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Proposed Rule2026-23614

Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Covered Financial Institutions

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Published
November 19, 2026

Issuing agencies

Treasury DepartmentFinancial Crimes Enforcement Network

Abstract

FinCEN is issuing this proposed rule to strengthen customer due diligence requirements under the Customer Due Diligence Rule consistent with the policy goals of, and as directed by, Executive Order 14406, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial System. Specifically, the proposal ensures financial institutions covered by the Customer Due Diligence Rule collect sufficient information to verify the identities of beneficial owners of legal entity customers and maintain the authority, where warranted, to obtain additional information, including information relevant to whether the beneficial owners of legal entity customers possess lawful immigration status and employment authorization in the United States when such information is relevant to assessing risks.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 91 Issue 222 (Thursday, November 19, 2026)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 222 (Thursday, November 19, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 74514-74530]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2026-23614]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

31 CFR Part 1010

RIN 1506-AB78


Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Covered Financial 
Institutions

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing this proposed rule to strengthen customer 
due diligence requirements under the Customer Due Diligence Rule 
consistent with the policy goals of, and as directed by, Executive 
Order 14406, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial System. 
Specifically, the proposal ensures financial institutions covered by 
the Customer Due Diligence Rule collect sufficient information to 
verify the identities of beneficial owners of legal entity customers 
and maintain the authority, where warranted, to obtain additional 
information, including information relevant to whether the beneficial 
owners of legal entity customers possess lawful immigration status and 
employment authorization in the United States when such information is 
relevant to assessing risks.

DATES: Comments must be received by January 19, 2027.

ADDRESSES: Comments must be submitted in one of the following two ways 
(please choose only one of the ways listed):
    <bullet> Electronically at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>. Follow the 
``Submit a comment'' instructions under Docket FINCEN-2026-0298. If you 
are reading this document on <a href="http://federalregister.gov">federalregister.gov</a>, you may use the green 
``SUBMIT A PUBLIC COMMENT'' button beneath this rulemaking's title to 
submit a comment to the <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> docket.
    <bullet> You may mail written comments to the following address: 
Regulatory and Strategic Affairs Division, Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183. Mailed comments must be 
received by the close of the comment period.
    All comments will be made available to the public. Do not include 
personal identifiable information in submissions; submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. We may redact in 
part or withhold entirely from publication a comment that contains 
threats of violence, classified information, or information potentially 
related to a whistleblower submission or that identifies a 
whistleblower. Comments may be submitted anonymously. When multiple 
comments are submitted with identical or near-identical content, FinCEN 
may post only a single representative example of identical or 
substantially identical comments. All related documents and comments 
are posted on <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>.
    In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), a summary of this proposed 
rule may be found at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: FinCEN's Regulatory Support Section by 
submitting an inquiry at <a href="http://www.fincen.gov/contact">www.fincen.gov/contact</a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Scope

    This proposed rule would amend the Customer Due Diligence (CDD) 
Rule, which was promulgated under authorities provided by the Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA), to strengthen certain customer due diligence 
requirements. This proposed rule supports the efforts of the Department 
of the Treasury to make the CDD Rule more effective, risk-based, and 
focused on the greatest threats to financial institutions and national 
security, as well as promote Treasury's efforts to reduce unnecessary 
regulatory burden consistent with Executive Order 14192, Unleashing 
Prosperity Through Deregulation. This proposal implements the directive 
in Executive Order 14406, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial 
System (hereinafter ``Executive Order 14406'') to propose changes to 
applicable BSA regulations to strengthen risk-based customer due 
diligence requirements.

II. Background and Authority

A. The Bank Secrecy Act

    Enacted in 1970 and amended several times since, the BSA is 
designed to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and 
other illicit finance risks.\1\ Congress has authorized the Secretary 
of the Treasury to administer the BSA. The Secretary has in turn 
delegated the authority to implement, administer, and enforce 
compliance with the BSA and its associated regulations to the Director 
of FinCEN.\2\
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    \1\ Certain parts of the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act, its amendments, and the other statutes relating to 
the subject matter of that Act, are collectively referred to as the 
Bank Secrecy Act or BSA. These statutes are codified at 12 U.S.C. 
1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951-1960, and 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314 and 5316-5336 
and notes thereto, with implementing regulations at 31 CFR chapter 
X.
    \2\ See Treasury Order 180-01, at ] 3 (Jan. 14, 2020), <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/orders-and-directives/treasury-order-180-01">https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/orders-and-directives/treasury-order-180-01</a>; see also 31 U.S.C. 310(b)(2)(I) (providing 
that the Director of FinCEN shall ``[a]dminister the requirements of 
subchapter II of chapter 53 of this title, chapter 2 of title I of 
Public Law 91-508, and section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act, to the extent delegated such authority by the Secretary of the 
Treasury'').
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    Since its original enactment, Congress has expanded the BSA to 
address various aspects of anti-money laundering (AML) and countering 
the financing of terrorism (CFT) compliance, including through 
expansion of the BSA. In 1992, the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering 
Act \3\ gave the Secretary authority to require financial institutions, 
as defined in the BSA regulations, to ``carry out'' AML programs and to 
prescribe minimum standards for such programs, including: ``(A) the 
development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; (B) the 
designation of a compliance officer; (C) an ongoing employee training 
program; and (D) an independent audit function to test programs.'' \4\
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    \3\ Section 1517 of Public Law 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (Oct. 28, 
1992) (Annunzio-Wylie).
    \4\ Section 1517(b) of Public Law 102-550 (amending 31 U.S.C. 
5318(h)(1)).
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    Later, the USA PATRIOT Act further amended the BSA, reinforcing the 
Annunzio-Wylie framework by making it mandatory for financial 
institutions to maintain AML programs that meet minimum prescribed 
standards.\5\ The USA PATRIOT Act also, among other things, directed 
the Secretary to set minimum standards for financial institutions 
regarding customer identity in connection with the opening of accounts, 
commonly referred to as customer identification program (CIP) 
requirements,\6\ and expanded the definition of ``financial 
institution'' under the BSA, and by extension the AML program 
requirement, to cover certain other financial industry participants 
(e.g., credit unions and futures commission merchants).\7\
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    \5\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318(h), as added by section 352 of the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA 
PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001).
    \6\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318(l) as added by section 326 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.
    \7\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(E) and 31 U.S.C. 5312(c), as added 
by section 321 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

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[[Page 74515]]

    Finally, on January 1, 2021, Congress enacted the William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY 
2021 NDAA), of which the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AML Act) was a 
component.\8\ Among the purposes of the AML Act, as stated by Congress, 
was to reinforce that required policies, procedures and controls should 
support the need for AML/CFT programs to be ``risk-based.'' \9\ 
Consistent with the goals of the AML Act, Treasury recognizes the 
urgent need to modernize the AML/CFT regime in the United States so 
that it is effective, risk-based, and focused on the greatest threats 
to financial institutions and national security.\10\
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    \8\ William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Public Law 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (Jan. 
1, 2021).
    \9\ Section 6002(4) of the FY 2021 NDAA; see also 31 U.S.C. 
5311(2), (3) as added by section 6101 of the AML Act (establishing 
that among the purposes of the BSA are to prevent money laundering 
and terrorist financing through the establishment of ``risk-based 
programs'' and facilitate the ``tracking of money that has been 
sourced through criminal activity''). Section 5318(h), as amended by 
section 6101 the AML Act, also requires that when prescribing 
minimum standards for programs under this section, the Secretary 
shall take into account certain factors: (i) financial institutions 
are spending private compliance funds for a public and private 
benefit, including protecting the United States financial system 
from illicit finance risks; (ii) extension of financial services to 
the underbanked and the facilitation of financial transactions, 
including remittances, coming from the United States and abroad in 
ways that simultaneously prevent criminal persons from abusing 
formal or informal financial services networks are key U.S. policy 
goals; (iii) effective AML/CFT programs safeguard national security 
and generate significant public benefits by preventing flow of 
illicit funds in the financial system and by assisting law 
enforcement and national security agencies with identification and 
prosecution of persons attempting money laundering and other illicit 
activity in the financial system; and (iv) AML/CFT programs should 
be reasonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with BSA 
requirements and be risk-based, including ensuring that more 
attention and resources of financial institutions be directed 
towards higher risk customers and activities than lower risk. FinCEN 
took these factors into consideration when preparing this proposal.
    \10\ See, e.g., FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR 18704, 18708 (Apr. 10, 2026) 
(discussing Treasury's guiding principles for BSA reform and 
providing examples of steps taken to implement a modernized BSA 
regulatory and supervisory regime).
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B. The Customer Due Diligence Rule

    FinCEN has implemented these statutory mandates and authorities by 
promulgating program rules, among other requirements. Most notably in a 
2016 rulemaking, FinCEN, in consultation with the Federal functional 
regulators, incorporated both general and specific customer due 
diligence (CDD) requirements into FinCEN's regulations.\11\
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    \11\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 81 FR 29398 (May 11, 2016).
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    First, the 2016 rulemaking required banks, brokers and dealers in 
securities, mutual funds, and futures commission merchants and 
introducing brokers in commodities (collectively ``covered financial 
institutions'') to implement and maintain, as part of their AML 
programs, ``appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing 
customer due diligence,'' including ``[u]nderstanding the nature and 
purpose of customer relationships for the purposes of developing a 
customer risk profile'' and ``[c]onducting ongoing monitoring'' both 
``to identify and report suspicious transactions'' and ``on a risk 
basis, to maintain and update customer information.'' \12\ This became 
what is now colloquially known as the ``fifth pillar'' of an AML 
compliance program.\13\
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    \12\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 81 FR at 29457 (setting out the regulatory text); see 
also id. at 29450, note 185; 31 CFR 1020.210(b)(2)(v), 
1023.210(b)(5), 1024.210(b)(5), 1026.210(b)(5).
    \13\ As indicated above, the other pillars are the four 
requirements listed in 31 U.S.C. 5318(h): ``(A) the development of 
internal policies, procedures, and controls; (B) the designation of 
a compliance officer; (C) an ongoing employee training program; and 
(D) an independent audit function to test programs.''
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    Second, the CDD rulemaking codified at 31 CFR 1010.230 a 
requirement that covered financial institutions ``identify and verify 
beneficial owners of legal entity customers.'' \14\ Under what became 
known as the ``ownership prong'' of this requirement, covered financial 
institutions collect the names and identifying information of ``[e]ach 
individual, if any, who, directly or indirectly . . . owns 25 percent 
or more of the equity interests'' of the legal entity customer.\15\ 
Under what became known as the ``control prong'' of this requirement, 
covered financial institutions collect the name and identifying 
information of ``[a] single individual with significant responsibility 
to control, manage, or direct a legal entity customer.'' \16\ For the 
status of the specified individuals as beneficial owners of the legal 
entity customer, covered financial institutions could ``rely on the 
information supplied by the legal entity customer . . . provided that 
[the covered financial institution] has no knowledge of facts that 
would reasonably call into question the reliability of such 
information.'' \17\ For verification of the identity of the individual 
beneficial owners, covered financial institutions, at a minimum, would 
have to follow procedures containing all of the elements required for 
verification of individual account-holders under applicable CIP 
regulations.\18\ Covered financial institutions were required to 
undertake this identification and verification ``at the time a new 
account is opened,'' meaning every time that a legal entity customer 
opened a new account.\19\
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    \14\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 81 FR at 29451 (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(a)).
    \15\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(d)(1)).
    \16\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(d)(2)).
    \17\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2)).
    \18\ Id. (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2)). The CIP 
regulations are category-specific rules establishing the 
requirements for some categories of financial institutions, 
including all covered financial institutions, in connection with 
customer identification and verification of identity. See 31 CFR 
1020.220 (CIP for banks), 31 CFR 1023.220 (CIP for brokers and 
dealers in securities), 31 CFR 1024.220 (CIP for mutual funds), 31 
CFR 1026.220 (CIP for futures commission merchants and introducing 
brokers in commodities).
    \19\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 81 FR at 29451 (codified at 31 CFR 1010.230(a)(1)). 
CDD Rule requirements were effective long before the passage of the 
Corporate Transparency Act, and the two legal authorities differ in 
numerous ways. The CTA's objective, creating a nationwide system of 
direct reporting to the federal government of highly useful 
information related to beneficial ownership, is different from that 
of the CDD Rule, as are its definition of beneficial owner, the 
information in which it is interested, the entities reporting that 
information, and the recipients of that information.
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C. Recent Modifications to CDD Rule Obligations

