the alternative, the proposed
rule is expected to preserve more of the AML/CFT, countering fraud,
countering sanctions-evasion, and countering illicit-finance benefits
associated with a uniform beneficial ownership identification baseline,
while still reducing burden through relief from duplicative collection
at repeat account openings, greater flexibility to use third-party
sources, and risk-based authority to obtain additional information when
warranted. Accordingly, FinCEN preliminarily assesses that the
alternative would likely provide, at most, modest additional compliance
cost savings relative to the proposal, while presenting greater risks
to regulatory consistency and the effectiveness of customer due
diligence.
b. Alternative 2: Additional Data Collection Requirements
FinCEN separately considered a version of the proposed rule that
would have required covered financial institutions to collect
additional information beyond what this proposal would require by
expanding the list of information an institution must obtain about each
beneficial owner of a legal entity customer beyond the beneficial
owner's name, date of birth, address, and qualifying identifying
number. The goal of such an enhanced data collection requirement would
be to reduce uncertainty about whether the information that a covered
financial institution can be relied upon to collect will be sufficient
to perform a meaningful analysis of beneficial ownership-related risks.
FinCEN believes that such an approach would be overly prescriptive
and inconsistent with the aim of Executive Order 14406 to improve the
risk-based nature of the CDD Rule by allowing financial institutions to
focus on higher-risk customers, including those that present risks
related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other
unlawful activity. FinCEN believes that the proposed rule would ensure
that covered financial institutions collect sufficient information
concerning the beneficial owners of their legal entity customers, while
providing the necessary flexibility for a covered financial institution
to collect additional information for specific beneficial owners where
such collection is warranted by risk. The small benefit in terms of
increased regulatory certainty that the alternative would achieve would
come at significant cost to covered financial institutions. Thus,
FinCEN rejected this alternative approach.
This alternative would likely produce greater regulatory certainty
than the proposed rule by specifying additional information that
covered financial institutions must obtain from each beneficial owner
of a legal entity customer. A more prescriptive information-collection
requirement could reduce ambiguity about whether an institution has
collected enough information to conduct a meaningful beneficial
ownership risk assessment and could promote more uniform practices
across covered financial institutions.
However, relative to the proposed rule, this alternative would
likely impose materially greater costs, by requiring additional
information in all cases, including for legal entity customers and
beneficial owners that present lower risk and for whom the additional
information may have limited marginal value. The principal costs of
this alternative would likely include increased customer outreach,
longer account-opening processes, additional form and system changes,
additional training, and greater compliance and quality-control
burdens. These costs would be recurring because institutions would have
to collect any additional information for each covered beneficial owner
whenever beneficial ownership information is required. The alternative
could also increase burden on legal entity customers and beneficial
owners by requiring them to provide additional information even when no
risk-based factor suggests that the information is needed.
FinCEN preliminarily assesses that the proposed rule better
balances costs and benefits. Compared with the alternative, the
proposed rule preserves a clear minimum standard, maintains flexibility
to collect additional information in higher-risk circumstances, and
avoids imposing additional recurring burden on all covered financial
institutions, legal entity customers, and beneficial owners.
c. Alternative 3: Delayed Effective Date for Small Financial
Institutions
FinCEN separately and additionally considered modifying the
proposed rule to provide a delayed effective date for small financial
institutions as defined by the RFA, as a way of minimizing costs to
small businesses. However, FinCEN does not believe that implementation
of the proposed rule would impose a significant burden on small
financial institutions, as much of the proposal is permissive rather
than prescriptive or captures existing industry practices.
Additionally, FinCEN is mindful that by introducing a staggered
effective date by financial institution size, this may inadvertently
create confusion or unequal burdens for the small businesses that are
the legal entity customers of covered financial institutions by causing
them to face different standards of information provision based on the
size of the institutions where they maintain an account. Accordingly,
FinCEN has opted against this alternative.
This alternative could reduce near-term implementation burden for
small covered financial institutions by giving them additional time to
review the final rule and make any needed updates to policies,
procedures, forms, workflows, systems, or training materials. A delayed
effective date could be most useful in providing additional time for
small institutions with less automated account-opening systems, fewer
compliance personnel, or greater reliance on third-party vendors or
core processors whose services might be more difficult to obtain or
more expensive for small financial institutions if required to compete
with larger institutions in the run-up to a universal, industry-wide
effective date.
FinCEN expects, however, that the incremental benefit of this
alternative
[[Page 74528]]
would be limited. The proposed rule is not expected to impose
significant costs because it would not expand the population of covered
financial institutions, legal entity customers, accounts, or beneficial
owners, and would not impose new mandatory reporting, recordkeeping, or
customer information collection requirements. A delayed effective date
for small financial institutions would also delay the benefits of
regulatory clarity and burden reduction for those institutions.