    In 2026, FinCEN used its authority under the BSA to grant exceptive 
relief to covered financial institutions from the requirement to 
identify and verify the identities of beneficial owners of legal entity 
customers at each new account opening.\20\ That order, FIN-2026-R001, 
acknowledged that the CDD Rule requires a covered financial institution 
to identify and verify a legal entity customer's beneficial owners each 
time that customer opens an account with the covered financial 
institution, regardless of how little time passes between account 
openings or whether the covered financial institution has knowledge of 
facts that would reasonably call into question the reliability of 
beneficial ownership information last obtained about the customer. 
Consistent with the Trump Administration's policy of reducing 
unnecessary regulatory burden and enhancing the risk-based framework of 
the AML/CFT regulations, FinCEN granted relief so that a covered 
financial

[[Page 74516]]

institution--instead of being required to undertake identification and 
verification ``at the time a new account is opened''--``may instead 
limit its identification and verification of the identities of 
beneficial owners . . . to the following scenarios: (1) when a legal 
entity customer first opens an account with a covered financial 
institution; (2) any time thereafter when the covered financial 
institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into 
question the reliability of beneficial ownership information previously 
obtained about the legal entity customer; and (3) as needed based on a 
covered financial institution's risk-based procedures for conducting 
ongoing customer due diligence.'' \21\ FinCEN noted in its exceptive 
relief order that it would consider whether to codify this relief via a 
rulemaking.
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    \20\ See FinCEN, FIN-2026-R001, Exceptive Relief from 
Requirement to Identify and Verify Beneficial Owners at Each Account 
Opening (Feb. 13, 2026), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-02/FinCEN-Order-CCDExceptiveRelief.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-02/FinCEN-Order-CCDExceptiveRelief.pdf</a>.
    \21\ Id.
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D. Executive Order 14406: Restoring Integrity to America's Financial 
System

    On May 19, 2026, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 
14406 to further the Administration's policy of ``restor[ing] integrity 
to America's financial system, safeguard[ing] financial institutions 
against structural risks, and deter[ring] fraud and abuse.'' \22\ The 
Executive Order highlighted risks to the financial system caused by 
illicit cross-border financial activity and extension of credit or 
financial services to the inadmissible and removable alien population. 
To address these risks, it emphasized the importance of the Federal 
government adopting tailored measures to safeguard the financial system 
from illicit use and promote safe and sound lending and other practices 
by financial institutions and stated the need for financial 
institutions to have in place ``proper know-your-customer practices'' 
to prevent abuse of the system and be attentive to ``credit risks posed 
by the extension of . . . consumer credit to the inadmissible and 
removable alien population.'' \23\ The Executive Order requires actions 
by various Federal agencies, including changes to the CDD Rule and 
consideration of changes to CIP rules.\24\
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    \22\ Executive Order 14406 of May 19, 2026, Restoring Integrity 
to America's Financial System, 91 FR 30479 (May 22, 2026).
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ Section 3(a) directed the Secretary to issue a formal 
Advisory to financial institutions regarding the risks associated 
with the exploitation of the United States financial system by non-
work authorized populations and their employers. Executive Order 
14406 of May 19, 2026, Restoring Integrity to America's Financial 
System, 91 FR at 30480. The Secretary, through FinCEN and jointly 
with the FDIC, OCC, and NCUA, on June 5, 2026, issued an advisory 
that urged financial institutions to be vigilant against fraud 
schemes and other suspicious or potentially criminal activities 
involving the unlawful employment of illegal aliens and the 
associated risks to the integrity of the U.S. financial system. See 
FinCEN, FIN-2026-A002, Joint Advisory on Non-Work Authorized 
Populations and Their Employers and Risks to the Integrity of the 
U.S. Financial System (June 5, 2026), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf</a>. 
Section 4 directed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
to consider clarifying that potential deportation and loss of wages 
are factors that could adversely affect a non-work authorized 
borrower's ability to repay an extension of credit under the 
``ability-to-repay'' standards, and it required the FDIC, OCC, and 
NCUA to issue guidance regarding the management of the potential 
credit risks posed by the non-work authorized population. Executive 
Order 14406 of May 19, 2026, Restoring Integrity to America's 
Financial System, 91 FR at 30480-81. The CFPB issued its statement 
on June 8, 2026. See CFPB, Statement on Ability to Repay and 
Immigration Status, 91 FR 34607 (June 8, 2026). The FDIC, OCC, and 
NCUA subsequently published interagency guidance. FDIC, OCC, and 
NCUA, Interagency Guidance on Lending to Individuals Not Legally 
Authorized to Work in the United States (July 13, 2026), <a href="https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2026/nr-ia-2026-57a.pdf">https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2026/nr-ia-2026-57a.pdf</a>.
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    This proposal would implement section 3(b) of Executive Order 
14406. Section 3(b) directs the Secretary--in consultation with the 
``appropriate Federal functional financial regulators,'' defined in the 
Executive Order as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA)--to propose changes to applicable implementing 
regulations of the BSA to strengthen risk-based customer due diligence 
requirements for covered financial institutions. Section 3(b) of the 
Executive Order specifies that such changes should ensure that ``(i) 
institutions collect and verify sufficient customer identity 
information to reasonably identify the nominal and beneficial owners of 
accounts in order to assess risks related to illicit finance, sanctions 
evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity; and (ii) institutions 
maintain the authority, where warranted by other risk indicators or 
supervisory concerns, to obtain additional information necessary to 
resolve material compliance concerns, including information relevant to 
whether account holders possess lawful immigration status and 
employment authorization in the United States when such information is 
relevant to assessing risks associated with fraud, identity 
misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other illicit financial 
activity, as part of a risk-based customer due diligence program.''

E. Other FinCEN Proposed Rules

    In developing its proposal to implement section 3(b) of Executive 
Order 14406, FinCEN has considered other relevant FinCEN regulations--
both those in effect and those in consideration--that are relevant to 
customer due diligence and mitigation of customer risk to inform the 
specifics of this proposed rule.
    FinCEN has issued proposed rules further emphasizing the risk-based 
approach to AML/CFT programs for covered financial institutions, as 
well as permitted payment stablecoin issuers (PPSIs).\25\ Those rules, 
if finalized as proposed, would, among other things, require each 
covered financial institution and PPSI to establish a risk-based set of 
internal policies, procedures, and controls that must be reasonably 
designed to conduct ongoing customer due diligence. Under these 
proposed requirements, if finalized, covered financial institutions 
must establish and maintain a written AML/CFT program that includes 
appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due 
diligence, to include, but not be limited to, understanding the nature 
and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a 
customer risk profile.
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    \25\ FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing 
of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR 18704 (Apr. 10, 2026); FinCEN, 
Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering 
the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Program 
Requirements, 91 FR 18582 (Apr. 10, 2026); see also FinCEN, OCC, 
FRB, FDIC, and NCUA, Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Customer 
Identification Program, 91 FR 37234 (June 22, 2026). FinCEN's 
proposal implementing the GENIUS Act's anti-money laundering 
obligations for PPSIs also proposes changes to 31 CFR 1010.230. The 
potential changes under both proposals would be complementary rather 
than conflicting.
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    Notably, those proposals are consistent with Executive Order 
14406's directive to adopt tailored measures to safeguard the financial 
system from illicit use and ensure that institutions maintain risk-
based customer due diligence programs.\26\ Most importantly,

[[Page 74517]]

the proposals would, if finalized, ensure internal policies, 
procedures, and controls--including those relating to conducting 
ongoing customer due diligence--must be reasonably designed to mitigate 
assessed risk, including by allocating more attention and resources 
toward higher-risk customers and activities rather than toward lower-
risk customers and activities.\27\
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    \26\ This proposal is one element of broader CDD Rule revisions, 
including those required by the Corporate Transparency Act. The CTA 
directed Treasury to revise the CDD Rule to: (1) bring it into 
conformity with the AML Act of 2020, including the CTA; (2) account 
for financial institutions' access to beneficial ownership 
information reported to FinCEN so financial institutions may confirm 
beneficial ownership information provided directly to them for the 
purpose of facilitating their compliance with anti-money laundering, 
countering the financing of terrorism, and customer due diligence 
requirements; and (3) reduce any burdens on financial institutions 
and legal entity customers that are, in light of the CTA, 
unnecessary or duplicative. Section 6403(d)(1)(A)-(C) of the FY 2021 
NDAA. The current proposal is not the revision to the CDD Rule that 
addresses the issues specified by the CTA. FinCEN recently issued a 
final rule regarding beneficial ownership reporting requirements, 
which limits reporting to foreign entities registered to do business 
in the United States. FinCEN, Beneficial Ownership Information 
Reporting Requirement Revision, 91 FR 52508 (Aug. 14, 2026). FinCEN 
has determined that, given how recently the new beneficial ownership 
reporting regime has been finalized, such changes are more 
appropriately considered as part of a separate rulemaking. 
Additionally, FinCEN has proposed, as required by the GENIUS Act, 
applying CDD obligations to PPSIs. See OFAC and FinCEN, Permitted 
Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Program Requirements, 
91 FR at 18604. This proposal, with respect to PPSIs, if finalized, 
would apply to PPSIs as a category of institution covered by CDD 
obligations.
    \27\ See, e.g., 91 FR at 18717-18.
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III. Overview of the Proposal

    In drafting this proposed rule, FinCEN has considered how it can 
best strengthen the CDD Rule by adopting tailored measures to safeguard 
the financial system, including by ensuring that covered financial 
institutions have risk-based collection and verification requirements 
and direct compliance resources towards higher risk customers as 
directed by Executive Order 14406. In addition to implementing the 
directive in section 3(b) of Executive Order 14406, FinCEN also seeks 
to further the Trump Administration's efforts to modernize the AML/CFT 
regime by making it more effective, risk-based, and focused on the 
greatest threats to national security, while reducing unnecessary 
regulatory burden.
    After considering the existing regulations, proposals, and 
obligations, as well as the directives in Executive Order 14406, FinCEN 
assesses that targeted amendments to the CDD Rule--specifically, Sec.  
1010.230--best effectuate the goals of Executive Order 14406. 
Specifically, this proposal includes three targeted revisions to the 
CDD Rule codified at Sec.  1010.230, in addition to other minor 
regulatory clarifications.
    First, consistent with Executive Order 14406, the proposal would 
strengthen risk-based customer due diligence requirements for covered 
financial institutions by making explicit that, where warranted by 
other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, a covered financial 
institution may obtain additional information necessary to resolve 
material compliance concerns, including information relevant to whether 
account holders possess lawful immigration status and employment 
authorization in the United States when such information is relevant to 
assessing risks associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation, 
sanctions evasion, or other illicit financial activity, as part of a 
risk-based customer due diligence program.
    Second, FinCEN is proposing to formally incorporate the exceptive 
relief provided in FIN-2026-R001. This change would formally eliminate 
the requirement for covered financial institutions to repeatedly 
collect and verify beneficial ownership information in cases where 
there is no reason to believe that the customer's beneficial ownership 
information has changed since it was last collected, and the 
circumstances do not indicate a risk-based need to collect and verify 
beneficial ownership information. By codifying this relief, FinCEN is 
ensuring that covered financial institutions will continue to benefit 
from the flexibility to direct compliance resources consistent with 
their own assessments of risk.
    Third, the proposal would specify in Sec.  1010.230 the pieces of 
information a covered financial institution must collect relating to 
beneficial owners. This would involve moving the specific details of 
the requirement to collect information about beneficial owners from the 
rule's Appendix A into the rule itself. Most, but not all, of those 
details would not change. The proposal would, however, restrict the 
ability to satisfy the information collection requirement by collecting 
a beneficial owner's Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN). 
Additional flexibilities described in the proposal would allow 
institutions to obtain information from third parties. FinCEN assesses 
that these proposed changes would ensure that covered financial 
institutions collect sufficient, appropriate information to be able to 
verify the identities of beneficial owners while making it less 
burdensome for covered financial institutions to reasonably identify 
beneficial owners. As a result, FinCEN expects covered financial 
institutions will be both able to use their resources more efficiently 
and better positioned to assess risks related to illicit finance, 
sanctions evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity.
    In developing this proposal, as directed by Executive Order 14406, 
FinCEN consulted with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union 
Administration. Additionally, FinCEN consulted the staff of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, which are the primary Federal functional regulators for 
additional categories of institutions covered by the CDD Rule, 
specifically brokers and dealers in securities, mutual funds, and 
futures commission merchants and introducing brokers.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ As noted in note 26 above, if FinCEN's proposed rule 
regarding PPSIs is finalized, the list will also include PPSIs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Section-By-Section Analysis

A. Proposed Amendment to 31 CFR 1010.230(a)--In General

    As mentioned above, this rulemaking is rooted in FinCEN's authority 
to ``prescribe minimum standards for programs'' intended to ``guard 
against money laundering and the financing of terrorism through 
financial institutions . . . including . . . the development of 
internal policies, procedures, and controls[.]'' \29\ Consistent with 
Executive Order 14406's emphasis on assessing the risk associated with 
beneficial owners, the proposed language would clarify that covered 
financial institutions are required to establish and maintain written 
procedures reasonably designed to identify and verify the identity of 
beneficial owners of legal entity customers. This proposed addition of 
the words ``the identity of'' to Sec.  1010.230(a) is intended to make 
clear that covered financial institutions are required to collect and 
verify identifying information on a beneficial owner (i.e., to verify 
the individual's existence and identity), not whether that individual 
is actually a beneficial owner of the legal entity that is the covered 
financial institution's customer. This is consistent with language in 
the current rule that a covered financial institution may rely on the 
information supplied by the legal entity customer regarding the 
identity of its beneficial owner or owners, provided that it has no 
knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into question the 
reliability of such information.\30\ This proposed language is intended 
as a clarification and does not change covered financial institutions' 
existing obligations to verify the identities of beneficial owners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318(h)(1)(A), (2).
    \30\ FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 81 FR at 29407.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FinCEN is also proposing to add ``countering the financing of 
terrorism'' to the reference in Sec.  1010.230 to ``anti-

[[Page 74518]]

money laundering compliance programs.'' The inclusion of countering the 
financing of terrorism is a technical change, consistent with other 
FinCEN proposals, which reflects a statutory change requiring 
institutions to account for risks related to terrorist financing.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See, e.g., FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR at 18711 (proposing adding 
``countering the financing of terrorism'' to references to ``anti-
money laundering program'' to reflect USA PATRIOT Act obligation to 
account for risks related to terrorist financing and to reflect new 
statutory language in the AML Act amending 31 U.S.C. 5318(h)(1)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Proposed Amendment to 31 CFR 1010.230(b)--Identification and 
Verification

1. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(i)--Timing
    The proposal would codify the exemptive relief provided in FIN-
2026-R001 by amending Sec.  1010.230(b)(1)(i). FinCEN expects that this 
proposed change, if finalized, will ensure covered financial 
institutions continue to benefit from the flexibility to allocate 
compliance resources to focus on customers that present higher risks 
related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other 
unlawful activity as indicated in Executive Order 14406.
    The current rule requires a covered financial institution to 
identify the beneficial owner(s) of each legal entity customer every 
time a new account is opened, subject to certain limited exemptions. 
Covered financial institutions and their trade associations have 
characterized this requirement as unnecessarily burdensome, 
particularly in situations involving legal entity customers whose 
business happens to involve the frequent creation of new accounts. 
Where there is no reason to think that the customer's beneficial 
ownership information has changed since last collected, they have 
pointed out, repeated collection and verification of the same 
information wastes resources that, deployed in a more risk-conscious 
manner, could improve overall risk management.
    The proposed rule would address these concerns by replacing the 
rigid account opening requirement with a more flexible, risk-based 
approach. The proposed rule provides that a covered financial 
institution must identify the beneficial owner(s) of a legal entity 
customer: (1) when the legal entity customer first opens an account 
with the covered financial institution; (2) any time thereafter when 
the covered financial institution has knowledge of facts that would 
reasonably call into question the reliability of beneficial ownership 
information previously obtained about the legal entity customer; and 
(3) as needed based on a covered financial institution's risk-based 
procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence. The proposal 
would eliminate the requirement for covered financial institutions to 
collect a legal entity customer's beneficial ownership information at 
each new account opening except, among other circumstances, as needed 
based on a covered financial institution's risk-based procedures for 
conducting ongoing customer due diligence. Whether a financial 
institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into 
question the reliability of previously obtained beneficial ownership 
information would depend upon the facts and circumstances. Notably, if 
a covered financial institution elects, as part of its risk-based 
procedures, to continue collecting beneficial ownership information at 
each account opening, it would be permitted to do so under the proposed 
rule. FinCEN expects this change would, consistent with the policy 
goals of Executive Order 14406, improve the risk-based nature of the 
CDD Rule by allowing financial institutions to focus on higher risk 
customers, including those that present risks related to illicit 
finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other unlawful activity.
    FinCEN requests comment on the timing element of the proposal. 
Specifically, FinCEN seeks comment on whether ``any time thereafter 
when the covered financial institution has knowledge of facts that 
would reasonably call into question the reliability of beneficial 
ownership information previously obtained about the legal entity 
customer'' is an appropriate trigger for identification and 
verification of beneficial owners.
    Additionally, one of the three circumstances in which FinCEN's 
exceptive relief specifies that beneficial ownership information should 
be collected--and therefore one of the circumstances in which this 
proposal requires that it be collected--is ``when the covered financial 
institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into 
question the reliability of beneficial ownership information previously 
obtained about the legal entity customer.'' FinCEN requests comment on 
its use of ``reliability.'' If, for example, the covered financial 
institution has reason to believe there has been a change in ownership 
of the legal entity, the covered financial institution might not be 
questioning the ``reliability'' so much as the continuing accuracy of 
the information originally provided. FinCEN therefore requests comment 
on whether ``reliability'' should be used, defined in a more specific 
fashion, or supplemented.
2. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(ii)--Information To Collect
    The proposed rule would make two changes relating to the 
information potentially collected by financial institutions under Sec.  
1010.230. Both changes support the policy directives of Executive Order 
14406 by ensuring institutions collect information sufficient to 
reasonably identify the beneficial owners of legal entity customers for 
the specific purpose of assessing risks related to illicit finance, 
sanctions evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity. One change would 
make explicit the information a covered financial institution must 
collect, while the second would ensure that covered financial 
institutions can collect additional information, where warranted by 
other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, to assess risks 
associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, 
or other illicit financial activity.
    This combination reinforces the original CDD Rule's balancing of 
categorical and risk-based elements. FinCEN has assessed that this 
balance not only ensures that a covered financial institution will 
collect sufficient information with regard to beneficial owners of its 
legal entity customers, but also provides flexibility for a covered 
financial institution to collect additional information for particular 
beneficial owners where warranted by risk. In doing so, FinCEN aims to 
strengthen the risk-based element of the CDD Rule, including by 
ensuring that institutions maintain the authority to collect additional 
information based on risk, while still maintaining the categorical 
aspect of the CDD Rule.
    The proposed rule in general requires that a covered financial 
institution must obtain information about each beneficial owner of a 
legal entity customer sufficient to allow the institution to identify, 
and to verify the identity of, the beneficial owner. FinCEN proposes 
these changes to make plain the specific information that covered 
financial institutions are required to obtain about beneficial owners 
of legal entities. The proposed rule specifies a discrete list of 
information that a covered financial institution must obtain about each 
beneficial owner of a legal entity customer, which includes a 
qualifying identifying number for the individual.

[[Page 74519]]

    Under this proposal the regulatory text would set out a list of 
identifying numbers that may be used to satisfy this requirement, 
including a Social Security number, or for non-U.S. persons a passport 
number with country of issuance, an alien identification card, or a 
number and country of any other government-issued document evidencing 
nationality or residence and bearing a photograph--all of which are 
included in the existing certification form in Appendix A to the 
current rule. The proposal also specifies that an Individual Taxpayer 
Identification Number (ITIN) is not an acceptable substitute for a 
Social Security number.\32\ This specification recognizes that an ITIN, 
as the IRS has noted, is ``issued . . . for federal tax purposes 
only.'' \33\ It also reinforces the analysis set forth in FinCEN's 
recent advisory that recognized the use of an ITIN in lieu of a Social 
Security number or valid employment authorization document may be 
identified as a risk factor requiring enhanced due diligence.\34\ 
Recognizing the risk associated with ITINs, FinCEN proposes to exclude 
their use as an identifying number for a beneficial owner. It expects 
that ITIN holders legally in the United States and authorized to work 
will have alternative identification including, for example, a foreign 
passport or an alien identification card.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ IRS, Instructions for Form W-7 (12/2024) (revised Dec. 
2024), <a href="https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7">https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7</a> (directing individuals 
not to apply for an ITIN if they ``have an SSN or [are] eligible to 
get an SSN'').
    \33\ See, e.g., IRS, Individual taxpayer identification number 
(ITIN) (last accessed Nov. 3, 2026), <a href="https://www.irs.gov/tin/itin/individual-taxpayer-identification-number-itin">https://www.irs.gov/tin/itin/individual-taxpayer-identification-number-itin</a>. Notably, to obtain 
an ITIN an individual must provide documents that both establish 
identity and connection to a foreign country. IRS, Instructions for 
Form W-7 (12/2024) (revised Dec. 2024), <a href="https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7">https://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw7</a>. In some cases, documents required by the IRS to 
establish either foreign status or identity could also be used under 
the proposed rule, including a passport, a visa issued by the U.S. 
Department of State, or national identification card meeting certain 
requirements. Id.
    \34\ FinCEN, FIN-2026-A002, Joint Advisory on Non-Work 
Authorized Populations and Their Employers and Risks to the 
Integrity of the U.S. Financial System (June 5, 2026), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Non-Work-Authorized-Populations.pdf</a> (noting that ``the use of an ITIN in lieu 
of an SSN or valid employment authorization document may be 
identified as a risk factor requiring enhanced due diligence to 
ensure the account is not being utilized to facilitate the unlawful 
employment of unlawful aliens'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While new in the rule itself, the proposed language identifying 
core pieces of information is substantively the same as the current 
rule's optional Appendix A form. The proposed rule returns the appendix 
to its proper function of providing material supplementary to the 
regulation, rather than stating the regulatory requirement itself. In 
maintaining that continuity, FinCEN seeks to preserve a workable level 
of flexibility for covered financial institutions in complying with 
this requirement. FinCEN seeks comment on the workability of its 
specific proposal that an ITIN cannot substitute for a Social Security 
number under this provision, as well as whether it should make other 
changes, either specifically to permit or to prohibit acceptance of 
other identification numbers or documents.
    As noted earlier in this section, the proposed rule has a second 
goal: that covered financial institutions maintain the authority to 
collect additional information. The proposed rule does this by 
proposing regulatory text stating that, where warranted by other risk 
indicators or supervisory concerns, a covered financial institution may 
obtain additional information necessary to mitigate indicated risk or 
address supervisory concerns, including when relevant to assessing 
risks associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions 
evasion, or other illicit financial activity, lawful immigration status 
or employment authorization in the United States. This is intended to 
make clear that, in situations of heightened risk or supervisory 
concern, a financial institution may consider obtaining additional 
information in order to confirm a beneficial owner's identity. It is 
also intended to make clear that such additional information can 
include immigration status and employment authorization information.
    FinCEN anticipates providing additional guidance, alerts, or 
advisories to financial institutions, including highlighting new and 
emerging threats and typologies that may further feed into financial 
institutions' risk-based assessments. Providing this type of feedback 
through supplemental documents, rather than in specific regulatory 
text, will allow both Treasury and the financial institutions to more 
quickly adapt to address new and emerging threats and typologies and 
allow financial institutions to assess risks associated with fraud, 
identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other illicit 
financial activity, including illicit activity relating to a lack of 
lawful immigration status or employment authorization in the United 
States.
    This proposal does not specify situations that present heightened 
risks, instead deferring that judgment to financial institutions and 
allowing them greater flexibility to identify such situations, relying 
on appropriate risk-based practices. However, such situations may well 
be judged to include instances where the identifying information for a 
beneficial owner residing in the United States presented to covered 
financial institutions includes documentation issued by a foreign 
government, rather than an identity document issued by a United States 
federal or state government agency. An individual may even present an 
ITIN and represent it to be a Social Security number, which could be a 
risk factor warranting additional inquiry.
    Moreover, the CDD Rule is critical to aiding a covered financial 
institution's efforts to detect and report suspicious activity, 
including activity that could expose the institution to loss. 
Immigration and employment status would also be germane to reasonably 
assessing risk if the beneficial owner were providing a financial 
guarantee based on the beneficial owner's income from U.S. employment--
income that might be in jeopardy if the beneficial owner were not 
legally authorized to work in the United States. Thus, a covered 
financial institution's compliance with the CDD Rule and its efforts to 
detect and report suspicious activity may aid the institution in 
evaluating risk outside of illicit finance.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Immigration status or status as a permanent resident of the 
United States may be relevant for financial institutions in 
evaluating risks other than illicit finance risks, such as credit 
risks of borrowers. See Interagency Guidance on Lending to 
Individuals Not Legally Authorized to Work in the United States, 
supra note 24; see also 12 CFR 1002.6(b)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This permissiveness, however, should not be misinterpreted. The 
proposed language providing that a covered financial institution 
``may'' obtain such additional information is not intended to suggest 
any reduction of the requirement to conduct ongoing due diligence or to 
verify the identity of each beneficial owner according to risk-based 
procedures that contain, at a minimum, the same elements financial 
institutions are required to use to verify the identity of individual 
customers under applicable CIP requirements. It is intended to 
reinforce the individual covered financial institution's authority, 
where warranted by other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, to 
demand additional information as part of a risk-based customer due 
diligence program.
    FinCEN is interested in receiving comments on whether this 
rulemaking strikes an appropriate balance between mandating information 
collection and recognition that covered financial institutions may be 
better placed to assess what information they should