FinCEN preliminarily assesses that the proposed rule better
balances costs and benefits. A delayed effective date for small
financial institutions could provide some additional implementation
flexibility, but the likely cost savings would be modest because the
proposal is expected to reduce, rather than increase, recurring
beneficial ownership collection and verification obligations. The
proposed rule also aligns with practices that at least some
institutions have already revised or begun revising in response to the
February 2026 exceptive relief.
B. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14192
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, to the
extent permitted by law, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits, including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety, distributive, and equity effects. Executive Order
13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits,
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and promoting flexibility.
FinCEN has considered the expected costs and benefits of the
proposed rule and does not anticipate that it would introduce an effect
of $100 million or more on the economy in a given year. Notwithstanding
a lack of expected economic significance under section 3(f)(1) of
Executive Order 12866, the proposed rule has been reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and found to otherwise meet the
criteria for a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, FinCEN has conducted the requisite
regulatory impact analysis and included a summary thereof in section
IX.A.
FinCEN expects that this action, when finalized, would be an
Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action because it is expected to
reduce compliance burden and to have total costs less than zero. The
proposal would codify relief from duplicative beneficial ownership
identification and verification at repeat account openings and would
not impose a new mandatory reporting, recordkeeping, or customer
information collection requirement.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The RFA requires an agency either to provide an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis with a proposed rule or to certify that the
proposed rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule
would apply to covered financial institutions, some of which are small
entities. However, the proposal would not expand the categories of
covered financial institutions, would not impose a new reporting or
recordkeeping requirement, and would not require covered financial
institutions to collect additional information in all cases.
FinCEN expects that any one-time costs for small covered financial
institutions would be limited to ordinary-course review of the final
rule and conforming updates to policies, procedures, forms, training,
or workflows. FinCEN expects those costs to be small because small
covered financial institutions already maintain CDD procedures and
because the proposal is expected to reduce rather than increase
recurring beneficial ownership collection and verification obligations
for repeat account openings. Accordingly, FinCEN certifies that the
proposed rule, if finalized, would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the UMRA,\53\ Public Law 104-4, requires that an
agency prepare a budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule
that may result in new, incremental expenditures by State, local, and
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $193
million or more in any one year ($100 million in 1995, adjusted for
inflation).\54\ If a budgetary impact statement is required, section
202 of the UMRA also requires an agency to identify and consider a
reasonable number of regulatory alternatives before promulgating a
rule. FinCEN has determined that this rule will not result in increased
expenditures by State, local, and Tribal governments, or by the private
sector, of $193 million or more. Accordingly, FinCEN has not prepared a
budgetary impact statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ 2 U.S.C. 1532.
\54\ The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis reports the annual
value of the gross domestic product implicit price deflator for
calendar year 1995 (the year UMRA was enacted) as 66.939, and as
128.974 for calendar year 2025 (the most recent available). Thus,
the inflation-adjusted estimate for $100 million is 128.974 / 66.939
x $100 million, or $192.7 million. See U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Table 1.1.9. Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic
Product, BEA Interactive Data Application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the PRA, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person
is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it
displays a valid control number assigned by OMB. Written comments and
recommendations for the proposed information collection can be
submitted by visiting <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain</a>. Find
this particular document by selecting ``Currently Under Review--Open
for Public Comments'' or by using the search function. Comments are
welcome and must be received by January 19, 2027.
In accordance with requirements of the PRA, 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(A), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, the
following information concerns the collection of information as it
relates to the amendments to covered financial institutions' AML/CFT
program regulations.
1. Description of Affected Financial Institutions and OMB Control
Numbers
OMB Control Number(s): 1506-0020, 1506-0035, 1506-0081, 1506-0088,
and 1506-0070.
The proposed amendments, if adopted, may affect covered financial
institutions' recordkeeping activities, and as a result, burdens
incurred. To the extent that covered financial institutions' CDD-
related recordkeeping burdens are currently accounted for under FinCEN
OMB control numbers, they have been so primarily under OMB control
number 1506-0070,\55\ with additional components currently accounted
for under 1506-0081 (applicable to Investment Advisers) \56\ or under
proposal to be accounted for under OMB control numbers 1506-0020
(Mutual Funds), 1506-0035 (Banks Without a Federal Functional
Regulator), and 1506-0088 (PPSIs).\57\
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\55\ See FinCEN, Agency Information Collection Activities;
Proposed Renewal; Comment Request; Renewal Without Change of the
Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Legal Entity Customers, 89 FR
14148 (Feb. 26, 2024).