[[Page 74520]]

collect. FinCEN is also interested in receiving comments on whether its 
proposed approach mitigates the risks identified in Executive Order 
14406, including by providing covered financial institutions sufficient 
authority to collect necessary information.
3. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(iii)--Sources of Information
    The proposed rule also would improve the risk-based nature of the 
CDD Rule by providing more flexibility in how a covered financial 
institution obtains information, which is expected to reduce compliance 
burden. In doing so, this change supports Executive Order 14406 by 
allowing those financial institutions to direct resources to higher 
risk customers and activities, including customers that present risks 
related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other 
unlawful activity as indicated in Executive Order 14406.
    The CDD Rule specifies that covered financial institutions must 
obtain information about a legal entity customer's beneficial owners 
``from the individual opening the account on behalf of the legal entity 
customer,'' using the optional certification form found at Appendix A 
to the rule or its substantive equivalent.\36\ Some have attempted to 
read the regulation as allowing the collection of information from 
third parties along the lines of the bank-specific CIP Rule's special 
provision for the opening of individual credit card accounts, provided 
that a representative of the legal entity customer certified the 
accuracy of the information.\37\ However, given the equivocal support 
that the CDD Rule's preamble provides for this interpretation, many 
covered financial institutions have been collecting beneficial 
ownership directly from their customers every time it was required, 
despite the time and expense of this practice.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1).
    \37\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.220(a)(2)(i)(C) (credit card account 
opening CIP rule for banks). Notably, in the CIP Rule context FinCEN 
and the Federal Banking Agencies granted exceptive relief to permit 
banks to obtain Tax Identification Number information from a third-
party source rather than the customer for all accounts, provided 
that the bank otherwise complies with the CIP Rule. See FinCEN, OCC, 
FDIC, NCUA, Order--Customer Identification Program (June 27, 2025), 
<a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2025-06/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-final508.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2025-06/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-final508.pdf</a>; FinCEN and Board, Order--Customer Identification 
Program (July 31, 2025), <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/shared/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-Board-only-508.pdf">https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/shared/CIP-TIN-Exemption-Order-Board-only-508.pdf</a>.
    \38\ See FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for 
Financial Institutions, 81 FR at 29405-29406. The best argument for 
the expansive reading is based on the negative inference to be drawn 
from the statement ``FinCEN declines to permit reliance solely upon 
previously gathered alternate sources of beneficial ownership 
information.'' See 81 FR at 29406.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed addition of paragraph (b)(1)(iii) would offer covered 
financial institutions clarity by providing that a covered financial 
institution may obtain any information described in paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii) by acquiring it from a third-party source. Regardless of the 
source from which information is obtained, a covered financial 
institution must comply with the certification requirement set forth in 
paragraph (b)(1)(iv). Similarly, regardless of the source from which 
information was obtained, a covered financial institution must comply 
with the requirement to identify the beneficial owner(s) of a legal 
entity customer any time after the legal entity customer first opens an 
account with the covered financial institution when the covered 
financial institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call 
into question the reliability of beneficial ownership information 
previously obtained about the legal entity customer.
4. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(1)(iv)--Certification
    Relatedly, the proposed rule also would improve the risk-based 
nature of the CDD Rule by providing more flexibility about when an 
institution must obtain a new certification for an existing legal 
entity customer. This enables a covered financial institution to rely 
on beneficial ownership information previously obtained from a 
certification provided in connection with the initial opening of an 
account by the legal entity customer with the covered financial 
institution. This change supports Executive Order 14406 by allowing 
financial institutions to focus on higher risk customers and 
activities, instead of activities that result in unnecessary 
information collection untethered from the risk of a particular 
customer.
    The proposal provides that when a legal entity customer first opens 
an account with a covered financial institution, the covered financial 
institution obtaining information on the legal entity customer's 
beneficial owners must obtain a certification from the individual 
opening the account on behalf of the legal entity customer that the 
information obtained is accurate to the best of the individual's 
knowledge. A covered financial institution may, but is not required, to 
use the standardized certification form contained in Appendix A to 
Sec.  1010.230. If the standardized certification form is not used, a 
covered financial institution must obtain from the individual opening 
the account the information required by the standardized certification 
form by another means.
    The proposal also provides that, when obtaining information on 
beneficial owners as needed based on a covered financial institution's 
risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence, a 
covered financial institution may rely on beneficial ownership 
information previously obtained from a certification provided in 
connection with the initial opening of an account by the legal entity 
customer with the covered financial institution. In order to rely on 
such a prior certification, the covered financial institution must 
obtain from a representative of the legal entity customer either oral 
or written confirmation that such information is up to date and 
accurate to the best of the individual's knowledge. This confirmation 
may, but is not required to, take the form of the standardized 
certification form in Appendix A of this section. Thus, certification 
remains essential to collection of beneficial ownership information, 
but the proposal grants flexibility to institutions with respect to the 
form of certification obtained.
    The covered financial institution must maintain a record of such 
certification or confirmation, whether the certification or 
confirmation is oral or written. If a covered financial institution is 
unable to obtain a necessary certification or confirmation that 
previously obtained beneficial ownership information is up-to-date and 
accurate, or if the covered financial institution has knowledge of 
facts that would reasonably call into question the reliability of 
beneficial ownership information previously obtained about the legal 
entity customer, the covered financial institution must identify and 
verify the identities of the beneficial owners of the legal entity 
customer in accordance with the general requirements of Sec.  1010.230.
5. Proposed 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2)--Verification
    Under this proposal, Sec.  1010.230 would contain a discrete list 
of information that covered financial institutions must collect, which 
would serve as the factual basis for their verification of the 
identities of the beneficial owners of their legal entity customers. 
The presence of this list could create confusion given Sec.  1010.230's 
current cross-reference to the CIP rules, which encompass those rules' 
own list of information that must

[[Page 74521]]

be collected for CIP compliance purposes. The cross-reference currently 
requires covered financial institutions to have procedures that 
``contain the elements required for verifying the identity of customers 
that are individuals under Sec.  1020.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for 
banks); Sec.  1023.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for brokers or dealers in 
securities); Sec.  1024.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for mutual funds); 
or Sec.  1026.220(a)(2) of this chapter (for futures commission 
merchants or introducing brokers in commodities).'' \39\ Sections 
(a)(2)(ii) and (a)(2)(iii) of the CIP rules concern procedures for 
customer verification and procedures in situations where verification 
is impossible. Section (a)(2)(i) of those rules, however, is a list of 
customer information that a financial institution is required to 
collect about each individual or corporate customer. Among other 
things, section (a)(2)(i) of those rules specifically allows use of ``a 
taxpayer identification number,'' i.e. an ITIN, for a non-U.S. person, 
which would not be permitted under this proposal and should not be 
misinterpreted to apply to the CDD Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ 31 CFR 1010.230(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To clarify which aspects of the CIP rules do and do not apply for 
purposes of the CDD Rule, FinCEN proposes amending Sec.  
1010.230(b)(2). That change will clarify that a covered financial 
institution must have customer due diligence verification procedures 
that reflect the requirements of that institution's CIP rule, but also 
that covered financial institutions must adhere to proposed Sec.  
1010.230(b)(1)(ii), which specifies the information to be collected. 
This change is designed to clarify but not change the current CDD 
Rule's adoption of CIP verification procedural standards while 
recognizing that the information a financial institution can use to 
verify an identity will, if this proposal is adopted, be different 
under the CIP and CDD Rules. FinCEN requests comment on challenges that 
may arise from different information collection requirements for CIP 
and CDD obligations, and whether the revised cross-reference is 
sufficiently clear.
    In addition, given the continuing reference to, and incorporation 
of the standards of, the CIP rule, FinCEN solicits comments about the 
need for the CDD Rule itself to qualify the compliance standard of its 
verification requirement with the phrase ``to the extent reasonable and 
practicable''--a phrase that is already found in the CIP rule.\40\ 
Alternatively, FinCEN solicits comments on whether it should dispense 
with cross-references altogether and insert in the CDD Rule all of the 
specific appropriate procedural language now found in the CIP rule 
itself, even if such insertion simply reproduces relevant CIP rule 
language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.220(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Effective Date

    FinCEN proposes that the rule would be effective 90 days after 
publication in the Federal Register.

VI. Requests for Comment

    FinCEN seeks comments on all aspects of the proposed rule and 
specifically seeks comments on the following topics. For all responses, 
commenters are encouraged to provide the basis for any conclusions 
drawn in their comments.
    1. Do the information collection requirements proposed in this 
rulemaking strike an appropriate balance, including between providing 
covered financial institutions sufficient direction in information 
collection, as well as discretion to require more information when risk 
warrants additional collection?
    2. Is the information that the proposal requires covered financial 
institutions to collect and verify sufficient for them to reasonably 
identify most beneficial owners and assess beneficial ownership-related 
risks related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, or other 
unlawful activity? If not, what additional or alternative information 
should covered financial institutions be required to collect?
    3. Does the proposal provide covered financial institutions 
sufficient certainty that, where warranted, they maintain the ability 
to collect additional information, including relating to whether 
beneficial owners possess lawful immigration status and employment 
authorization in the United States? Should the proposed text be refined 
in any way?
    4. Under the proposal, a covered financial institution may be 
required to collect beneficial ownership information ``any time 
thereafter [that is, after the initial collection] when the covered 
financial institution has knowledge of facts that would reasonably call 
into question the reliability of beneficial ownership information 
previously obtained about the legal entity customer.'' Is this 
circumstance an appropriate trigger for identification and verification 
of beneficial owners? Does it need to be refined or clarified, and if 
so how? For example, could ``reliability'' be supplemented with another 
measure, such as ``accuracy'' or ``continuing accuracy,'' given that, 
if the covered financial institution has reason to believe there has 
been a change in ownership of the legal entity, the covered financial 
institution might not be questioning the ``reliability'' so much as the 
continuing accuracy of the information originally provided?
    5. Does the proposal's prohibition on use of an ITIN in lieu of a 
Social Security number appropriately balance risk? Does it represent 
any compliance challenges for covered financial institutions, including 
because of the potential divergent approach between the information 
permitted to be collected under the CIP rules and the CDD Rule? Would 
additional FinCEN guidance help address those challenges?
    6. Should FinCEN consider alternatives to prohibiting use of an 
ITIN? For example, should FinCEN allow collection of an ITIN for 
verification purposes but require a covered financial institution to 
undertake additional steps, such as further due diligence measures or 
submission of additional information or documentation? Describe 
benefits and drawbacks of such alternatives.
    7. Are there circumstances where an individual lawfully present in 
the United States would have an ITIN, but no other number or document 
specified in the proposal? If yes, how could FinCEN account for such 
scenarios while still accounting for the risk addressed by Executive 
Order 14406?
    8. The CDD Rule incorporates some language borrowed from the CIP 
rules, and it also cross-references the CIP rules. In general, should 
FinCEN dispense with cross-references altogether and insert in the CDD 
Rule all of the specific appropriate procedural language of the CIP 
rule itself? Whether or not FinCEN adopts this global solution, should 
FinCEN retain the phrase ``to the extent reasonable and practicable,'' 
borrowed from the CIP rules, in the verification section of the CDD 
Rule? Should it use an alternative standard? If the phrase is deleted, 
what will be the effect?
    9. The CDD Rule requirement is, generally speaking, 
``categorical,'' imposing essentially the same core requirements with 
respect to all of a covered financial institution's non-exempt legal 
entity customers. Should FinCEN provide greater flexibility to covered 
financial institutions to adjust their due diligence efforts with 
respect to legal entity customers and their beneficial owners downward 
with decreased risk, not simply upward with

[[Page 74522]]

respect to increased risk? What lower risk scenarios might be 
identified, under which on a risk-basis financial institutions should 
be permitted to collect less or different information related to 
beneficial ownership?
    10. Should the recordkeeping requirement of the CDD Rule, 31 CFR 
1010.230(i), be amended to better account for written or verbal 
confirmations contemplated under the proposed revisions to 31 CFR 
1010.230(b)(1)(iv)(B)? The existing language of 31 CFR 
1010.230(i)(1)(i) requires covered financial institutions to keep 
records that include ``For identification, any identifying information 
obtained by the covered financial institution pursuant to paragraph (b) 
of this section [the paragraph requiring collection of information], 
including without limitation the certification (if obtained)[.]'' Is it 
clear that the phrase ``any identifying information obtained'' includes 
a confirmation that information previously collected has not changed, 
or should the text be amended to explicitly address the matter of such 
confirmations about previously collected information?
    11. The Appendix A form provides a list of corporate positions that 
could have ``significant responsibility for managing the legal 
entity,'' which includes ``Vice President'' and ``Treasurer.'' Should 
these or any other positions be listed as possible control persons? 
Alternatively, should any of these or other positions be excluded from 
the category of control person?
    12. Should FinCEN consider a longer or shorter implementation 
period? Why?