\56\ See FinCEN, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: Anti-
Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and
Suspicious Activity Report Filing Requirements for Registered
Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers, 89 FR 72156,
72261-64 (Sept. 4, 2024).
\57\ See FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the
Financing of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR at 18746-50. As proposed, a
covered financial institution would be required to establish and
maintain a written AML/CFT program that includes: ``appropriate
risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence,
to include, but not be limited to: understanding the nature and
purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a
customer risk profile.'' Id.; see also OFAC and FinCEN, Permitted
Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the
Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program
Requirements, 91 FR 18582.
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[[Page 74529]]
2. Estimated Annual Burden
The PRA requires that agencies consider the impact of paperwork and
other information collection burdens imposed on the public. FinCEN does
not estimate any incremental burden under the PRA associated with this
proposed rule because the proposal would not impose any new reporting,
recordkeeping, or third-party disclosure requirement. The proposal
would codify existing relief from the requirement to identify and
verify beneficial owners at each repeat account opening and would
clarify that covered financial institutions may obtain additional
information in heightened-risk circumstances where warranted by risk
indicators or supervisory concerns. The decision by a covered financial
institution to obtain additional information in a particular case would
depend on its own risk-based assessment and the need to resolve a
material compliance concern. FinCEN requests comment on whether the
proposed rule could reasonably be expected to introduce incremental PRA
effects that should be identified and included in this burden analysis.
3. General Request for Comments Under the PRA
Comments submitted in response to this proposed rule will be
summarized and included in a request for OMB approval. All comments
will become a matter of public record. FinCEN invites comments on: (1)
whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper
performance of FinCEN's mission, including whether the information
shall have practical utility; (2) the accuracy of FinCEN's estimate of
the burden of the collection of information; (3) ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; (4)
ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on
reporting persons, including through the use of technology; and (5)
estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchase of services required to provide information.
F. Additional Requests for Comment
1. FinCEN requests comment on the appropriate baseline and on any
data that would help quantify cost savings relative to either baseline.
2. FinCEN requests comment on current practices, including the
extent to which covered financial institutions have already adjusted
procedures, forms, systems, training, or quality-control processes in
response to the February 2026 exceptive relief.
3. FinCEN requests data on the distribution of accounts per legal
entity customer, the annual number of repeat account openings by legal
entity customers, the time required to collect and verify beneficial
ownership information at repeat account openings, and the extent of any
implementation costs or savings associated with the proposed rule.
4. FinCEN requests comment on whether the proposed clarification
could cause covered financial institutions to change policies,
procedures, training, systems, or customer-facing practices in ways
that would generate incremental costs not identified here.
5. FinCEN requests comment on any potential distributional effects,
including whether the proposal would have different effects across
banks, brokers or dealers in securities, mutual funds, futures
commission merchants, and introducing brokers in commodities, or across
small and large covered financial institutions.
6. FinCEN requests comment on the expected cost savings and any
potential costs associated with implementing the proposed rule.
7. FinCEN invites comment from small entities on all aspects of its
certification pursuant to RFA requirements that the proposed rule is
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, including any data on implementation costs,
cost savings, or operational effects.
8. FinCEN requests comment on the extent of any one-time
implementation costs and on whether such costs vary materially by
institution type or size.
9. FinCEN requests data on the distribution of accounts per legal
entity customer, the annual number of repeat account openings by legal
entity customers, the time required to collect and verify beneficial
ownership information at repeat account openings, and the extent of any
implementation costs or savings associated with the proposed rule.
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 1010
Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Authority
delegations (Government agencies), Banks, Banking, Brokers, Business
and industry, Citizenship and naturalization, Commodity futures, Crime,
Currency, Electronic filing, Federal savings associations, Federal-
State relations, Fiduciaries, Foreign banking, Foreign currencies,
Foreign persons, Gambling, Holding companies, Indians, Indians--law,
Indians--tribal government, Insurance companies, Investigations,
Investment companies, Law enforcement, Penalties, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Savings associations, Securities, Small
business, Terrorism, Time.
Amendment to FinCEN Regulations
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network proposes to amend 31 CFR part 1010 as follows.