VII. Severability

    As part of this proposal, FinCEN proposes that if one portion of 
the proposed regulation, if finalized, is found to be invalid, the 
invalidated portion of the regulation should be severed with the 
remaining portions of the regulation remaining in full force and 
effect. FinCEN's position is that invalidation of any one provision, or 
application thereof to any one person or circumstance, does not, and 
should not, affect any other provision in this proposed regulation. 
Each provision serves an important, related, but distinct purpose and 
application, designed to benefit the public by protecting the U.S. 
financial system from illicit financial activity. FinCEN accordingly 
has proposed each provision such that invalidity to one provision would 
not undermine the operability or usefulness of the other provisions.

VIII. Executive Order 14294 Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal 
Regulations

    Executive Order 14294 Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal 
Regulations requires that agencies promulgating regulations potentially 
subject to criminal enforcement explicitly describe the conduct subject 
to criminal enforcement, the authorizing statutes, and the mens rea 
standard applicable to those offenses.\41\ Section 5 of Executive Order 
14294 directs that all future notices of proposed rulemaking and final 
rules published in the Federal Register, the violation of which may 
constitute criminal regulatory offenses, should include a statement 
identifying that the rule or proposed rule is a criminal regulatory 
offense and the authorizing statute.\42\ Executive Order 14294 directs 
agencies to draft this statement in consultation with the Department of 
Justice.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Executive Order 14292 of May 9, 2026, Fighting 
Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations, 90 FR 20363, 20364 (May 
14, 2025).
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Executive Order 14294 further directs that the regulatory text of 
all NPRMs and final rules with criminal consequences published in the 
Federal Register after May 9, 2025 should explicitly state a mens rea 
requirement for each element of a criminal regulatory offense, 
accompanied by citations to the relevant provisions of the authorizing 
statute.
    Willful violations of the regulations set forward in this proposed 
rule, if finalized, may be subject to criminal penalties pursuant to 31 
U.S.C. 5322 and regulations promulgated in 31 CFR chapter X. The 
statutory authority for criminal liability requires a mens rea of 
willfulness as an element pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5322(a) and 31 U.S.C. 
5322(b). FinCEN's existing regulation, 31 CFR 1010.840, that sets out 
criminal penalties for violations of regulations promulgated in 31 CFR 
chapter X also includes a mens rea of willfulness. In drafting this 
statement, FinCEN has consulted with the Department of Justice.

IX. Regulatory Impact Analysis

    FinCEN has analyzed this proposed rule as required under Executive 
Orders 12866, 13563, and 14192; the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA); 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA); and the Paperwork Reduction 
Act (PRA). This section presents the findings of its analysis, 
including a discussion of the expected incremental economic effects of 
the proposed rule relative to the current regulatory baseline and 
invites comment on all aspects of this analysis, including any data or 
information that would assist FinCEN in better quantifying the costs, 
cost savings, or other effects of the proposed rule.
    The proposed rule would amend the CDD Rule, 31 CFR 1010.230, 
primarily by making three overarching revisions, and introduce certain 
minor regulatory clarifications. These revisions, as discussed in 
section III: (1) make it explicit that covered financial institutions 
may obtain additional information necessary to mitigate indicated risk 
or address supervisory concerns; (2) incorporate FinCEN's exceptive 
relief and required information, permissible sources, and 
certification; and (3) specify pieces of information required to be 
collected, while providing additional flexibility in how such 
information is obtained. The following analysis focuses on the expected 
incremental economic effects of these revisions.
    As a threshold matter, FinCEN does not expect the proposed 
amendments would have a significant economic effect. Among other 
things, the proposal would not expand the set of covered financial 
institutions, would not expand the definition of legal entity customer, 
would not require covered financial institutions to collect beneficial 
ownership information from a new class of customers, and would not 
impose a new mandatory reporting or recordkeeping requirement. Instead, 
the proposal would codify regulatory flexibility that reduces 
duplicative beneficial ownership identification and verification at 
repeat account openings while identifying select risk-based triggers 
for obtaining and updating information when appropriate. The proposed 
clarification regarding the collection of additional information in 
heightened-risk circumstances is itself risk based; it does not impose 
a categorical obligation to collect any particular additional document 
or information, nor does it expand the pre-existing authority or 
obligation of covered financial institutions to collect risk-relevant 
information.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See supra section IV.B.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Analysis of Impact

1. Broad Economic Considerations
    As it proposes these amendments to Sec.  1010.230, FinCEN remains 
mindful of the fundamental economic tensions observed in the original 
rule. The analysis in the CDD Rule framed beneficial ownership 
requirements as addressing externalities associated with

[[Page 74523]]

illicit finance. Covered financial institutions bear the private costs 
of collecting and verifying beneficial ownership information, while 
many of the benefits of improved transparency, including reduced money 
laundering, terrorist financing, fraud, sanctions evasion, and related 
illicit activity, accrue broadly to the public, law enforcement, 
national security agencies, and the financial system as a whole. Absent 
a standard of collection requirements, covered financial institutions 
may underinvest in beneficial ownership information collection, 
particularly if they believe more rigorous requirements could place 
them at a competitive disadvantage relative to institutions with less 
comprehensive practices.
    Prior FinCEN analysis also recognized cross-border spillovers.\45\ 
Jurisdictions with less stringent AML/CFT standards may become more 
attractive destinations for laundering proceeds generated by illicit 
activity elsewhere, allowing those jurisdictions to receive capital 
inflows without bearing the full social costs of the underlying crimes. 
A clear and consistent CDD framework can help mitigate this concern by 
improving beneficial ownership transparency and making it more costly 
for illicit actors to misuse legal entities to access the U.S. 
financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for 
Financial Institutions, 81 FR at 29432-33; FinCEN, Notice of 
Availability of Regulatory Impact Assessment and Initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis Regarding the Customer Due Diligence 
Requirements for Financial Institutions, 80 FR 80308 (Dec. 24, 
2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed revisions build on that same general framework but are 
expected to have more limited incremental economic effects than the 
original CDD Rule. Rather than creating a new beneficial ownership 
information-collection obligation, the proposal would clarify and 
refine existing CDD requirements, reduce duplicative collection at 
repeat account openings, and preserve risk-based authority to obtain 
additional information when warranted by risk indicators or supervisory 
concerns. Thus, the relevant economic trade-off is not whether to 
impose a new beneficial ownership framework, but how best to preserve 
the benefits of beneficial ownership transparency while reducing 
unnecessary or duplicative compliance activity.
    Having taken the original animating concerns into consideration, 
FinCEN believes the proposed amendments would enhance the balance of 
imposing private costs on financial institutions for the public benefit 
of standardized due diligence practices.
2. Institutional Baseline and Affected Parties
a. Regulatory Baseline
    The anticipated incremental economic effects of the proposed rule 
were analyzed against a counterfactual state of the world in which a 
covered financial institution's obligations under the BSA would 
maintain the status quo. For purposes of this analysis, FinCEN 
considered the most salient component of the regulatory baseline to be 
comprised of both the original CDD Rule, as currently implemented and 
interpreted, and FinCEN's February 2026 exceptive relief.\46\ 
Additionally, the impact analysis takes into account that covered 
financial institutions continue to be subject to, among other 
obligations, applicable AML/CFT program, customer identification, 
suspicious activity reporting, and recordkeeping requirements under the 
BSA. FinCEN further took into consideration that covered financial 
institutions' business practices may be subject to other regulatory 
standards and requirements that govern operating risks.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Covered financial institutions also currently have 
flexibility under the February 2026 exceptive relief order to 
identify and verify beneficial owners at the first account opening, 
when facts reasonably call previously obtained information into 
question, and as otherwise required by risk-based ongoing customer 
due diligence procedures.
    \47\ See, e.g., Interagency Guidance on Lending to Individuals 
Not Legally Authorized to Work in the United States, supra note 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using this baseline, FinCEN does not expect the proposed rule to 
impose significant incremental costs because the primary change is to 
codify and make durable an existing form of relief, while clarifying 
that covered financial institutions may obtain additional information 
in risk-based circumstances. In the alternative, if the proposed rule 
were evaluated relative to the pre-relief requirement to identify and 
verify beneficial owners each time a legal entity customer opened a new 
account, the proposed rule would be expected to generate cost savings 
by eliminating duplicative beneficial ownership collection and 
verification at repeat account openings.
b. Baseline of Affected Parties
    The primary affected parties of the proposed amendments are the 
covered financial institutions already subject to the CDD Rule and, 
indirectly, their current and prospective legal entity customers and 
beneficial owners. Because the proposal would not expand the definition 
of covered financial institution, legal entity customer, account, or 
beneficial owner, FinCEN does not expect the proposal to impose new 
compliance costs on any newly affected population. FinCEN encourages 
commenters who do not share this expectation to submit comments on the 
subject, ideally supported by specific information.
i. Covered Financial Institutions
    The proposed rule would apply to all financial institutions 
currently subject to the CDD Rule: banks, brokers or dealers in 
securities (broker-dealers), mutual funds, and futures commission 
merchants (FCMs) and introducing brokers in commodities (IBCs). FinCEN 
estimates that there are approximately 14,554 potentially affected 
covered financial institutions, consisting of 8,988 banks; 3,277 
brokers-dealers; 1,335 mutual funds; and 954 FCMs and IBCs.\48\ While 
these estimates provide a useful reference point for the total 
population of financial institutions with CDD obligations, they do not 
identify how many covered financial institutions have legal entity 
customers that open more than one account with the same institution 
during a given period. As such, the estimates of expected affected 
covered financial institutions summarized in table 1 are provided for 
illustrative purposes only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ For a complete description of the sources of data and 
methodologies utilized to form these estimates, see the endnotes 
provided in table 1. As previously discussed, FinCEN has separately 
proposed to apply CDD Rule obligations to a proposed new type of 
regulated financial institution, PPSIs. See supra section II.E, note 
28. Because that proposal is not yet finalized, meaning that PPSIs 
are not currently a covered financial institution, this analysis 
does not incorporate PPSIs. Notably, however, FinCEN has estimated 
that the number of PPSIs would be small. See OFAC and FinCEN, 
Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering 
the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program 
Requirements, 91 FR at 18628 (estimating 50 PPSIs).