PART 1010--GENERAL PROVISIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 1010 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1829b and 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314
and 5316-5336; title III, sec. 314, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 307;
sec. 2006, Pub. L. 114-41, 129 Stat. 457; sec. 701 Pub. L. 114-74,
129 Stat. 599; sec. 6403, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388.
0
2. Section 1010.230 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
(a) In general. Covered financial institutions are required to
establish and maintain written procedures that are reasonably designed
to identify and verify the identity of beneficial owners of legal
entity customers and to include such procedures in their anti-money
laundering/countering the financing of terrorism program required under
31 U.S.C. 5318(h) and its implementing regulations.
0
b. Revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
(b) Identification and verification. With respect to legal entity
customers, the covered financial institution's customer due diligence
procedures shall enable the institution to:
(1) Identify the beneficial owner(s) of each legal entity customer,
unless the customer is otherwise excluded pursuant to paragraph (e) of
this section or the account is exempted pursuant to paragraph (h) of
this section.
(i) Timing. A covered financial institution must identify the
beneficial owner(s) of a legal entity customer:
(A) when the legal entity customer first opens an account with the
covered financial institution;
[[Page 74530]]
(B) any time thereafter when the covered financial institution has
knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into question the
reliability of beneficial ownership information previously obtained
about the legal entity customer; and
(C) as needed based on a covered financial institution's risk-based
procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence.
(ii) Information necessary for identification and verification of
identity. A covered financial institution must obtain information about
each beneficial owner sufficient to allow the covered financial
institution to identify, and to verify the identity of, the beneficial
owner. The financial institution must obtain, at minimum, the
information described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A)-(D) about each
beneficial owner, and may obtain additional information as described in
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(E):
(A) name;
(B) date of birth;
(C) residential or business street address, or if the beneficial
owner does not have a residential or business street address an Army
Post Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO) box number, or the
residential or business street address of next of kin or of another
contact individual; and (D) (1) for a U.S. person, a Social Security
number (not including an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number), or
(2) for a non-U.S. person, (i) a Social Security number (not including
an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number); (ii) a passport number
and country of issuance; (iii) an alien identification card number; or
(iv) a number and country of issuance of any other government issued
document evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a photograph
or similar safeguard.
(E) Where warranted by other risk indicators or supervisory
concerns, including but not limited to indicators of risks associated
with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other
illicit financial activity, the covered financial institution may
obtain additional information useful in mitigating risk or addressing
supervisory concerns, including but not limited to information relevant
to lawful immigration status and employment authorization in the United
States.
(iii) Sources of Information. Subject to compliance with the
certification requirement in paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of this section, a
covered financial institution may obtain any information described in
paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section by acquiring it from a third-party
source.
(iv) Certification.
(A) When obtaining information at a time described in paragraph
(b)(1)(i)(A) of this section, a covered financial institution must
obtain a certification from the individual opening the account on
behalf of the legal entity customer that the information obtained is
accurate to the best of the individual's knowledge. This certification
may, but is not required to, take the form of the certification in
Appendix A of this section.
(B) When obtaining information at a time described in paragraph
(b)(1)(i)(C) of this section, a covered financial institution may rely
on information to which a certification provided in connection with
obtaining information at a time described in paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A) of
this section applies, provided that a representative of the legal
entity customer provides oral or written confirmation that such
information is up to date and accurate to the best of the individual's
knowledge. Written confirmation may, but is not required to, take the
form of the certification in Appendix A of this section.
(2) Verify the identity of each beneficial owner identified to the
covered financial institution, according to risk-based procedures, to
the extent reasonable and practicable. At a minimum, these procedures
must require collection of information specified in paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) and contain the elements required for verifying the identity
of customers that are individuals under Sec. 1020.220(a)(2), other
than Sec. 1020.220(a)(2)(i), of this chapter (for banks); Sec.
1023.220(a)(2), other than Sec. 1023.220(a)(2)(i), of this chapter
(for brokers or dealers in securities); Sec. 1024.220(a)(2), other
than Sec. 1024.220(a)(2)(i), of this chapter (for mutual funds); or
Sec. 1026.220(a)(2), other than Sec. 1026.220(a)(2)(i), of this
chapter (for futures commission merchants or introducing brokers in
commodities); provided, that in the case of documentary verification,
the financial institution may use photocopies or other reproductions of
the documents listed in paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A)(1) of Sec. 1020.220 of
this chapter (for banks); Sec. 1023.220 of this chapter (for brokers
or dealers in securities); Sec. 1024.220 of this chapter (for mutual
funds); or Sec. 1026.220 of this chapter (for futures commission
merchants or introducing brokers in commodities). A covered financial
institution may rely on the information supplied by the legal entity
customer regarding the identity of its beneficial owner or owners,
provided that it has no knowledge of facts that would reasonably call
into question the reliability of such information.
Jenna H. Casanova,
Acting Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2026-23614 Filed 11-18-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P
</pre></body>
</html>This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.