[[Page 74524]]



      Table 1--Estimates of Covered Financial Institutions by Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Number of financial
      Covered financial institution type \a\            institutions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Banks with a Federal functional regulator \b\....              \c\ 8,623
Banks without a Federal functional regulator \d\.                \e\ 365
Broker-dealers \f\...............................              \g\ 3,277
Mutual funds \h\.................................              \i\ 1,335
FCMs and IBCs \j\................................                \k\ 954
                                                  ----------------------
    Total........................................                 14,554
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t) (definition of
  financial institution).
\b\ See 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(1); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(d), 31 CFR
  1020.210(a).
\c\ This includes 4,336 FDIC-insured depository institutions (i.e.,
  federally regulated banks) according to the FDIC's Quarterly Bank
  Profile for 2025 Q4, p. 2 (<a href="https://www.fdic.gov/quarterly-banking-profile/past-quarterly-banking-profiles">https://www.fdic.gov/quarterly-banking-profile/past-quarterly-banking-profiles</a>). It also includes 4,287 NCUA-
  insured credit unions as of December 31, 2025, according to the NCUA's
  Quarterly Credit Union Data Summary: 2025 Q4, p. i (<a href="https://ncua.gov/analysis/credit-union-corporate-call-report-data/quarterly-data-summary-reports">https://ncua.gov/analysis/credit-union-corporate-call-report-data/quarterly-data-summary-reports</a>).
\d\ See 31 CFR 1020.210(b).
\e\ The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Master Account
  and Services Database (<a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/master-account-and-services-database-existing-access.htm">https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/master-account-and-services-database-existing-access.htm</a>) contains
  data as of November 30, 2025, on financial institutions that use
  Federal Reserve Bank financial services, including those with no
  additional Federal regulator. FinCEN used this data to identify 365
  banks and credit unions with no additional Federal regulator using
  Federal Reserve Bank financial services.
\f\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(G); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(2).
\g\ This estimate is based on U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
  (SEC) data on active broker-dealers, see Company Information About
  Active Broker-Dealers (last updated Oct. 1, 2026), December 2025 Data
  table (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/foia-services/frequently-requested-documents/company-information-about-active-broker-dealers">https://www.sec.gov/foia-services/frequently-requested-documents/company-information-about-active-broker-dealers</a>), which
  listed 3,277 active broker-dealers registered with the SEC as of
  December 31, 2025.
\h\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(I); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(10) and 31
  CFR 1010.100(gg).
\i\ This estimate is based on the number of registered investment
  companies filing Form N-1A in SEC's Annual Registered Investment
  Company Update: Form N-CEN Data, Period Ending December 2025 (May
  2026), table 1.3, p. 4 (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/files/annual-registered-investment-company-update-20260512.pdf">https://www.sec.gov/files/annual-registered-investment-company-update-20260512.pdf</a>).
\j\ See 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(H); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(8-9).
\k\ According to Commodity Futures Trading Commission data on FCMs, see
  Financial Data for FCMs, December 31, 2025 data, (<a href="https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/financialfcmdata/index.htm">https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/financialfcmdata/index.htm</a>), there were 66 registered
  FCMs as of December 31, 2025. The number of IBCs as of December 31,
  2025 (888) was obtained from the National Futures Association ``NFA
  Membership and Registration'' website (<a href="https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/membership-and-directories.html">https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/membership-and-directories.html</a>). Because
  deduplication of entities registered as both FCMs and IBCs was not
  feasible, this estimate may double-count some entities registered in
  both categories. FinCEN, however, believes this subpopulation may be
  small.

ii. Legal Entity Customers and Their Beneficial Owners
    Legal entity customers and their beneficial owners are also 
affected because covered financial institutions obtain and verify 
beneficial ownership information when a legal entity customer first 
opens an account and, as applicable, when facts call prior information 
into question or risk-based procedures otherwise require it. FinCEN 
cannot estimate the total number of unique legal entity customers or 
beneficial owners that may be directly affected parties from the 
estimated 5,465,250 \49\ annual responses projected using its 
historical methodology because that measure may include multiple 
responses for the same legal entity customer and information concerning 
multiple beneficial owners. Because the 1.5-account-per-day assumption 
that informed that estimate is based on limited information developed 
for the CDD Rule in 2016, and a 2024 banking-industry survey has since 
suggested that it may be low,\50\ FinCEN considers 5,457,750 a rough 
estimate and requests comments that include current data on legal 
entity account openings, including variation by institution type and 
size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for 
Financial Institutions Final Rule, 81 FR at 29448 (explaining that 
FinCEN had no direct data on annual legal entity account openings by 
small financial institutions and that the estimate, based in part on 
information from one very large financial institution, assumed small 
institutions would open at most 1.5 such accounts per day, and 
probably fewer); see also FinCEN, Agency Information Collection 
Activities; Proposed Renewal; Comment Request; Renewal Without 
Change of the Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Legal Entity 
Customers, 84 FR 72137, 72138 n.9 (Dec. 30, 2019); FinCEN, Agency 
Information Collection Activities; Proposed Renewal; Comment 
Request; Renewal Without Change of the Beneficial Ownership 
Requirements for Legal Entity Customers, 89 FR 14148, 14149 n.16 
(Feb. 26, 2024) (applying an average of 1.5 new legal entity 
accounts per business day to all covered financial institutions). 
Applying that rate to the 14,554 covered financial institutions 
identified in Table 1 and 250 business days yields 5,457,750 legal 
entity customer accounts opened per year (14,554 x 1.5 x 250). 
Industry comments suggest the estimate may be low, at least for 
banks.
    \50\ See American Bankers Association, Letter to FinCEN on CDD 
PRA Rule, Docket No. FINCEN-2024-0008, OMB Control No. 1506-0070, at 
5 (Apr. 26, 2024) (reporting that 92 percent of 141 surveyed banks 
disagreed with the 1.5-account estimate and that 94 percent of those 
respondents characterized it as ``very low''), <a href="https://www.aba.com/-/media/documents/comment-letter/clfincencdd20240426.pdf?rev=07c23ff3932e4fe5a5f3f7033bb57344">https://www.aba.com/-/media/documents/comment-letter/clfincencdd20240426.pdf?rev=07c23ff3932e4fe5a5f3f7033bb57344</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Current Market Practices
    Covered financial institutions currently use a range of processes 
to manage account-opening, customer due diligence, customer 
identification, and beneficial ownership information-related 
activities. These processes may be implemented through internal 
systems, third-party vendors, core processors, transfer agents, 
introducing and carrying broker relationships, or other operational 
arrangements, depending on the institution type and business model. 
Many covered financial institutions maintain customer or party master 
files and account master records that allow the institution to 
associate multiple accounts with the same legal entity customer. The 
degree of centralization, comingling of data and automation varies by 
institution size, product mix, and technology architecture.
    FinCEN expects that covered financial institutions have already 
developed policies and procedures to obtain and verify beneficial 
ownership information for legal entity customers and to update customer 
information on a risk basis. FinCEN also expects that some covered 
financial institutions have revised or begun revising their procedures 
in response to the February 2026 exceptive relief. As a result, the 
proposed rule is expected to align the text of the CDD Rule with 
practices that many

[[Page 74525]]

institutions may already have adopted or planned to adopt.
3. Description of Proposed Regulation
    For purposes of the RIA, FinCEN considered the various components 
of the proposed rule with a view towards the specific features or 
elements that may generate, either directly or indirectly, an economic 
benefit or cost or lead to changes in a market participant's incentives 
in a way that may generate economic benefits or costs.\51\ To balance 
the completeness of the RIA with the desire for expositional clarity 
and ease of tractability between the proposed regulatory text and 
sections IV (Section-by-Section Analysis) and IX (Regulatory Impact 
Analysis), FinCEN has included table2, to provide a mapping of the 
various components of the proposed rulemaking as presented in sectionIV 
to their analogous categorization in the RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See infra section IX.A.4.

                                 Table 2--Overview/Mapping of the Proposed Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Discussed in
      Elements of the proposed rule            Section IV           RIA        Proposed regulatory text location
                                                analysis       subsection(s)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revise the general requirement to clarify  IV.A.............  IX.A.3.........  1010.230(a).
 that covered financial institutions must
 establish and maintain written
 procedures reasonably designed to
 identify and verify the identity of
 beneficial owners of legal entity
 customers, and include such procedures
 in their AML/CFT programs.
Add ``countering the financing of          IV.A.............  IX.A.3.........  1010.230(a).
 terrorism'' to the reference to anti-
 money laundering compliance programs.
Replace the current requirement to         IV.B.1...........  IX.A.1, IX.A.3,  1010.230(b)(1)(i).
 identify and verify beneficial owners at                      IX.A.4.a,
 each new account opening with a timing                        IX.A.4.b,
 framework requiring identification and                        IX.C, IX.E.
 verification: (1) when the legal entity
 customer first opens an account with the
 covered financial institution; (2) when
 the institution has knowledge of facts
 that would reasonably call into question
 the reliability of beneficial ownership
 information previously obtained about
 the legal entity customer; and (3) as
 needed based on risk-based procedures
 for conducting ongoing customer due
 diligence.
Specify the minimum information that a     IV.B.2...........  IX.A.3,          1010.230(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(D)
 covered financial institution must                            IX.A.4.a,
 obtain about each beneficial owner,                           IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
 including name, date of birth, address,
 and an identifying number, unless risk-
 based procedures warrant obtaining more
 information.
Clarify that, for a U.S. person            IV.B.2...........  IX.A.3,          1010.230(b)(1)(ii)(D)
 beneficial owner, the required                                IX.A.4.a,
 identifying number is a Social Security                       IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
 number, and that for U.S. and non-U.S.
 persons, an ITIN is not an acceptable
 substitute for a Social Security number.
Clarify that, where warranted by other     IV.B.2...........  IX.A.1, IX.A.3,  1010.230(b)(1)(ii)
 risk indicators or supervisory concerns,                      IX.A.4.a,
 a covered financial institution may                           IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
 obtain additional information necessary
 to mitigate indicated risk or address
 supervisory concerns, including when
 relevant to assessing risks associated
 with fraud, identity misrepresentation,
 sanctions evasion, or other illicit
 financial activity, information relevant
 to lawful immigration status and
 employment authorization in the United
 States.
Permit covered financial institutions to   IV.B.3...........  IX.A.1, IX.A.3,  1010.230(b)(1)(iii)
 obtain required beneficial ownership                          IX.A.4.a,
 information from a third-party source,                        IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
 subject to compliance with the
 certification requirement.
Require a covered financial institution,   IV.B.4...........  IX.A.3,          1010.230(b)(1)(iv)(A)
 when obtaining beneficial ownership                           IX.A.4.a,
 information at the first account                              IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
 opening, to obtain a certification from
 the individual opening the account on
 behalf of the legal entity customer that
 the information obtained is accurate to
 the best of that individual's knowledge;
 retain use of the standardized
 certification form as optional.
Permit a covered financial institution,    IV.B.4...........  IX.A.1, IX.A.3,  1010.230(b)(1)(iv)(B)
 when obtaining beneficial ownership                           IX.A.4.a,
 information as needed based on risk-                          IX.A.4.b, IX.E.
 based ongoing CDD procedures, to rely on
 information previously obtained from a
 certification provided at the first
 account opening, provided that a
 representative of the legal entity
 customer gives oral or written
 confirmation that the information is up
 to date and accurate to the best of the
 individual's knowledge.
Clarify the verification cross-reference   IV.B.5...........  IX.A.3,          1010.230(b)(2)
 to the applicable CIP rules so that                           IX.A.4.b.
 covered financial institutions must use
 verification procedures containing the
 elements required for verifying the
 identity of individual customers, while
 avoiding ambiguity that the CIP
 information-collection list governs
 beneficial ownership information
 collection under the CDD Rule.
Retain the provision allowing a covered    IV.B.5...........  IX.A.3.........  1010.230(b)(2)
 financial institution to rely on
 information supplied by the legal entity
 customer regarding the identity of its
 beneficial owner or owners, provided
 that the institution has no knowledge of
 facts that would reasonably call into
 question the reliability of such
 information.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Anticipated Economic Effects
a. Expected Benefits
    FinCEN expects the proposed rule to produce several categories of 
benefits. First, codifying the relief from beneficial ownership 
identification and verification at every repeat account opening should 
reduce duplicative compliance activity. Covered financial institutions 
would be able to rely on beneficial ownership information obtained at 
the first account opening unless facts reasonably call the reliability 
of that information into question or risk-based procedures otherwise 
require additional or updated information. This should reduce 
repetitive customer outreach, duplicative collection of identification 
information, and associated account-opening delays.
    Second, the proposed rule should improve regulatory clarity. 
Codifying the February 2026 exceptive relief in the CDD Rule would 
reduce uncertainty about the continued availability and operation of 
that relief and would allow covered financial institutions to design 
policies, procedures, systems, and training around the text of the 
regulation. Clearer regulatory text may also promote more consistent 
supervisory expectations across covered financial institutions and 
functional regulators, possibly reducing examination costs.
    Third, the proposal should better align the CDD Rule with a risk-
based

[[Page 74526]]

approach to AML/CFT compliance. The proposal would preserve the 
ability, and where applicable the obligation, of covered financial 
institutions to update or obtain additional information when facts call 
previously obtained beneficial ownership information into question or 
when risk-based procedures indicate that additional or updated 
information is appropriate. At the same time, the proposal would avoid 
requiring covered financial institutions to repeat the same 
identification and verification steps at every account opening without 
regard to risk or whether the institution already has reliable 
information about the legal entity customer.
    Fourth, the proposed clarification concerning additional 
information in heightened-risk or supervisory-concern circumstances may 
help covered financial institutions resolve material compliance 
concerns involving fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions 
evasion, or other illicit financial activity. By clarifying that 
covered financial institutions may obtain additional information where 
warranted by risk indicators or supervisory concerns, the proposal may 
support more effective risk assessment while avoiding a categorical, 
one-size-fits-all requirement.
    FinCEN has not quantified these benefits at this stage because 
public data are limited regarding the number of repeat account openings 
by the same legal entity customer at the same covered financial 
institution and regarding the degree to which institutions have already 
implemented the February 2026 exceptive relief.
b. Expected Costs
    FinCEN does not expect the proposed rule to impose significant 
economic costs. The proposal would not impose a new obligation to file 
reports with FinCEN, would not require covered financial institutions 
to retain a new category of records, would not expand the population of 
covered financial institutions, and would not impose a new mandatory 
customer due diligence procedure for all accounts or all customers.
    Covered financial institutions may incur limited one-time costs to 
review the final rule and revise policies, procedures, forms, account-
opening workflows, monitoring processes, or training materials. FinCEN 
expects these costs to be small because covered financial institutions 
already maintain CDD policies and procedures and because the proposed 
rule generally aligns with existing exceptive relief and ordinary-
course risk-based due diligence practices. To the extent an institution 
has already implemented the February 2026 exceptive relief, any 
incremental implementation cost attributable to this proposal should be 
further reduced.
    FinCEN does not expect that its specification of information 
covered financial institutions must collect and exclusion of ITINs will 
impose significant costs. FinCEN believes its proposed regulatory text 
largely aligns with current practices, though some institutions may 
incur limited one-time costs to review the final rule and revise 
policies, procedures, forms, account-opening workflows, monitoring 
processes, or training materials accordingly.
    FinCEN does not expect the proposed clarification regarding 
additional information in heightened-risk circumstances to require 
covered financial institutions to collect additional information in 
every case. The proposed language would clarify that an institution may 
consider obtaining additional information where warranted by risk 
indicators or supervisory concerns and where the information is 
relevant to resolving material compliance concerns. FinCEN does not 
expect this clarification to result in significant recurring costs.
    FinCEN also does not expect the proposed rule to have significant 
adverse effects on competition, innovation, access to financial 
services, or market structure. By reducing duplicative collection and 
verification requirements, the proposal may reduce account-opening 
friction for legal entity customers, including small businesses.
5. Consideration of Alternatives
    In developing the proposed rule, FinCEN considered several policy 
alternatives, including alternatives specifically tailored to 
accommodate small entities that may otherwise be disproportionately 
burdened by regulatory compliance. FinCEN invites comment on these 
alternatives, and on any other alternatives that were not considered 
here but could reasonably be expected to accomplish the same policy 
objectives with equal or greater efficiency.
a. Alternative 1: Strictly Risk-Based Information Collection
    First, FinCEN considered adopting an entirely risk-based approach 
to the determination of the types of information that covered financial 
institutions would have to collect in order to identify and verify the 
identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers.\52\ In 
contrast to the proposed rule, the alternative considered would 
eliminate the proposed list of required information and instead grant 
covered financial institutions complete discretion to determine what 
information to obtain from a beneficial owner of a legal entity 
customer, based upon the institution's own risk-based analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ The proposed rule sets out a discrete list of information 
that a covered financial institution must obtain about each 
beneficial owner of a legal entity customer: name; date of birth; 
residential or business street address, or if the beneficial owner 
does not have a residential or business street address an Army Post 
Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO) box number, or the 
residential or business street address of next of kin or of another 
contact individual; and (1) for a U.S. person, a Social Security 
number (not including an ITIN), or (2) for a non-U.S. person, (a) a 
Social Security number (not including an ITIN); (b), a passport 
number and country of issuance; (c) an alien identification card 
number; or (d) a number and country of issuance of any other 
government-issued document evidencing nationality or residence and 
bearing a photograph or similar safeguard.
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    FinCEN believes that the proposed rule, which specifies certain 
information that a covered financial institution must collect, 
appropriately acknowledges a continuing need for a minimum standard, 
supplemented, rather than replaced, by tailoring based on risk. FinCEN 
is concerned that declining to set a minimum requirement for 
information to be collected across covered financial institutions would 
make it easier for illicit actors to enter into the financial system by 
persuading covered financial institutions that they are low-risk 
customers and therefore should not provide much, if any, identifying 
information, or by targeting covered financial institutions with less 
comprehensive CDD programs or less sophisticated risk-analysis 
capabilities. In return for focusing on heightened risks, the financial 
services industry as a whole might obtain some regulatory relief, but 
in FinCEN's judgment not significantly more than the proposal itself 
provides. Accordingly, FinCEN has opted against this alternative. This 
alternative could reduce compliance costs for some covered financial 
institutions by allowing them to collect less information for 
beneficial owners they determine to present lower risk. The cost 
savings would likely arise from reduced customer outreach, fewer 
information fields collected, and potentially shorter account-opening 
processes in low-risk cases. The magnitude of those savings, however, 
is uncertain and may be limited because the proposed rule already 
reduces duplicative compliance activity by eliminating repeated 
beneficial ownership identification and

[[Page 74527]]

verification at repeat account openings unless facts or risk-based 
procedures call for updated information. The proposed rule also already 
permits covered financial institutions to obtain additional information 
only where warranted by risk indicators or supervisory concerns, rather 
than imposing a categorical obligation to collect additional 
information in every case.
    This alternative would also likely provide greater discretion and 
potentially greater burden reduction in some low-risk circumstances, 
but at the cost of reduced uniformity, less regulatory certainty, and 
potentially weaker beneficial ownership transparency. This trade-off 
may be particularly important for smaller or less technologically 
sophisticated covered financial institutions. Although the alternative 
could appear less burdensome because it would allow such institutions 
to collect less information in some cases, it could also require them 
to make and document more case-specific judgments about what 
information is sufficient to identify and verify beneficial owners. 
That added discretion could increase uncertainty, training needs, 
supervisory risk, and inconsistency in implementation.
    FinCEN therefore expects that the proposed rule would better 
balance costs and benefits. Compared with the alternative, the proposed 
rule is expected to preserve more of the AML/CFT, countering fraud, 
countering sanctions-evasion, and countering illicit-finance benefits 
associated with a uniform beneficial ownership identification baseline, 
while still reducing burden through relief from duplicative collection 
at repeat account openings, greater flexibility to use third-party 
sources, and risk-based authority to obtain additional information when 
warranted. Accordingly, FinCEN preliminarily assesses that the 
alternative would likely provide, at most, modest additional compliance 
cost savings relative to the proposal, while presenting greater risks 
to regulatory consistency and the effectiveness of customer due 
diligence.
b. Alternative 2: Additional Data Collection Requirements
    FinCEN separately considered a version of the proposed rule that 
would have required covered financial institutions to collect 
additional information beyond what this proposal would require by 
expanding the list of information an institution must obtain about each 
beneficial owner of a legal entity customer beyond the beneficial 
owner's name, date of birth, address, and qualifying identifying 
number. The goal of such an enhanced data collection requirement would 
be to reduce uncertainty about whether the information that a covered 
financial institution can be relied upon to collect will be sufficient 
to perform a meaningful analysis of beneficial ownership-related risks.
    FinCEN believes that such an approach would be overly prescriptive 
and inconsistent with the aim of Executive Order 14406 to improve the 
risk-based nature of the CDD Rule by allowing financial institutions to 
focus on higher-risk customers, including those that present risks 
related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, and other 
unlawful activity. FinCEN believes that the proposed rule would ensure 
that covered financial institutions collect sufficient information 
concerning the beneficial owners of their legal entity customers, while 
providing the necessary flexibility for a covered financial institution 
to collect additional information for specific beneficial owners where 
such collection is warranted by risk. The small benefit in terms of 
increased regulatory certainty that the alternative would achieve would 
come at significant cost to covered financial institutions. Thus, 
FinCEN rejected this alternative approach.
    This alternative would likely produce greater regulatory certainty 
than the proposed rule by specifying additional information that 
covered financial institutions must obtain from each beneficial owner 
of a legal entity customer. A more prescriptive information-collection 
requirement could reduce ambiguity about whether an institution has 
collected enough information to conduct a meaningful beneficial 
ownership risk assessment and could promote more uniform practices 
across covered financial institutions.
    However, relative to the proposed rule, this alternative would 
likely impose materially greater costs, by requiring additional 
information in all cases, including for legal entity customers and 
beneficial owners that present lower risk and for whom the additional 
information may have limited marginal value. The principal costs of 
this alternative would likely include increased customer outreach, 
longer account-opening processes, additional form and system changes, 
additional training, and greater compliance and quality-control 
burdens. These costs would be recurring because institutions would have 
to collect any additional information for each covered beneficial owner 
whenever beneficial ownership information is required. The alternative 
could also increase burden on legal entity customers and beneficial 
owners by requiring them to provide additional information even when no 
risk-based factor suggests that the information is needed.
    FinCEN preliminarily assesses that the proposed rule better 
balances costs and benefits. Compared with the alternative, the 
proposed rule preserves a clear minimum standard, maintains flexibility 
to collect additional information in higher-risk circumstances, and 
avoids imposing additional recurring burden on all covered financial 
institutions, legal entity customers, and beneficial owners.
c. Alternative 3: Delayed Effective Date for Small Financial 
Institutions
    FinCEN separately and additionally considered modifying the 
proposed rule to provide a delayed effective date for small financial 
institutions as defined by the RFA, as a way of minimizing costs to 
small businesses. However, FinCEN does not believe that implementation 
of the proposed rule would impose a significant burden on small 
financial institutions, as much of the proposal is permissive rather 
than prescriptive or captures existing industry practices. 
Additionally, FinCEN is mindful that by introducing a staggered 
effective date by financial institution size, this may inadvertently 
create confusion or unequal burdens for the small businesses that are 
the legal entity customers of covered financial institutions by causing 
them to face different standards of information provision based on the 
size of the institutions where they maintain an account. Accordingly, 
FinCEN has opted against this alternative.
    This alternative could reduce near-term implementation burden for 
small covered financial institutions by giving them additional time to 
review the final rule and make any needed updates to policies, 
procedures, forms, workflows, systems, or training materials. A delayed 
effective date could be most useful in providing additional time for 
small institutions with less automated account-opening systems, fewer 
compliance personnel, or greater reliance on third-party vendors or 
core processors whose services might be more difficult to obtain or 
more expensive for small financial institutions if required to compete 
with larger institutions in the run-up to a universal, industry-wide 
effective date.
    FinCEN expects, however, that the incremental benefit of this 
alternative

[[Page 74528]]

would be limited. The proposed rule is not expected to impose 
significant costs because it would not expand the population of covered 
financial institutions, legal entity customers, accounts, or beneficial 
owners, and would not impose new mandatory reporting, recordkeeping, or 
customer information collection requirements. A delayed effective date 
for small financial institutions would also delay the benefits of 
regulatory clarity and burden reduction for those institutions.
    FinCEN preliminarily assesses that the proposed rule better 
balances costs and benefits. A delayed effective date for small 
financial institutions could provide some additional implementation 
flexibility, but the likely cost savings would be modest because the 
proposal is expected to reduce, rather than increase, recurring 
beneficial ownership collection and verification obligations. The 
proposed rule also aligns with practices that at least some 
institutions have already revised or begun revising in response to the 
February 2026 exceptive relief.

B. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14192

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the 
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, to the 
extent permitted by law, to select regulatory approaches that maximize 
net benefits, including potential economic, environmental, public 
health and safety, distributive, and equity effects. Executive Order 
13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, 
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and promoting flexibility.
    FinCEN has considered the expected costs and benefits of the 
proposed rule and does not anticipate that it would introduce an effect 
of $100 million or more on the economy in a given year. Notwithstanding 
a lack of expected economic significance under section 3(f)(1) of 
Executive Order 12866, the proposed rule has been reviewed by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and found to otherwise meet the 
criteria for a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, FinCEN has conducted the requisite 
regulatory impact analysis and included a summary thereof in section 
IX.A.
    FinCEN expects that this action, when finalized, would be an 
Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action because it is expected to 
reduce compliance burden and to have total costs less than zero. The 
proposal would codify relief from duplicative beneficial ownership 
identification and verification at repeat account openings and would 
not impose a new mandatory reporting, recordkeeping, or customer 
information collection requirement.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The RFA requires an agency either to provide an initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis with a proposed rule or to certify that the 
proposed rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule 
would apply to covered financial institutions, some of which are small 
entities. However, the proposal would not expand the categories of 
covered financial institutions, would not impose a new reporting or 
recordkeeping requirement, and would not require covered financial 
institutions to collect additional information in all cases.
    FinCEN expects that any one-time costs for small covered financial 
institutions would be limited to ordinary-course review of the final 
rule and conforming updates to policies, procedures, forms, training, 
or workflows. FinCEN expects those costs to be small because small 
covered financial institutions already maintain CDD procedures and 
because the proposal is expected to reduce rather than increase 
recurring beneficial ownership collection and verification obligations 
for repeat account openings. Accordingly, FinCEN certifies that the 
proposed rule, if finalized, would not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Section 202 of the UMRA,\53\ Public Law 104-4, requires that an 
agency prepare a budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule 
that may result in new, incremental expenditures by State, local, and 
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $193 
million or more in any one year ($100 million in 1995, adjusted for 
inflation).\54\ If a budgetary impact statement is required, section 
202 of the UMRA also requires an agency to identify and consider a 
reasonable number of regulatory alternatives before promulgating a 
rule. FinCEN has determined that this rule will not result in increased 
expenditures by State, local, and Tribal governments, or by the private 
sector, of $193 million or more. Accordingly, FinCEN has not prepared a 
budgetary impact statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ 2 U.S.C. 1532.
    \54\ The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis reports the annual 
value of the gross domestic product implicit price deflator for 
calendar year 1995 (the year UMRA was enacted) as 66.939, and as 
128.974 for calendar year 2025 (the most recent available). Thus, 
the inflation-adjusted estimate for $100 million is 128.974 / 66.939 
x $100 million, or $192.7 million. See U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Table 1.1.9. Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic 
Product, BEA Interactive Data Application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the PRA, an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person 
is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it 
displays a valid control number assigned by OMB. Written comments and 
recommendations for the proposed information collection can be 
submitted by visiting <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain</a>. Find 
this particular document by selecting ``Currently Under Review--Open 
for Public Comments'' or by using the search function. Comments are 
welcome and must be received by January 19, 2027.
    In accordance with requirements of the PRA, 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(2)(A), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, the 
following information concerns the collection of information as it 
relates to the amendments to covered financial institutions' AML/CFT 
program regulations.
1. Description of Affected Financial Institutions and OMB Control 
Numbers
    OMB Control Number(s): 1506-0020, 1506-0035, 1506-0081, 1506-0088, 
and 1506-0070.
    The proposed amendments, if adopted, may affect covered financial 
institutions' recordkeeping activities, and as a result, burdens 
incurred. To the extent that covered financial institutions' CDD-
related recordkeeping burdens are currently accounted for under FinCEN 
OMB control numbers, they have been so primarily under OMB control 
number 1506-0070,\55\ with additional components currently accounted 
for under 1506-0081 (applicable to Investment Advisers) \56\ or under 
proposal to be accounted for under OMB control numbers 1506-0020 
(Mutual Funds), 1506-0035 (Banks Without a Federal Functional 
Regulator), and 1506-0088 (PPSIs).\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See FinCEN, Agency Information Collection Activities; 
Proposed Renewal; Comment Request; Renewal Without Change of the 
Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Legal Entity Customers, 89 FR 
14148 (Feb. 26, 2024).
    \56\ See FinCEN, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: Anti-
Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and 
Suspicious Activity Report Filing Requirements for Registered 
Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers, 89 FR 72156, 
72261-64 (Sept. 4, 2024).
    \57\ See FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism Programs, 91 FR at 18746-50. As proposed, a 
covered financial institution would be required to establish and 
maintain a written AML/CFT program that includes: ``appropriate 
risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence, 
to include, but not be limited to: understanding the nature and 
purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a 
customer risk profile.'' Id.; see also OFAC and FinCEN, Permitted 
Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program 
Requirements, 91 FR 18582.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 74529]]

2. Estimated Annual Burden
    The PRA requires that agencies consider the impact of paperwork and 
other information collection burdens imposed on the public. FinCEN does 
not estimate any incremental burden under the PRA associated with this 
proposed rule because the proposal would not impose any new reporting, 
recordkeeping, or third-party disclosure requirement. The proposal 
would codify existing relief from the requirement to identify and 
verify beneficial owners at each repeat account opening and would 
clarify that covered financial institutions may obtain additional 
information in heightened-risk circumstances where warranted by risk 
indicators or supervisory concerns. The decision by a covered financial 
institution to obtain additional information in a particular case would 
depend on its own risk-based assessment and the need to resolve a 
material compliance concern. FinCEN requests comment on whether the 
proposed rule could reasonably be expected to introduce incremental PRA 
effects that should be identified and included in this burden analysis.
3. General Request for Comments Under the PRA
    Comments submitted in response to this proposed rule will be 
summarized and included in a request for OMB approval. All comments 
will become a matter of public record. FinCEN invites comments on: (1) 
whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper 
performance of FinCEN's mission, including whether the information 
shall have practical utility; (2) the accuracy of FinCEN's estimate of 
the burden of the collection of information; (3) ways to enhance the 
quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; (4) 
ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on 
reporting persons, including through the use of technology; and (5) 
estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services required to provide information.

F. Additional Requests for Comment

    1. FinCEN requests comment on the appropriate baseline and on any 
data that would help quantify cost savings relative to either baseline.
    2. FinCEN requests comment on current practices, including the 
extent to which covered financial institutions have already adjusted 
procedures, forms, systems, training, or quality-control processes in 
response to the February 2026 exceptive relief.
    3. FinCEN requests data on the distribution of accounts per legal 
entity customer, the annual number of repeat account openings by legal 
entity customers, the time required to collect and verify beneficial 
ownership information at repeat account openings, and the extent of any 
implementation costs or savings associated with the proposed rule.
    4. FinCEN requests comment on whether the proposed clarification 
could cause covered financial institutions to change policies, 
procedures, training, systems, or customer-facing practices in ways 
that would generate incremental costs not identified here.
    5. FinCEN requests comment on any potential distributional effects, 
including whether the proposal would have different effects across 
banks, brokers or dealers in securities, mutual funds, futures 
commission merchants, and introducing brokers in commodities, or across 
small and large covered financial institutions.
    6. FinCEN requests comment on the expected cost savings and any 
potential costs associated with implementing the proposed rule.
    7. FinCEN invites comment from small entities on all aspects of its 
certification pursuant to RFA requirements that the proposed rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, including any data on implementation costs, 
cost savings, or operational effects.
    8. FinCEN requests comment on the extent of any one-time 
implementation costs and on whether such costs vary materially by 
institution type or size.
    9. FinCEN requests data on the distribution of accounts per legal 
entity customer, the annual number of repeat account openings by legal 
entity customers, the time required to collect and verify beneficial 
ownership information at repeat account openings, and the extent of any 
implementation costs or savings associated with the proposed rule.

List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 1010

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Authority 
delegations (Government agencies), Banks, Banking, Brokers, Business 
and industry, Citizenship and naturalization, Commodity futures, Crime, 
Currency, Electronic filing, Federal savings associations, Federal-
State relations, Fiduciaries, Foreign banking, Foreign currencies, 
Foreign persons, Gambling, Holding companies, Indians, Indians--law, 
Indians--tribal government, Insurance companies, Investigations, 
Investment companies, Law enforcement, Penalties, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Savings associations, Securities, Small 
business, Terrorism, Time.

Amendment to FinCEN Regulations

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network proposes to amend 31 CFR part 1010 as follows.

PART 1010--GENERAL PROVISIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 1010 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1829b and 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314 
and 5316-5336; title III, sec. 314, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 307; 
sec. 2006, Pub. L. 114-41, 129 Stat. 457; sec. 701 Pub. L. 114-74, 
129 Stat. 599; sec. 6403, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388.

0
2. Section 1010.230 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
    (a) In general. Covered financial institutions are required to 
establish and maintain written procedures that are reasonably designed 
to identify and verify the identity of beneficial owners of legal 
entity customers and to include such procedures in their anti-money 
laundering/countering the financing of terrorism program required under 
31 U.S.C. 5318(h) and its implementing regulations.
0
b. Revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
    (b) Identification and verification. With respect to legal entity 
customers, the covered financial institution's customer due diligence 
procedures shall enable the institution to:
    (1) Identify the beneficial owner(s) of each legal entity customer, 
unless the customer is otherwise excluded pursuant to paragraph (e) of 
this section or the account is exempted pursuant to paragraph (h) of 
this section.
    (i) Timing. A covered financial institution must identify the 
beneficial owner(s) of a legal entity customer:
    (A) when the legal entity customer first opens an account with the 
covered financial institution;

[[Page 74530]]

    (B) any time thereafter when the covered financial institution has 
knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into question the 
reliability of beneficial ownership information previously obtained 
about the legal entity customer; and
    (C) as needed based on a covered financial institution's risk-based 
procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence.
    (ii) Information necessary for identification and verification of 
identity. A covered financial institution must obtain information about 
each beneficial owner sufficient to allow the covered financial 
institution to identify, and to verify the identity of, the beneficial 
owner. The financial institution must obtain, at minimum, the 
information described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A)-(D) about each 
beneficial owner, and may obtain additional information as described in 
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(E):
    (A) name;
    (B) date of birth;
    (C) residential or business street address, or if the beneficial 
owner does not have a residential or business street address an Army 
Post Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO) box number, or the 
residential or business street address of next of kin or of another 
contact individual; and (D) (1) for a U.S. person, a Social Security 
number (not including an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number), or 
(2) for a non-U.S. person, (i) a Social Security number (not including 
an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number); (ii) a passport number 
and country of issuance; (iii) an alien identification card number; or 
(iv) a number and country of issuance of any other government issued 
document evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a photograph 
or similar safeguard.
    (E) Where warranted by other risk indicators or supervisory 
concerns, including but not limited to indicators of risks associated 
with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other 
illicit financial activity, the covered financial institution may 
obtain additional information useful in mitigating risk or addressing 
supervisory concerns, including but not limited to information relevant 
to lawful immigration status and employment authorization in the United 
States.
    (iii) Sources of Information. Subject to compliance with the 
certification requirement in paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of this section, a 
covered financial institution may obtain any information described in 
paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section by acquiring it from a third-party 
source.
    (iv) Certification.
    (A) When obtaining information at a time described in paragraph 
(b)(1)(i)(A) of this section, a covered financial institution must 
obtain a certification from the individual opening the account on 
behalf of the legal entity customer that the information obtained is 
accurate to the best of the individual's knowledge. This certification 
may, but is not required to, take the form of the certification in 
Appendix A of this section.
    (B) When obtaining information at a time described in paragraph 
(b)(1)(i)(C) of this section, a covered financial institution may rely 
on information to which a certification provided in connection with 
obtaining information at a time described in paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A) of 
this section applies, provided that a representative of the legal 
entity customer provides oral or written confirmation that such 
information is up to date and accurate to the best of the individual's 
knowledge. Written confirmation may, but is not required to, take the 
form of the certification in Appendix A of this section.
    (2) Verify the identity of each beneficial owner identified to the 
covered financial institution, according to risk-based procedures, to 
the extent reasonable and practicable. At a minimum, these procedures 
must require collection of information specified in paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii) and contain the elements required for verifying the identity 
of customers that are individuals under Sec.  1020.220(a)(2), other 
than Sec.  1020.220(a)(2)(i), of this chapter (for banks); Sec.  
1023.220(a)(2), other than Sec.  1023.220(a)(2)(i), of this chapter 
(for brokers or dealers in securities); Sec.  1024.220(a)(2), other 
than Sec.  1024.220(a)(2)(i), of this chapter (for mutual funds); or 
Sec.  1026.220(a)(2), other than Sec.  1026.220(a)(2)(i), of this 
chapter (for futures commission merchants or introducing brokers in 
commodities); provided, that in the case of documentary verification, 
the financial institution may use photocopies or other reproductions of 
the documents listed in paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A)(1) of Sec.  1020.220 of 
this chapter (for banks); Sec.  1023.220 of this chapter (for brokers 
or dealers in securities); Sec.  1024.220 of this chapter (for mutual 
funds); or Sec.  1026.220 of this chapter (for futures commission 
merchants or introducing brokers in commodities). A covered financial 
institution may rely on the information supplied by the legal entity 
customer regarding the identity of its beneficial owner or owners, 
provided that it has no knowledge of facts that would reasonably call 
into question the reliability of such information.

Jenna H. Casanova,
Acting Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2026-23614 Filed 11-18-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P


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Indexed from Federal Register on November 19, 2026.

This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.